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This thesis consists of three self-contained essays. We study undesirable behaviors such
as cheating and self-sabotaging in contests in a laboratory environment.
The rst paper proposes a new anti-doping policy. In a conditional superannuation
scheme, athletes have to pay a certain fraction of their proceeds from sports into a fund from
which they can draw only well after their careers and if they have never been caught doping.
Theoretically, this fund has two important advantages over conventional anti-doping policies
such as bans and nes. It does not lose its deterrence eect when athletes approach the
end of their careers (unlike bans), and it can deal with the widespread problem that drug
cheats are often only found out much later when the detection technology has caught up
with doping practices. We build a model of a dynamic sporting contest, implement it in the
laboratory and compare the performance of our policy to that of traditional policies. Our
policy compares favorably with respect to doping prevention and the quality of resulting
sporting contests.
In the second paper, we study a tournament that rewards not only winners but also losers
with extremely bad performance, which creates an incentive for underdogs to under-perform
deliberately. Such a contest scheme is often employed to improve the long term competitive
balance. We design two treatments, with or without the leaderboard, to investigate whether
social status can reduce this self-sabotaging behaviour. The leaderboard of all participants'
ranked performance is used as a proxy of social status. Our results show that underdogs
respond to the monetary self-sabotaging incentives in contests. In addition, individuals
tend to self-sabotage just enough when the leaderboard is displayed to everybody. Without
the leaderboard, players self-sabotage more excessively. We conjecture that by achieving
exactly the level of performance that gives the consolation prize, tankers in the leaderboard
treatment want to signal that they understand the game well and they tanked to receive the
consolation prize.
iii
The third paper addresses an agency problem in a contest between two contestants, each
with a manager. Individuals that are engaged in contests have strong incentives to cheat.
Sanctions are designed to deter potential cheaters. Often other agents in the contestant's
team (e.g., a coach of an athlete) or company (a manager of an R&D engineer) have a
benet from cheating and can inuence on the cheating decision. If only the contestant is
punished for cheating, an agency problem arises. We show theoretically, that extending the
liability from the contestant to the manager reduces cheating only if nes are suciently
high. Otherwise over-all cheating rate increases. Experimental tests conrm that for high
nes joint liability is eective in reducing cheating, while predicted detrimental eect of joint
liability when nes are low does not materialise.
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In economics it is generally accepted that a contest is a good mechanism to increase moti-
vation and to improve productivity. While individuals have incentives to put forth greater
eort in contests, they also have greater incentives to cheat if that is possible (Faravelli et al.,
2015). Dishonesty in contests can take various forms. Almost all kinds of cheating in contests
fall into one of two broad categories: cheating to win and cheating to lose (Preston and
Szymanski, 2003). Cheating to win refers to contestants attempting to increase their
relative performance articially to get ahead. This could be athletes abusing drugs to
improve athletic performance in professional sports or employees sabotaging co-workers when
competing for promotion within a corporation.
Counter-intuitively as it is, cheating to lose means contestants under-performing de-
liberately in order to lose. This incentive problem is often created as a by-product of
the need to maintain long term competitive balance. In major sports leagues, the draft
order is determined by the inverse order of previous season's standings, with the worst
performing team receiving the rst pick (or the largest probability to get the rst pick if
a draft lottery is used). This design gives teams that are not good enough to have a shot
at the championship an incentive to race to the bottom by losing deliberately with the
aim of improving their position in the draft. While perverse draft incentives are specic to
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professional sports, there are other domains where very bad performance is more benecial
than just bad performance. In the context of industrial policy, where governments intervene
to support domestic industries, government handouts might increase with worse performance.
In this case a deliberately bad rm performance might pay once the resulting subsidies are
accounted for.
In reality, contests often suer from agency problems that exacerbate the cheating incen-
tives. A contestant is often paired up with an agent who assists the contestant in the contest.
Think of an athlete and her coach in sports or a subordinate and her senior manager during
a promotion period. In what follows we refer to this additional agent (i.e., coach, senior
manager) as a manager. In a contestant-manager relationship, the contestant's cheating
decision can be inuenced by the manager. For example, a coach may ask an athlete to take
illicit substances to boost performance, or a team doctor might inject an athlete with banned
substances without her knowledge. A senior manager may suggest an investment banker to
recommend inferior nancial products for a higher commission in order to get promoted.
Agency problems arise when the manager has some control over the cheating decision and
manager's incentives dier from that of the contestant. Misaligned incentive often exists
because the manager's remuneration package is usually positively related to the contestant's
performance, while punishment for detected cheating only aects the contestant. Think of
an athlete who are banned for using drugs, with no direct consequence to her coach. Think
of a investment banker who is red for breaking the rules, with no direct consequence to her
senior manager. Such agency problems imply that the standard deterrence of punishing a
cheating contestant solely may be ineective.
In his seminal work on crime and punishment, Becker (1968) shows that deterrence
regimes generally have two distinct features, the magnitude of the punishment and the
probability of being caught. The relative eciency of sanctions is typically studied through
comparing the relative impact of detection probabilities and ne levels by varying them while
keeping the expected punishment constant. The discussion of specic forms of sanctions in
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the literature is relatively limited. Therefore, this thesis which consists of three self-contained
essays, investigates dierent forms of dishonest behaviors and appropriate deterrence mech-
anisms that curb specic cheating behavior in contests-like situations. Since cheating is
usually conducted secretly in real life, reliable data from the eld is not available. In addition,
given a specic contest, the manipulation of deterrence mechanisms for the purpose of eld
experiments is practically impossible. Consequently, we use laboratory experiments for our
empirical tests.
In Chapter 2, we study doping behavior in sports contests among three heterogeneous
players and examine whether an innovative anti-doping scheme of conditional superannua-
tion, is more eective at reducing doping than two traditional anti-doping instruments: nes
and bans. In reality, dopers who are tested positive for performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs)
could face nes and/or bans. However, testing technologies, despite of their continuous
improvement, cannot keep abreast of new developments in PEDs. When there are no tests
to detect more sophisticated PEDs or doping methods, the practices are risk free at the time
of engaging in misconducts. To overcome the problem of delayed detection, we propose a
conditional superannuation system, under which athletes are required to put a part of their
winnings and sponsorship money into a superannuation account. After retirement, they are
allowed to access the money paid into this account only if they have never been found guilty
of doping.
To investigate the likely impact of such a policy, we rst build a model of a three-player
dynamic contest game. Three players are heterogeneous in the sense that they have dierent
time-varing abilities assigned to them. Each player has to make a doping decision rst
and then an eort decision. A player's performance is determined based on the ability,
the eort and the doping decisions. We then introduce three dierent anti-doping schemes
to the contest. Due to the complexity of the game, solving for the subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium is impractical. It is possible to make some predictions on cheating and eort
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though. We can establish that cheating is reduced at the expense of competitiveness (i.e.,
lower eort exertion).
We set out to test empirically which anti-doping measure is the most ecient in reducing
cheating but not eort. For this we take our model to the lab and use a real eort task in
which experimental subjects have to perform in four dierent treatments: (i) a benchmark
treatment where no penalty is applied, (ii) a ne treatment, (iii) a ban treatment and (iv) a
conditional superannuation treatment. In each treatment, individuals have to conduct four
sets of real-eort tasks under two payment schemes. After measuring subjects ability in the
real eort task under the piece rate scheme, they compete three times against the other
two subjects in a contest. The three anti-doping policy treatments are made comparable
by choosing the treatment specic parameters such that the expected loss from detected
cheating across treatments are the same.
While the theory suggests the same deterrence eect, using a pooled logistic regression
model, we observe that the conditional superannuation scheme yields a lower amount of
cheating than both the ne and the ban schemes. We run a pooled OLS model on eort
exertion and nd that none of the anti-doping policies reduces the competitiveness of the
game signicantly. This contradicts the theoretical model predictions. Moreover, the eort
level is slightly higher in the conditional superannuation treatment than the ne treatment.
Together with its important advantage of being eective with delayed detection, we conclude
that the conditional superannuation scheme is more ecient than traditional schemes.
In Chapter 3, we examine self-sabotaging behavior in contests between two players of
dierent ability - a favorite and an underdog. This captures situations where underdogs
have an incentive to lose deliberately instead of trying to win. The incentive to self-sabotage
exists in contests where not only the winner but also losers that perform particularly badly
are rewarded. Typical examples of such contests are match-xing and major sports leagues
that award priority draft picks to the worst performing teams. Since there is no clear line
between losing deliberately or losing genuinely, it is dicult, if not impossible, to clearly
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identify self-sabotaging in practice. As a result, no direct deterrence mechanism is ever
used to target this undesirable behavior. In standard economic models where money is the
only concern, underdogs should always self-sabotage for nancial gains in a penalty-free
environment. This is clearly not always happening in reality. We hypothesize that due
to image concerns, underdogs are willing to engage in a costly status seeking activity by
sacricing the monetary gain for a higher rank in contests.
In order to test whether and how people respond to the self-sabotaging incentive, we
implement a real-eort task under two payment schemes in the baseline treatment where
deliberate under-performance is allowed. In the rst part of this treatment, subjects have to
attempt eight addition questions under a piece rate scheme. Subjects can choose between
submitting an answer or skipping the question. For each and every question, subjects are
notied if their rst submission is incorrect and asked if they would like to attempt the
question again. This enables a subject to proceed without changing an obviously wrong
answer. Once all eight questions are completed, subjects are ranked and paired up according
to their performance such that each contest contains one favourite and one underdog. The
paired subjects compete with each other in solving a new set of eight addition questions over
three periods. A subject gains one point for solving the question, loses one point for making
an incorrect submission and gains nothing for missing the question. At the end, the winner
receives 15 AUDs and the loser receives nothing. However, we compensate those particularly
bad performing losers (i.e., those who have a nal score of one or less) with 5 AUDs as a
consolation prize. This creates the monetary incentive for underdogs to achieve a lower score
than they should be (i.e, to lose with a score of one or less). The design allows us to study
and derive clean measures of two forms of self-sabotaging behavior in a controlled manner,
active self-sabotaging and lack of trying. The former refers to when underdogs make
obvious wrong entries and the later refers to when they skip the question without trying.
Our treatment variation, is the introduction of a leaderboard in the contests. This enables
us to test if subjects engage in costly status seeking activities. At the end of each contest in
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one treatment, a leaderboard that displays rankings, scores and prole pictures of all subjects
in a session is shown to the public. If the preference for a higher rank exists, underdogs are
expected to self-sabotage less frequently in this treatment.
Our results provide evidence that underdogs self-sabotage for monetary gain. We identify
both types of self-sabotaging to have taken place in our experiment. Our model suggests
that it is optimal for an underdog to start o trying for higher scores, and only active
self-sabotaging if and only if the winning probability becomes suciently low. However,
we nd that the majority of underdogs do not play according to the theoretical optimum.
Instead, our data shows that those worst performing losers skip the questions right from the
beginning. Namely, underdogs are more likely to exhibit lack of trying behavior, rather
than active self-sabotaging. For the variation of the availability of the leaderboard, the
amount of self-sabotaging decisions is insensitive to the leaderboard. However, the degree
of self-sabotaging is signicantly less severe in the leaderboard treatment where underdogs
tend to self-sabotage just enough for the monetary gain. That is, the propensity to stick to
the maximum score that still yields the consolation prize (i.e., nishing with a nal score
of exact one) is higher when the leaderboard is shown. We conjecture that by doing this,
underdogs send a signal to the public that they understand the experiment well, rather than
having weak basic math skill.
In Chapter 4, we investigate an under-researched agency problem in contests. In a contest
between two contestants, each contestant works together with a manager as a team by
simultaneously deciding on whether the contestant should cheat or not. Within each team,
one of the two individual cheating decisions is randomly selected as the contestant's nal
decision. Knowing the cheating decisions of all players, contestants compete with each other
by exerting costly eort to gain a share of a xed monetary prize. Since the contestants are
the ones who carry out unethical actions, by default they receive the whole punishment if
caught cheating. Since there is no consequence for the manager to cheat, an agency problem
arises due to the conict of interest between the contestant and the manager. Because
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the later always has the incentive to cheat even if cheating harms the former. Extending
punishment to the manager is the obvious candidate to solve the agency problem.
Our setting consists of two punishment schemes, an individual liability scheme where
the ne is borne by the contestant alone and a joint liability scheme where the same ne is
shared by both the contestant and the manager. We compare the two schemes in terms of the
average cheating rate in equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis shows that the joint liability
scheme does not guarantee a lower rate of cheating than the independent liability scheme.
The equilibrium deterrence eect of the punishment schemes is dependent on the size of
the ne (and the eectiveness of cheating). When the ne is high (or cheating is relatively
ineective), then joint liability results in an over-all reduction of cheating. When the ne is
low, the joint liability scheme backres in equilibrium with a higher rate of cheating than in
the individual liability scheme. The intuition for the backring is as follows: the total (low)
ne is sucient to deter contestants from cheating. Now this low ne is spread across the
contestant and the manager. Since manager's and contestant's incentives are not perfectly
aligned, a shared small ne does not change the manager's cheating behaviour but increases
the cheating incentive of the contestants.
Based on these theoretical predictions, we use a two-by-two treatment design to study
cheating behavior with the presence of the agency problem in the laboratory. On one
dimension, we vary the punishment schemes (individual vs. joint). On the other dimension,
we vary the magnitude of the ne (low vs. high). We obtain four treatments: joint liability
with high ne, joint liability with low ne, individual liability with high ne, and individual
liability with low ne. The parameters are chosen such that joint liability theoretically
should reduce cheating in the high-ne treatments but should backre if the ne is low.
The experimental data reveals that managers are less likely to cheat under the joint liability
scheme than under the individual liability scheme, regardless of the size of the ne. However,
contestants only react to joint liability by cheating more when the ne is low. Overall, we nd
that the joint liability high ne treatment outperforms the other three treatments. While
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the theory prediction shows that the deterrence eect of the joint liability low ne treatment
should be lowest, we observe the same deterrence eects across the joint liability low ne
treatment and the independent liability treatments (high ne and low ne). Overall, the
empirical results suggest that joint liability performs at least as good as individual liability,
which leads to the policy suggestion that backring of joint liability is less of a concern than
predicted by the theory. Moreover, we also nd no treatment eect on contestants' eorts.
The major factor that aects the competitiveness is the implemented cheating decision of the
team. Taking the opponent's cheating decision as given, over-exertion of eort is signicantly
higher if one's own implemented decision is to cheat. This suggests that contestants become




An Experimental Comparison of
Anti-Doping Measures in Sporting
Contests
2.1 Introduction
The use of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) is rife in many competitive sports. Over the
past years, cycling, weightlifting and boxing are the three Olympic sports in which PED-use
by athletes is documented to be most extremely widespread. Especially in the cycling world,
doping, which was allowed in the early years of the Tour de France, has become more frequent
rather than less after its ban in the mid-1960s. After the revelations around the the drug
use of the then legendary cyclist Lance Armstrong, public trust in conventional prevention
measures has reached a low point. Currently, a drug cheat that is caught might lose a
considerable amount of money (loss of sponsorship, prize money, etc.) and will typically
be banned from competing for a certain period of time. The current anti-doping regime
has two considerable weaknesses. Since doping practices are typically slightly ahead of the
test technology, many cheats are only caught years after the actual doping happened. This
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severely reduces the deterrence eect of the loss of prize money and sponsorship contracts,
as well as that of bans. Athletes can count on having nished their career by the time they
are nally caught. Secondly, the current system of bans fails to provide strong anti-doping
incentives to athletes that are close to the end of their careers. If I am planning to retire
soon anyway, then a potential future ban does not feature much in my decision to dope or
not.
In the light of the disadvantages of the current system, we are proposing an alternative
or supplementary measure: conditional superannuation. Athletes have to contribute part
of their winnings and (ideally sponsorship money) into a pension fund and will only receive
payments out of the fund at some elapsed time after their career if they have never been
found guilty of doping. This measure has the potential to overcome these two disadvantages
of the current system. The athlete's balance will increase during their career, which ensures
that the loss from being found guilty increases over time. Hence, the deterrence eect is
maximized at the end of the career, when bans lose their eectiveness. Moreover, it is
possible to set the date when a decision on payouts is made such that enough time has
elapsed and testing of old samples with modern techniques has made sure that no cheating
that could not be detected previously has occurred.
While in theory, advantages of conditional superannuation appear to exist, it is unclear
how athletes actually react to such a measure. It considerably changes doping incentives
but also incentives to exert training eort over an athlete's career. The changing incentives,
together with general-equilibrium eects stemming from athletes competing with others,
makes it hard to evaluate the likely performance of a conditional superannuation system on
the base of theory alone. For this reason, we implement dierent measures in a real-eort
contest experiment with the salient characteristics of sports contests and compare their
performance. Three experimental subjects compete in three consecutive contests for prize
shares, where the share of a prize an athlete receives is determined by a linear contest-success
function with performances being the input. Subjects' performances are determined by three
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components: (i) the training eort, which is measured as the real eort in an adding-up task;
(ii) an endogenously given time-varying ability parameter and by (iii) the doping decision.
We compare the behavior under three dierent anti-doping regimes: (i) a ne regime, where
a doper pays a ne in the magnitude of her prize share for the period she was caught
in; (ii) a ban regime, where a caught doper is excluded from the next contest and (iii)
the conditional superannuation regime, where an athlete will be paid the withheld fraction
of their prize money only if they were never caught doping. In order to make the three
treatments comparable we calibrate the models by choosing enforcement parameters such
that the expected loss from doping is equalized across treatments. As a benchmark, we add
a control treatment without any anti-doping policy in place.
We nd that our conditional superannuation policy does clearly better at deterring
athletes from doping than bans. This is mainly due to the problem that bans lose their
deterrence eect once an athlete has decided to retire. The superannuation policy is also
slightly better at deterring doping than nes. While this dierence is not large and only
marginally signicant, we consider conditional pension funds superior to nes. The reason
is that our scheme in the experiments also delivers better competition through higher eorts
than the ne regime. An additional advantage of the conditional superannuation scheme
over nes, which we abstracted from in our simple experiments, is the important feature
that it can make use of delayed detection.
2.2 Related literature
Tournaments are used as an incentive device to allocate resources eciently. Ehrenberg
and Bognanno (1990) show the incentive eect of tournaments by studying a set of golf
tournament data. They nd that by adjusting the reward structure and the prizes in
tournaments, players' performance can be inuenced directly. In tournaments, it is the
participants' relative performance that determines their payo. Compared to other common
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incentive schemes, such a noncompetitive piece rates, tournaments can often increase average
eort levels, with a positive eect on output levels (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). However, unlike
any noncompetitive payment scheme, competition discourages cooperation. Not only that,
it can cause destructive activities such as sabotage (Lazear, 1989). By sabotaging, a player
might damage other competitors' performance with the intent of increasing their own chance
of winning. Lazear (1989) addresses the problem of sabotage in a theoretical framework and
shows that the smaller the prize gap between winners and losers, the lower the incentive to
sabotage. Sabotage is not the only drawback in tournaments. The problem of cheating (i.e.
doping in sports) is another severe issue.
While there is not much empirical work that looks at doping prevention, the ght against
doping has been looked at theoretically. The early literature on doping using game and
decision theoretical methods is nicely summarised in Dilger et al. (2007). Typically, the
doping decision generates a social dilemma situation: everybody staying clean is socially
optimal, but individually athletes have an incentive to dope. Berentsen et al. (2008) introduce
a whistle-blowing mechanism into a two-player game in which the loser can pay to report the
winner for doping after the competition. Only the reported winner needs to take drug tests.
The paper conducts a comparison of the whistle-blowing game with the normal inspection
game where a third party has the nal say on whether to test the winner or not. This
whistle-blowing mechanism is more eective in lowering the probabilities of doping, and
whistle blowing can induce a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Furthermore, this mechanism
is less costly as it requires fewer tests relative to the normal inspection game. Gilpatric
(2011) models doping as a continuous (instead of a dichotomous) variable.1 He studies
two aspects of enforcement and nds that, rstly, correlated audits are more eective in
reducing doping compared to independent audits. Secondly, an anti-doping policy that
gives losers the prize money by default if winners get caught can reduce doping incentives.
The latter result is in line with what Curry and Mongrain (2009) found in their paper,
1Kräkel (2007) arrived at similar results in a less general environment.
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which focuses on the deterrence problem. In one of the most recent papers that specically
explores doping behavior, Ryvkin (2013) models a symmetric winner-take-all tournament
game with an uncertain number of participants. In addition to the the general results that
are along the lines of previous ndings, his result of a non-monotonic penalty-testing frontier
is of special interest. In a nutshell, the non-monotonic penalty-testing frontier describes the
relation of the socially optimal equilibrium in which doping does not exist and the number of
participants determined endogenously in the game. The minimal size of the penalty to stop
doping is a non-monotonic function of the number of contestants. An individual's likelihood
of winning the prize declines sharply with the number of potential contestants if there are
already many competitors. Therefore, doping is less attractive to players in a massively big
competition and doping-deterring nes decline. However, if the number of participants is
moderate, then the marginal benet of doping outweighs the cost of sharing the prize money
with additional players. Hence, the incentive of doping grows with the number of contestants
and nes have to increase. Similarly, the probability of getting caught that ensures a clean
game in equilibrium as a function of the number of participants is also non-monotonic.
We are not the rst to propose alternative ways of tackling the doping problem. First of
all, there is always the option to reduce the doping incentives by modifying elements of the
contest such as attening the price schedule (Eber and Thépot, 1999) or making the sanctions
for detected cheating rank-dependent (Berentsen, 2002). A range of similar proposals aim at
establishing a social norm of non-doping in a sport, which then becomes self-enforcing due
to social preferences (Breivik, 1992). Concrete proposals involve scrapping the list of banned
substances with athletes keeping drug diaries (Bird and Wagner, 1997; Andre, 2016).
Most of the existing empirical literature tests theoretical contest models with cheating in
a controlled laboratory environment (Cason et al., 2010; Curry and Mongrain, 2009; Faravelli
et al., 2015). This stems from the fact that doping is forbidden in real-word competitions,
and therefore, eld data on doping suers from a severe observability problem. Abstract
laboratory contests can either be conducted with real-eort tasks. More often then not,
14
however, studies do not require any real eort by the participants. Instead, they simply
have to choose numbers that represent eort levels with induced costs. Nonetheless, in real
life work involves eort, fatigue, boredom, excitement and other aectations not present in
the abstract experiments (Van Dijk et al., 2001).
As a consequence real-eort tasks have become more prevalent in experiments. Two of
the most often used real-eort tasks are the Slider Task where subjects need to move slider
bars on their screen to a predetermined position (Gill and Prowse, 2012) and the Matrix
Task in which subjects have to collect numbers from given matrices to obtain a sum of 10
(Mazar et al., 2008). Both tasks require subjects to concentrate and repeat the same task,
just like in a training process. However, neither of them capture the fact that as the training
program continues, it progressively becomes more dicult to increase the performance as a
consequence of increased training. To capture this feature we employ a task (summing up
strings of one-digit numbers), which become increasingly dicult, as the number digits that
have to be summed increases over time. One problem of real-eort tasks in experiments is
often that the intended eort cost stemming from the task are not salient. Rather, subjects
enjoy the tasks and also do not have any opportunity cost of time for working on the task,
which leads to eorts becoming non-responsive to economic stimuli. For this reason, we
induce eort cost by paying a wage for the time subjects do not use in the eort task (See
Gächter et al., 2016, for a dierent clever way of inducing eort cost). Under this setup
subjects lose money with every second they work on the eort task.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.3 describes the theoretical
framework of a heterogeneous N -player game under four types of punishment mechanisms.
Section 2.4 illustrates the design of the experiment, which is based on our theoretical model.
Section 2.5 reports the results from the analysis of the data. The paper concludes in Section
2.6.
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2.3 The Underlying Model
Our model investigates four dierent enforcement regimes: (i) a penalty-free system; (ii) a
ne system; (iii) a ban system; and (iv) a superannuation-fund system. In this section, we
rst discuss the penalty-free model in detail and then describe the three anti-doping regimes.
In general it will not be possible to solve out for Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria. Hetero-
geneity in ability (in the subjects adding-up ability), together with complex enforcement
regimes that have dynamic incentive eects make it impractical to solve for equilibrium.
Hence, we derive a variety of predictions that can be derived without explicitly solving for
equilibrium. We start with the penalty-free environment.
2.3.1 Heterogeneous N -Player Dynamic Competition without En-
forcement
In the baseline model without penalties, n risk-neutral players participate over T consecutive
seasons, which consist of one sports contest each. All players are indexed by i where i ∈
I = {1, 2, 3, · · · , n}. It is assumed that athletes maximize their career expected payos.
We assume that an athlete's performance qi in a season depends on on her training eort
ei, natural ability ri, and doping decision di. Unlike some of the aforementioned literature,
eort and performance are two dierent concepts in our paper. Intuitively, a higher training
eort level or ability implies a better performance. In addition, performance can be enhanced
by using performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) regardless of the potential health damages
caused by such behavior in the long run. We assume these three factors to be complements,
which implies that an increase of any of these factors increases the marginal impact of any
of the other factors. The performance is simply assumed to be the product of the factors:




1 di = 0
δ di = 1




is the lowest ability level and
−
r is
the highest ability level among all players. A player who does not dope will have a doping
multiplier of unity, while a doper receives a multiplicative performance boost of δ > 1.
It is important to note that the doping decision, di, is a dichotomous choice variable with
values of 0 for non-dopers and 1 for dopers. In what follows, we refer to the two possible
actions as C for clean and D for doping. Note that eort and doping (ei and di) are the
only two choice variables in this model.
In each season subjects compete in a share-prize contest. In many sports individual
contests use winner-take-all-like compensation schemes (e.g., virtually all elite tennis tour-
naments). However, instead of modeling a specic sports contest, we are interested in a
certain period of the athlete's career or a whole season they played, which contains many
competitions. We are also not only interested in the prize money athletes can earn but also
in other kinds of performance-based income during that period, such as annual salary from
clubs and sponsorship and advertising income. A share-contest setting was chosen, since
there the payo in a season depends on the relative performance of an athlete, which is very
realistic. For simplicity, we just call this season payo, despite its broader meaning, prize
money. Once all individual performances are measured, an athlete's relative performances
can be observed. We use the following simple linear contest function:




where wi ∈ [0, 1] is the prize share received by i. The dierence between player i's perfor-
mance, qi, and the average performance of all other n − 1 athletes, q−i, is represented by
4qi, where q̄−i =
∑
q−i/(n − 1). The parameter β denotes the reactivity to performance
dierences, and the last constant term, 1/n ensures that every player receives the same share
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if 4qi = 0∀i.2 The price shares of all competitors sum to one. Note that the contest-success
function falls into the class of functions where success depends on the dierence of eorts,
which are less often used than eort-ratio based functions such as the very popular Tullock
contest-success function. While eort-dierence based contest-success functions are used
less frequently than others, they still play an important role in the literature (see e.g.
Baik, 1998; Che and Gale, 2000; Skaperdas and Vaidya, 2012). The purpose of using a
linear eort-dierence contest-success function is simplicity. On the other hand, our model
has a limitation of losing some key features in the environment where doping is an issue.
For example, one's choice of doping in contests normally depends on other competitors'
decisions to using doping, whereas our model yields a result that athlete's cheating decision
is independent of other athletes. However, other components of our environment are already
reasonably complex. Hence, we chose a simple contest function with potential confusion of
participants in mind.
To derive the expected payo E(πi) for player i, we have to specify the eort cost of
training and total prize money. We assume that the eort cost C(ei) satises C
′
(ei) > 0
and C(0) = 0. The total prize money is denoted by V. The expected payo in a season, as
a result, is given by
E(πi) = wiV − C(ei). (2.3)
Substituting the prize share function 2.2 into the payo function 2.3, the expected payo for















2Note that keeping shares between 0 and 1 requires a restriction on β.
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Given the payo functions, player i is assumed to maximize her payo by choosing a
training level ei and by making a doping decision, di. The rst-order condition for the
optimal training level requires
C
′
(e∗i (di)) = βV riδ(di). (2.4)
Hence, in our simple linear setting, player i's eort decision does not depend on what
other players are doing. Also, the larger the prize, V , the more eort an athlete puts into
training. Additionally, the optimal eort level is higher for dopers than non-dopers, as doping
increases the marginal return to eort.3
Now, suppose that these contests are repeated multiple times and that the only parameter
that varies is the athlete's ability level, rit. Player i at any time t0 maximizes his or her
payo from the future periods by choosing the optimal eort level as well as the best doping


















V − C(eit). (2.5)
Observe that in the case without enforcement, decisions are period-wise independent.
Since there is no enforcement and ceteris paribus wit(d = 1) > wit(d = 0), the optimal
choice is to dope in all periods and to choose the eort according to Equation 2.4.
Remark 2.1. In equilibrium, subjects always dope in the penalty-free treatment.
2.3.2 Heterogenous N -Player Dynamic Competition with Fines
Now suppose a ne system is introduced to prevent athletes from doping. In this dynamic
game, dopers have a positive probability (p) of being caught. The ne for being caught is
3 To see this, note that βV riδ > βV ri ⇒ C
′
(e∗i (di = 1)) > C
′
(e∗i (di = 0))⇒ e(di = 1)∗ > e(di = 0)∗.
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the loss of the total prize share. The chance of being falsely convicted for doping is zero by
assumption.





= {[1− p(dit)]witV } − C(eit) (2.6)
p(dit) =

p dit = 1
0 dit = 0
where eit, rit, wit and p(dit) represent player i 's eort level, ability level, prize share and
probability of getting caught. The variable p(dit) is a function of dit, representing a positive
probability of being caught doping, p, for PED-using athletes and 0 for all clean players.





















V − C (eit) .
Player i chooses the optimal training level in every period starting from the current
period with the aim of maximizing the future payo under the ne system. Observe that 
as in the no-penalty regime  the choices only impact payos in the current period. Hence
optimal eorts are given by similar rst-order conditions.
We have the following ndings on eorts in the ne system:





= βV rit. (2.7)
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= (1− p)βV ritδ. (2.8)









is ambiguous. If (1−p)δ > 1, player









vice versa. In our experiment, the probability of getting caught (p) and the doping eciency
(δ) are set to 30% and 1.2, respectively, which implies that equilibrium eorts are higher
without doping (as (1 − p)δ = 0.7 × 1.2 = 0.84 < 1). Similarly, we can compare the eorts
of dopers and non-dopers in the penalty-free and ne treatments.
Remark 2.2. For the same ability ri a doper will exert higher eort in the penalty-free
treatment than in the ne treatments, while non-dopers will exert the same eort.
We now turn to the doping decision:
1. The expected payo in any period t, given player i plays C and exerts the optimal



















2. Likewise, the expected payo, given player i plays D is























With the anti-doping ne, the dierence between a doper's payo and a non-doper's
payo depends not only on their respective performances, but also on the other competitors'
average performance, which in itself depends on the competitors abilities, eorts and doping
decisions. Since the eort-cost functions are unknown and might dier across athletes, we
cannot fully characterize the equilibrium. We can derive the following prediction though.
Remark 2.3. Ceteris paribus, in the ne treatment the incentive to dope increases with the
expected average performance of the competitors.
This is the case, since the dierence between the doping and non-doping payo increases
in the average performance of the others. The intuition behind this is that there is less to
lose from being caught doping if the competitors perform well and leave little of the share
to the athlete. To summarize, the ne regime reduces both the incentives to dope and
dopers' incentives to exert eort. It is also worth noting that for time-invariant values of the
probability of getting caught doping (p) and the doping eciency (δ), doping decisions across
dierent periods are independent in the ne regime. This implies that whatever happened
in previous seasons should have no impact on current behaviour.
2.3.3 Heterogenous N -Player Dynamic Competition with Bans
In the ban treatment, an athlete who is caught doping will not be allowed to compete in
the next season. The detection probability p remains the same as in the ne treatment.4




in the current period (t0) is identical to that in the






= wi,tV − C(ei,t).
4In reality, some bans extend to multiple seasons. In our model, however, the basic case with a one-season
ban is studied.
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While dopers can keep their prize money in the current period, they will be banned from
next season's competitions and will receive a payo of zero:
E(πbi,t+1)) = [1− p(di,t)]{wi,t+1V − C(ei,t+1)}.
We focus rst on eorts. In the current period (t), player i maximizes the payo by
choosing the optimal eort, eb∗i,t.






= βV rit. (2.9)






= βV ritδ. (2.10)
Remark 2.4. Eorts conditional on the doping decision in the ban regime are identical to
those in the penalty-free regime.
While the optimal eorts are independent of anticipated behavior in future decisions, doping
decisions depend on planned own and expected behavior of others in the future. Obviously,
in the nal season of an athlete, future bans have no deterrence eect.
Remark 2.5. In the nal period all players dope in the ban treatment.
In the penultimate period, a player will foresee that if not caught she will dope in the nal
period and therefore will compare the contemporaneous gain from doping and the expected
loss from next period. So, doping is protable if
E(πit|D)− E(πit|C)− pE(πi,t+1|D) > 0.
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In an earlier period, the condition for doping also depends on the planned doping decision
in the following period. In general, we can say that the doping incentive increases with the
ability in the current period and decreases with the ability in the following period. This is
indeed the case, as the contemporaneous gain from doping, E(πit|D) − E(πit|C), increases
with the ability, while the expected loss, pE(πi,t+1|D) > 0, increases with ability in the
following season.
Remark 2.6. Ceteribus paribus, we expect more doping in period t < T the higher rit and
the lower ri,t+1.
2.3.4 Heterogenous N -Player Dynamic Competition with Condi-
tional Superannuation
The conditional superannuation fund policy refers to an arrangement whereby athletes
have to make a compulsory contribution (to their super fund in each season). The contribu-
tion is a xed proportion λ of their season's prize money. Early access to the accrued benets
is prohibited under this mechanism. Athletes can make withdrawals from their super account
post-retirement if and only if they are not caught violating anti-doping policy in any period.
In other words, if a doper is caught once during their career, they lose their entire fund
balance. Moreover, the contribution is compulsory and needs to be made continuously until
the end of their sports career. Again, dopers face the same probability of getting caught
doping (p) as in the other regimes.
Under this regime, a player who is caught doping in a certain period leads to the loss of
past and expected future superannuation payments. This makes the decision for an athlete
very complex. However, if an athlete had been caught at any stage in the career, then the
future optimal behavior is straight forward. Recall that then further doping no longer has
additional cost and regardless of the doping behaviour any future price money will be taxed
at tax rate λ. Consequently, all caught dopers will dope in the future and the optimal eort
is determined by C
′
(es∗it (D)) = (1− λ)βV ritδ.
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On the other hand, if player i has never been caught previously and is coming up to
decide in period t0 the the relevant future payo is
E (Πsi ) =
T∑
t=t0











If a player is planing not to dope in the future, then the optimal eort in all future
periods is equal to the non-doping eorts in the other environments.
Remark 2.7. An athlete under the CSF scheme, who has not yet been caught and plans
never to dope in the future, will choose the same eort as all non-dopers in the ne and ban
treatments.
More generally, the rst-order condition for the eort of an athlete in period t0, with a
















Remark 2.8. In the superannuation treatment, for a given doping decision in the current
period the current eort declines with the number of planned future doping seasons.
The intuition behind this is simple. The more often future doping is planned, the higher
the probability of being caught at least once and  therefore  the lower the expected
superannuation return from this period's prize money. Whether a doper optimally exerts
more eort than a non-doper is ambiguous (similarly to what is found under a ne system).
In our experiment, with p = 0.3, δ = 1.2 and λ = 0.35, it turns out that a once-o doper
optimally exerts more, while repeat dopers optimally exert less eort than a player who
plans always to stay clean.
The doping decision in the CSF treatment is extremely complex, as the expected loss from
doping in a certain period depends on the future plans of doping and on eorts for all possible
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contingencies but also on the superannuation already accrued. Since the contemporaneous
gain from doping increases with own ability, we can at least make the following remark.
Remark 2.9. In the CSF treatment, ceteribus paribus, the likelihood of doping increases with
ability.
2.4 Experimental Design
Based on the model, our experiment includes four treatments, namely (i) a punishment-
free treatment, (ii) a ne treatment, (iii) a ban treatment and (iv) a conditional super-
annuation fund (CSF) treatment. To complement the theoretical analysis of the dierent
anti-doping regimes above, we study and compare their eectiveness in the laboratory. All
subjects started with a non-competitive real-eort task which was paid via a piece-rate.
This is the same real-eort task that was used in the subsequent three-period contest with
a doping option. The purpose of the piece-rate task before the actual contest is to allow the
participants to familiarize themselves with the task. Additionally, the piece-rate performance
can be used as a productivity measure that is not inuenced by competition. In the real-eort
task, subjects had to add strings of single-digit numbers. This task diers from most existing
mental arithmetic tasks used in previous research, as in our task items become increasingly
dicult. The rst question involves adding two randomly generated single-digit numbers.
After the participant solves this question correctly, the subject moves on to the next item,
which requires the addition of three single-digits, then four, ve and so on. We use this
arithmetic task for two reasons. Firstly, it is easy to understand and requires no prior
knowledge. Secondly, it allows us to generate increasing marginal costs of working on the
tasks. For this we allowed participants to decide when they wanted to stop working on the
task and paid them one Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) per second not used out of
the maximum of 240 seconds. As the time requirement to solve another task increases with
the tasks solved to far, the opportunity cost of solving an additional sum also increases.
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Participants should optimally stop when the benet of solving an additional sum (piece rate
or higher share of prize money) is exceeded by the opportunity cost.
In the initial xed-rate eort task, subjects were paid 15 ECUs for every sum solved in
addition to the one ECU per second left after they quit adding numbers. So, participants
should optimally stop exerting eort, whenever they realize that solving the next sum requires
more than 15 seconds. In the three-period contest game with doping, participants are divided
into groups of three, where each period they (after deciding on doping) compete for a share
of a prize of 600 ECUs. The share is determined according to the contest-success function
detailed above. Note that eort in our experiment is determined by the total number of
solved additions. For example, if a subject solves ve tasks, the eort level is then ve.
Here, a participant should optimally stop exerting eort once the additional share of the
prize gained for another unit of eorts falls short of the opportunity cost (which is equal to
the number of seconds required to form the next sum).
2.4.1 Parameters for Determining Performance
The relevant variables to calculate participants' share of a prize in a particular contest
round are the performances qit. As in the theoretical model, the performance score qit for
participant i in period t was determined by multiplying three factors: the time-varying ability
level (rit), the doping bonus (δ(dit)) and the eort (eit), which was equal to the number of
solved sums:
qit = ritδ(dit)eit.
To dierentiate players within a group, in each period we assign three dierent ability
levels to the group members: low (rLit = 2), medium (r
M
it = 3) and high (r
H
it = 4). Every
subject has dierent ability levels in their three periods, and no two group members have
the same ability level in the same period. Hence, the average ability was identical in each
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period and all subjects had each of the ability levels exactly once. Subjects knew the ability
levels of all three group members for all three periods in advance.
In all treatments and periods, players were asked if they want to cheat or not (to improve
their scores in that round). Subjects were aware of the treatment-specic consequences of
detected cheating. The cheaters received a cheating bonus of 20% on their performance (i.e.,
δ(di) = 1 if di = 0 and δ(di) = 1.2 if di = 1). Next, subjects were asked to calculate sums in
order to establish their eort level. They could decide when to stop solving sums. Once the
performances were determined, the shares of the prize were determined. The reactivity to
the performance dierence, β, from Equation (2.2) was set to a value of 1/100. This implies
that the price money for contestant i in period t becomes





where qit − q−it is the dierent between i′s performance and the average of the other two
group members' performance. In addition to the share of the prize money, players were also
paid 1 ECU per second not used for calculating sums from the eort stage. The same process
was repeated in the next two periods. The dierence across periods were the altered ability
parameters.
In order to make the three dierent anti-doping enforcement schemes comparable, it was
necessary to choose the parameters such that the expected losses from detected doping were
equalized. In the ne, ban and CSF treatments, the probability of detection was set to 0.30.
Recall that any subject's gain in the share-prize competition consists of two parts: the prize
share and the saved time, or:
Payoff = Prize Share+ Time Saved.
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In the ne treatment, if one gets caught, he or she loses all the prize money in that round,
but could still keep the money from saving their time at the rate of 1 ECU per second. The
expected loss for dopers in any period is
E(Lossfine) = p× Prize Share = 0.3× Prize Share. (2.12)
Making the Ban and Fine Treatments Comparable
In the second treatment, the captured doper is banned from the following period and is
paid merely a xed base salary, S, during the period of suspension. Given that dopers who
are found guilty of using PEDs are not allowed to participate, their share of the prize is
automatically lost and therefore, the expected loss for rst-time dopers in this case is
E(Loss) = p× (Prize Share+ Time Saved)− pS
=0.3× (Prize Share+ Time Saved)− 0.3S.
Under the assumption of identical doping behavior and eort exertion in the ne and
ban treatments, setting expected losses under both schemes equal allows us to determine
a residual payment for a banned subject. It turns out that using the behavior of subjects in
the ne treatment as the common behavior, a residual payment of S = 110 ECU equalizes
expected losses. Note that these expected losses are only accruing in the rst two periods,
since a ban has no deterrence eect in the last period.5
Making the CSF and Fine Treatments Comparable
In the CSF treatment, the compulsory contribution, λ, needs to be determined. Assuming
that θ is the probability that an individual dopes in any period the total expected loss under
5The problem of a missing competitor in a group due to a ban was solved by substituting the performance
of another player in the session into the share-price calculation.
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the CSF system can then be expressed as the probability of getting caught at least once
multiplied by the total contribution over the three periods:
E(Total Losssuper) = (1− (1− pθ)T )(TλPrize Share)
=(1− (1− 0.3θ)3)(3λPrize Share).
In order to solve for the equalizing contribution rate, this expected loss is equalized with
the expected loss in the ne treatment from (2.12). Simplifying and assuming identical
behaviour yields
(1− (1− 0.3θ)3)λ = 0.3θ.
Invoking again the same-behaviour assumption, the probability that a player dopes in any
period θ is taken directly from the ne treatment data. There are 11 dopers out of 63
participants in every period under the ne system, producing a probability of 11/63 if a
random player and period is picked. Solving out, the equalising CSF contribution rate
becomes 35% of the prize money.
2.4.2 Laboratory Implementation
The experiment used subjects drawn from the population of the University of Adelaide
Experimental Lab (AdLab) Database. Sessions for this experiment were conducted at the
computer laboratory of the University of Adelaide. There was a total of 270 participants
in twelve sessions for four treatments, which were recruited using Ben Greiner's ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). Each of them were allowed to register for one session only. Before the experi-
ment started, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer in the lab. Communication was
forbidden once the subjects entered the lab. The experimental treatments were programmed
in Urs Fischbacher's Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The instructions were provided at the
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beginning of each part and were read aloud by the experimenter. Before the competition
part of the actual experiments began, subjects had to answer a set of control question
regarding the contest success function. Subjects were paid at the end of the experiment at
the exchange rate of one AUD for 70 ECU. Participants earned about 17 AUD on average
for one hour of their work.
2.5 Results
This section presents our results. Our aim is to identify which anti-doping regime does
best in preventing doping but without overly reducing eorts. First, we report results that
provide an overview over aggregate dierences across treatments. We conduct regression
analysis on the level of an independent observation. A deeper analysis of doping behavior
follows, where we exploit the panel structure by estimating random-eect panels. Finally,
we compare eort levels in the four treatments using individual-level observations and panel
data analysis.
2.5.1 Aggregate Results
In our experiment, group members remain xed for all three periods, which means that
every group forms an independent observation. As a result, group average values are used
in the non-parametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests used to investigate treatment
dierences. Table 2.1 shows the group doping fraction, group average eort level and group
average payos in our four treatments: (i) No punishment system; (ii) Fine system; (iii)
Ban system; and (iv) Conditional Superannuation Fund treatment, under both piece rate
and share-prize contest payment schemes. The fraction of doping is calculated as the total
number of doping actions experimental subjects took divided by the total number of doping
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decisions within a group over the three periods. In treatments (i), (ii) and (iv), the total
number of doping decisions made is nine. In the Ban treatment, the number of doping
decisions in a group can be smaller as suspended players did not have a choice.
Table 2.1: Fraction of Doping, Average Eort and Average Payos in the Four Treatments
Types of N Probability of Average Average
Punishments Participants Doping Eort Payos
Piece Rate
No punishment 78 9.385 250.859
Fine 63 9.206 240.349
Ban 60 10.117 237.433
CSF 69 10.101 218.420
Share-prize Contest
No punishment 78 0.872 9.350 974.518
Fine 63 0.175 8.899 936.518
Ban 60 0.306 9.852 953.453
CSF 69 0.106 9.725 900.920
According to Table 2.1, the fraction of dopers in the three treatments with enforcement
is signicantly lower compared to that in the No-punishment treatment (p < 0.0001 for
all pairwise comparisons).6 In terms of the doping fraction in the three treatments with
punishments, the Fine and CSF treatments have a signicantly lower probability of doping
than the Ban treatment, with p = 0.0104 and p = 0.0002, respectively. The lowest
probability of doping is observed in the CSF treatment. However, it is not signicantly
dierent from that in the Fine treatment (p = 0.1649). On aggregate, our anti-doping
policies discourage subjects' doping eectively compared to the No-punishment treatment.
Furthermore, the CSF and Fine systems are more eective than Bans.
The average eort level is higher in the piece rate setting than in the contest for all
treatments. This eort dierence between the two incentive schemes is, however, not signif-
icant. The p-values of a Wilcoxon singed-rank test for matched group averages are 0.8588
6All tests on doping use two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests, with the fraction of doping decisions in a group
over the three rounds as an independent observation.
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for the No-punishment, 0.6513 for the Fine, 0.9702 for the Ban, and 0.4653 for the CSF
treatments. In the piece-rate game, all subjects were provided with identical instructions
regardless of which treatment they participated in, and therefore, no treatment eects should
be observed. If there are any, they are credited to natural individual dierences. In our case,
treatments have no signicant impact on average eort under the piece rate scheme (p-values
of 0.6215 for No-punishment versus Fine, 0.4038 for No-punishment versus Ban, 0.2639 for
No-punishment versus CSF, 0.1826 for Fine versus Ban and 0.8401 for CSF versus Ban,
respectively). However, there is a weakly signicant eect comparing the CSF to the ban
treatment (p = 0.0974). In the share-prize contest, in which treatment dierences are to be
expected, surprisingly, only one treatment dierence is signicant. In the CSF treatment,
we observe a weakly signicant positive eect on eort level compared to the Fine system
(p = 0.0602). Similarly, there are no big dierences in payos in the share contests. Aside
from the Bans compared to Fines (p = 0.0602), payo dierences in the share-prize contests
across treatments are not signicant and remarkably small.
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the proportion of dopers over the three periods in all
four treatments. Unsurprisingly, the No-punishment treatment has the highest proportion
of dopers with values above 80% for all three periods. Based on our model, all players
should dope under this system because there are no consequences of doping. The reason
behind the existence of some non-dopers is likely be the existence of some moral cost. On
the other hand, the probability of doping within the CSF treatment is always lowest among
all punishments in each period and lies in the range between 10% and 17%. The proportion
of dopers under the Fine system is slightly larger than that under the CSF. As for the Ban
treatment, doping fractions in the rst two periods are similar to those observed in the Fine
and CSF treatments, while this proportion soars to a much higher level (60%) in the last
period. This is as predicted by the theory. With respect to doping prevention, nes and
conditional superannuation are preferable to bans, since they do not suer from the lack of
deterrence in the last season of a competitor.
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Figure 2.1: Probability of Doping Over Time
Figure 2.2 illustrates an overview of the eort level in the four treatments. Subjects' av-
erage eort levels typically lie within the interval [8.5, 10]. A monotonically-increasing eort
level over the three periods is found under the No-punishment, Fine and Ban treatments,
indicating that subjects from these three treatments became more and more competitive
in the contest. Moreover, subjects in the Ban treatment exerted the highest eort level in
all the periods compared to those who were in the No-punishment treatment. Participants
under the Fine system had the lowest eort level in all periods. As far as the CSF treatment
goes, the average eort level decreases from period 1 to period 2, but then climbs to a new
higher level in period 3.
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Figure 2.2: Average Eort Levels Over Time
In Figure 2.3, the trends of average period prot in the contest for the four treatments
are presented. Firstly, the No-punishment, the Fine and the Ban system have very similar
average prots and all of them experience a moderate decrease in prots over the three
periods. This prot decline is consistent with the increasing competitiveness in the contest,
as displayed in Figure 2.2. Recall that subjects in the CSF treatment were required to make
a contribution out of their prize money into their super account and the account balance
will be returned to them as a lump sum in period 3 if they were not caught cheating in any
period. Due to this property, prots are much lower in the rst two periods of the CSF
treatment but much higher in the nal period, compared to the other three treatments. As
is the intention of a superannuation scheme, a part of the income is delayed.
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Figure 2.3: Average Period Prot Over Time
Fact 2.1. The aggregate results provide some support for our conditional superannuation
scheme. It delivers lower doping frequencies than bans, without the eort damaging eect of
nes.
In what follows, we will have a deeper look and will investigate if the results persist, when we
analyze individual behaviour. We start by checking if individuals's eort choices are roughly
rational.
2.5.2 Eorts, Optimality and Prots
In what follows we dig deeper into individual dierences in eort exertion behaviour and
the impact of treatments. We are interested to understand how the dierent treatments
impacted eort levels once we control for the innate mental calculation ability of subjects.
We have seen above that on aggregate, the CSF treatment yielded higher eorts than the
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ne treatment, while dominating the ban treatment on the doping-prevention front. Now,
we want to investigate if this observation still holds if we look at the individual level and
control for subject characteristics that, if unevenly distributed across treatments, could be
responsible for the results. First, we want to check if eort provision (i.e. the number of sums
subjects chose to solve) in the baseline task with a piece rate payment is roughly rational
and if there are dierences in rationality across treatments. Recall that up until the piece
rate task the treatments are identical, which means that if we observe signicant dierences
in the level of rationality across treatments, which persist once we control for characteristics,
then there would be doubt that the observed treatment dierences in the competition rounds
are causal.
To check this, we generate a variable capturing how close a subject came to optimality
when deciding when to stop exerting eort. The variable captures the net marginal benet
of the last-solved sum. A subject maximises her payo if the net marginal benet of the
last-solved sum is positive, while the net marginal benet of the next sum would be negative.
The gross marginal benet is xed at 15 ECUs (i.e. the piece rate), while the marginal cost
varies depending on the time an individual spends on the real-eort task. Recall that for
every second used for solving the task questions, 1 ECU is deducted. Thus, marginal cost
is equivalent to the seconds spent on an additional question. As a consequence, a negative
value for the optimality variable (i.e. the net marginal benet for the last-solved sum)
suggests over-exertion of eort. Conversely, a large positive net benet indicates, that it
is likely that further eort would have been optimal. Figure 2.4 shows the distributions
of the net marginal benet of the last-solved sums across treatments. The distributions
are very similar. The median subject (line within the boxes) in all treatments shows slight
over-exertion of eorts. Mann-Whitney U-tests reveal that the location of the distributions
are not signicantly dierent. This implies that the degree of rationality in choosing when
to stop forming sums does not signicantly dier across subjects in dierent treatments.
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Figure 2.4: Box Plot of the Net Marginal Benet of Eort in the Piece Rate Task
Table 2.2 reports a linear regression that conrms this nding. Here, we regress the
optimality variable on individual characteristics (gender, age, degree, high-school math
courses taken and arithmetic ability) of participants and on treatment dummies. The
regression conrms our observation, as no signicant dierences across the treatments are
found. Interestingly, none of the individual characteristics, except the arithmetic ability of
subjects, had an inuence on how well the subjects chose when to stop adding up numbers.
Our variable capturing the calculation ability measures the calculation speed of a person
relative to the speed of the fastest person in our sample. Suppose a person solved x sums.
Then, her innate calculation ability was measured as the time it took the fastest person to
solve x sums, divided by the time it took her. Hence, our measure takes a value of one for
the fastest person and, for example, assigns a value of 0.5 to a person who took twice as
much time calculating than the fastest person. We nd that the innate calculation ability
has a strongly signicant positive impact on the net marginal benet of the last sum solved.
This eect is driven by participants with low calculation ability over-exerting eort. We
conclude that for our analysis of individual treatment-specic doping and eort decision it is
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necessary to control for innate calculation ability in order to exclude the possibility that our
results are driven purely by random dierences in calculation ability across subjects assigned
to dierent treatments.
Table 2.2: OLS Estimation of Optimality in the Piece-Rate Task
Model OLS
Dependent Optimality













*** Sig. at the 1 % level, **Sig. at the 5 % level, *Sig. at the 10 % level
2.5.3 Individual Doping Behaviour
In this section, we check if our aggregate results on doping behaviour are robust in the sense
that they survive an in-depth analysis, whereby we control for individual characteristics.
We conduct random-eect regressions on the binary variable, dope, which captures if a
subject doped. Recall that we have three subjects each competing three times with one
another. Therefore, we have to take into account the correlation within a subject's behaviour
across time and across subjects and time. There are dierent strategies to deal with this 
explicit modeling of the dependencies or allowing for clustering by adjusting standard errors.
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We report the results for both, clustered standard errors at group level, and random-eect
models.7
Table 2.3 presents four specications. Specications 1a and 1b estimate average treatment
eects on the likelihood of a subject doping, while specications 2a and 2b further investigate
where the treatment eects come from. We control for innate calculation ability, assigned
ability and subject characteristics. Specications 1a and 1b yield large and signicant
negative average marginal eects for all three treatments with enforcement.
Fact 2.2. Doping occurs signicantly more often without enforcement than under any of the
three deterrence regimes.
In both the random-eect model and in the model with clustered standard errors, dop-
ing prevention with Bans is signicantly less eective than with Fines or a CSF ( p ∈
[0.001,0.021] for the two pairwise comparisons in the the two specications). The CSF further
tends to lower the doping frequency when compared to the Fine treatment. However, this
dierence is only weakly signicant (p = 0.0658 in 1a and p = 0.0827 in 1b). One possible
explanation for the better performance of the CSF regime is loss aversion. Although 35%
of athlete's winning prize is allocated to the superannuation fund every round, this fund is
still a part of her total wealth accumulated. Therefore, subjects with loss-averse preferences
are less prone to dope to avoid losing this part of wealth acquired in the previous periods.
However, the possible impact of loss aversion on cheating is not the same in the Fine and the
Ban treatments since those who are caught cheating are never endowed with the monetary
payo lost at the rst place. Therefore, although the expected loss is made the same across
three treatments, loss aversion could play a role on deterring cheating in the CSF treatment
but not in the Fan and the Ban treatments.
7We also estimated a multi-level eect model that allowed for random-eects at both the group and
subject level. The contribution of the random intercept at the group level to explaining the variance in
doping was not signicantly dierent from zero.
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Fact 2.3. The CSF system tends to be more eective in deterring doping compared to both
the Fine system and the Ban system. The Ban system has the weakest deterrence eect
among the deterrence systems.
Surprisingly, both the innate mental calculation ability as well as the exogenously as-
signed ability level have no signicant eect on the doping decision. This is surprising, since
theory predicts that doping should be more protable for higher-skilled athletes. In speci-
cations 2a and 2b, we add period dummies and a nal-period-ban treatment interaction.
Recall that a Ban should not have any deterrence eect on doping in the last season of
an athlete's career. This is also the case in our experiment. By adding a dummy for the
nal period in the ban treatment, we can check if this is driving the results that the Ban
treatment does less well in doping prevention than the others. This is exactly what we nd.
The coecient is highly signicant and large. Moreover, once we control for this end-game
eect, the probability of doping in the Ban treatment is no longer signicantly dierent to
the other enforcement methods (p > 0.8617and p > 0.8489 versus Fine; p > 0.1869 and
p > 0.1542 versus CSF ). So, the poor performance of the Ban system is entirely driven by
the lack of deterrence in the last period. The slight advantage of the CSF system over the
ne is robust and persists in both extended specications.
Fact 2.4. The weaker performance of the ban system stems entirely from the lack of deter-
rence in the last season.
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Table 2.3: Estimated Marginal Eects on Doping Probabilities
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b
Panel Logit Pooled Logit Panel Logit Pooled Logit
RE individual clustered group RE individual clustered group
Calculation Ability -0.1393 -0.1611 -0.1501 -0.1663
(0.1184) (0.1127) (0.1179) (0.1129)
Assigned Ability (base = Low)
Medium -0.0258 -0.0259 -0.0277 -0.0264
(0.0274) (0.0280) (0.0260) (0.0280)
High 0.0295 0.0296 0.0318 0.0294
(0.0281) (0.0302) (0.0264) (0.0302)
Period (base = Period 1)
Period 2 0.0075 0.0085
(0.0266) (0.0246)
Period 3 0.0179 0.0175
(0.0300) (0.0301)
Treatment (base = No Enforcement)
Fine -0.7017*** -0.6992*** -0.6761*** -0.6761***
(0.0425) (0.0465) (0.0445) (0.0477)
Ban -0.5676*** -0.5711*** -0.6850*** -0.6869***
(0.0494) (0.0452) (0.0462) (0.0499)
CSF -0.7773*** -0.7739*** -0.7582*** -0.7571***
(0.0351) (0.0390) (0.0376) (0.0407)
Ban Last Period 0.3053*** 0.3054***
(0.0617) (0.0761)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes
N 810 810 810 810
*** Sig. at the 1 percent level, **Sig. at the 5 percent level, *Sig. at the 10 percent level
2.5.4 Individual Eorts
While the primary objective of anti-doping policies is to provide sucient disincentives to
athletes using PEDs, they should also alter the incentives to exert eort. Among two anti-
doping policies, which are equally eective in reducing the incidence of doping, the one
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that provides stronger incentives for eort exertion is usually preferred, as it provides a
higher quality of contest with better performances. Due to the complex incentives under
a conditional pension system, theory does not make a clear prediction how eorts should
dier when compared to other systems. The only clear prediction is that subjects who
never dope should exert the same eorts across all treatments. In what follows, we have
estimated two models with eort being the dependent variable. In both models, we take a
conservative approach and allow for clustering at the group level. Random-eects models
yield equivalent results. In the rst model (1) in Table 2.4, we are interested in the over all
treatment eect. Controlling for some individual characteristics (such as calculation ability,
assigned ability, gender, math background and degree of study) we identify the treatment
eects through treatment dummies. We nd that, on average, the CSF increases eorts
by close to one question (about 10 percent) compared to a system without any anti-doping
policy (p < 0.075). Neither the Fine nor the Ban environments induce this surprising eect.
There, the eorts are not signicantly higher than in an environment without enforcement.
Moreover, the CSF system yields signicantly higher eorts than the ne system. This eect
is not only strongly statistically signicant (p < 0.032) but also economically relevant, since
the average dierence is about 12 percent.
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Table 2.4: Estimated Eects on Eorts
Model 1 2
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
clustered on group clustered on group
Calculation Ability -1.3829 -1.2949
(4.4935) (3.6283)
Calculation Ability^2 12.7542*** 12.7420***
(4.0446) (3.8482)










Treatment (base = No Enforcement)


















*** Sig. at the 1 percent level, **Sig. at the 5 percent level, *Sig. at the 10 percent level
Our second model (2) adds interactions between the treatment dummies and doping
behaviour in an attempt to identify where the observed dierences come from. The rst
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interesting insight is a clear dierence in behaviour depending on the existence of enforce-
ment. Theoretically, doping and eort should be complements regardless of the presence
of anti-doping rules. This is the case, since doping increases the marginal performance
improvement from eort. However, increased eort for given doping is only observed in the
treatments with enforcement. In the baseline treatment, subjects behave as if eort and
doping were substitutes. Dopers in the baseline treatment reduce their eorts (as shown by
the negative coecient on the doping/no-enforcement interaction).
Moreover, model 2 allows us to tease out the driver of the higher eorts with a CSF.
The higher eort in the CSF treatment compared to the treatment without enforcement
is caused by the dopers. The dopers under a CSF solve on average three questions more
(i.e. 30 percent) than dopers in the baseline (as shown by the dierence between the doping-
treatment interaction coecients, which is signicant at p < 0.02) . Given the high number of
dopers in the baseline treatment this eect drives the main eect. The superior performance
of the CSF scheme compared to enforcement with nes is mainly driven by the relatively
low eorts non-dopers exert under the ne system (see the negative coecient on the ne
dummy). The dierence in eorts of non-dopers between the CSF and the ne regime is
signicant (p < 0.063 ) and about the same size as the total eect from model 1.
2.6 Conclusion
Empirical evidence on doping behaviour is very rare, as reliable eld data is unavailable.
Doping behavior cannot be observed easily in real-world competitions, since it is always
conducted in secret. Our solution to this observability problem is the use of laboratory
experiments. This approach is clearly second-best, as the external validity depends on the
articial laboratory environment emulating the salient elements of the real world. In order to
capture the most salient features of sporting contests with doping, we conducted multi-period
real-eort contests with cheating. In three treatments, we pitted dierent anti-doping regimes
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against each other and compared the resulting behaviour. Our main aim was to see how
an innovative conditional superannuation scheme would perform compared to traditional
anti-doping measures, such as nes and bans. We nd that a conditional superannuation
system leads to less doping than bans and to better competition (through increased eorts)
than a ne system. We believe that our results, together with the theoretical properties of
conditional superannuation, make a good case for the introduction of such a system.
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Chapter 3
Does Social Status Reduce
Self-sabotaging Behaviour in Contests?
3.1 Introduction
In economics, the use of rank-order tournaments as ecient incentive devices for inducing
eort has been extensively studied theoretically (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Green and
Stokey, 1983; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; O'Keee et al., 1984). In a standard tournament,
the best performer receives the highest monetary prize, the second best performer receives
the second highest prize and so on, which motivates players to exert their best eort. In
practice, the use of tournament reward schemes is widespread. A typical example is a job
promotion tournament where workers are motivated to work hard by the prospect of being
promoted to a position with more prestige, inuence and higher remuneration.
Tournament reward schemes are traditionally the major source of incentives to com-
pete hard in professional sports. However, tournaments incentives have been shown to
sometimes backre and cause counterproductive behaviors such as cheating, sabotaging
and self-sabotaging (Preston and Szymanski, 2003). When participants cheat or sabotage
their competitors, they attempt to increase their chance to win illegitimately. Unlike in
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these cases, self-sabotage involves contestants deliberately under-performing in order to
lose. While cheating and sabotaging can be the result of very strong incentives to win,
self-sabotage is often the consequence of badly designed incentives. The major motivations
behind self-sabotaging in competitive settings come from direct nancial gain oered by a
third party, such as in match-xing or advantages like high draft picks that will pay o in the
future. In an industry-policy context, local companies that are meeting global competitive
challenges may have incentives to perform particularly poorly in order to receive handouts
from the government. Some might argue that car manufacturing in Australia faced this
perverse incentive in the decades before it ceased to exist.
Evidence of self-sabotage related to match xing is rife in competitive sport including
cricket, tennis, football, basketball. In 2000, the biggest cricket betting scandal was dis-
covered. The former South African captain, Hansie Cronje, was charged with taking bribes
from bookmakers and asking teammates to under-perform deliberately to manipulate the
result of a match against India. Bag and Saha (2011) study incentives that are distorted by
betting markets in a model where two bookmakers accept bets from two punters. In their
model, one of the bettors is able to bribe a team for match-xing. Their analysis shows that
only the stronger team in the two-team contest will be bribed to self-sabotage. Saha (2015)
extends this model to three teams and nds that the risk of self-sabotaging due to betting
corruption is smaller in a three-team contest than in a two-team contest.
Besides self-sabotage driven by corruption in the betting market, tanking for the purpose
of improving a team's draft position is often an issue. To enhance the long-term competitive
balance, professional sports leagues like NBA, NFL and AFL employ dierent kinds of a
reverse-order draft systems, which on average allocate more talented rookies to poorer per-
forming teams. This creates an under-performance incentive for teams that nd themselves
in a position where winning a title becomes impossible. A large body of existing work
using eld data shows that contestants respond to this self-sabotage incentive (Balsdon
et al., 2007; Duggan and Levitt, 2002; Taylor and Trogdon, 2002; Walters and Williams,
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2012; Wolfers, 2006). Taylor and Trogdon (2002) examine three NBA seasons of games and
provide strong empirical evidence that in the NBA teams that do not make the playos are
more likely to lose when inverse-rank drafting or draft lotteries were employed1. When the
incentive to lose was removed with an introduction lottery system that did not condition
on actual performance, the likelihood of eliminated teams losing a game is not signicantly
higher than that of teams that are not eliminated anymore. Fornwagner (2018) analyses
data from the NHL games and nds that teams react to dual incentives (i.e., the incentive
for teams to win more games when there is still a chance to reach the playos and the
incentive to lose more after being eliminated from playo considerations). Moreover, by
studying data on individual players level, she provides eld evidence that better players
played signicantly less after the elimination of their team compared to before elimination.
This means that poorer performance by eliminated teams can not be fully explained by lower
motivation or disappointment. Instead, losing more is a strategic component for eliminated
teams. As actual self-sabotage behavior is not readily identiable in the eld, we opt for
the controlled environment of the laboratory. Hence, our paper uses experimental methods
to study individual self-sabotaging behavior in a two-player contest where both the winner
and the loser who performed particularly badly receive a monetary reward and consolation
prize, respectively. This situation best captures the scenario where rms have an incentive
to perform badly in order to receive government handouts or the practice of the AFL to
award priority draft picks to teams who have particularly bad win-loss ratios2.
While weaker teams may have an incentive to lose on purpose, there are many situations
where they choose to forgo monetary gains or future advantages and instead give their best
eort in tournaments. Potential explanations are a joy of winning for winning's sake, pride
and the seeking of status. Status is typically dened as the ranking in a hierarchy that is
publicly recognised. People's concern for status, which induces individuals to care about
1In draft lotteries the probability of receiving a better draft position increases with the overall league
rank from the best to the worst.
2Up to 2012, there was an objective criterion for a priority pick. Since then the granting of priority draft
picks has become discretionary in order to reduce tanking.
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their position relative to other individuals in a reference group is well-documented (Brown
et al., 2008; Clark et al., 2008; Clark et al., 2010; Luttmer, 2005). Agents have a hard-
wired preference for higher ranks because a better relative standing typically brings external
benets such as greater access to resources (Ball et al., 2001) or peer recognition (Mas and
Moretti, 2009). Rege (2008) implies that people care about status because it serves as a
signal of non-observable ability. In addition to the tangible benets associated with status
the desire for a higher rank by itself is often sucient to internally motivate individuals
to exert more eort. Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) employ a eld experiment where
they show that workers who are paid a at rate become more productive merely because
they are provided with feedback of their rank-order position with respect to productivity
and pay. In a similar natural experiment, Tran and Zeckhauser (2012) examine the impact
of ranking information on the performance of students. Students are randomly divided
into three groups: an unranked control group, a group where students receive information
about their rank only and a group where the ranking is made public. The data shows that
the control group is outperformed by the two treatment groups, while the performances
in the two treatment groups are not signicantly dierent. These ndings indicate that
the performance incentives provided by rankings operate intrinsically rather than through
reputation concerns. This intrinsic motivation does not require social recognition and can
be explained by competitive preferences or a natural desire of dominance in competitions
(Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Rustichini, 2008).
Other studies, however, show that public recognition of high rankings feature in peo-
ple's preferences. A large body of existing literature provides evidence for the presence of
costly status seeking behavior (Friedman and Ostrov, 2008; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004;
Huberman et al., 2004). Costly status seeking subsumes behaviors where individuals have
a willingness to pay for higher publicly observable status. Hopkins and Kornienko (2009)
propose a model where consumers decide how to split income between consumption of a
normal good and a status good. To strive for status, agents spend more on positional
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goods at the expense of the normal good when those who consume less of the positional
good become richer. A few experimental studies demonstrate that people engage in costly
status seeking activities even when status does not provide any monetary return. Rustichini
and Vostroknutov (2008) develop two games, a game of skill and a game of luck, where
the outcome of the former reveals the ability of the person whereas that of the latter is
uninformative. At the end of each game, players have the choice to decrease another player's
monetary payment and publicly observed performance by paying a cost. They show that
people spend more of their income to reduce performance of others in the game of skill.
Moreover, participants spend their money mainly on those just above them, which reveals
the intention to rise in the rankings. The authors conjecture that the performance in the
skill game is a proxy for status, for which participants have social preferences exhibiting
envy. Charness et al. (2011) show that players exert higher eort in a real-eort task when
the ranking of performance of group members is revealed publicly. They are willing to incur
a cost to improve their ranking articially by sabotaging other group member's performance
or by purchasing redemption points, which increase performance observed by others but
does not provide any monetary returns.
Other studies investigate status seeking activities under a at-rate payment scheme or a
standard tournament pay scheme. Eriksson et al. (2009) nd that in standard tournaments
where the winner receives a xed payment whereas the loser receives no prize, the favorites
do not slack o, and underdogs do not give up, even when the likelihood of winning is
very low. We study a tournament where winners and particularly bad performing losers
both receive a prize, which creates an incentive for underdogs to lose heavily. Performance
is measured by scores obtained through solving real eort tasks. A correctly solved sum
increases performance while an incorrectly solved sum reduces performance. Our main design
innovation is that we do not only allow for insucient eort (i.e., not working on a sum)
but also for active self-sabotage (i.e., deliberate wrong entries). In order to be able to
separate between mistakes and self-sabotage, we warn subjects if their rst submitted sum
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has been wrong and ask them if they want to proceed or if they want to recalculate. For
a treatment variation, we manipulate the feedback by showing a leaderboard of all players'
ranked performance to the treatment group but not to the control group. Status is proxied
by the ranking positions on the leaderboard. When subjects who lag behind intend to
improve their status, they face a monetary opportunity cost for not losing with extreme
poor performances (i.e., consolation prize). We reinforce the concept of status by displaying
players' prole pictures and ranking on the leaderboard.
The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, we investigate how individuals respond to self-
sabotaging incentives in competitive settings. Second, we explore the performance impact
of showing a leaderboard which contains the performance and the ranking of all players
to the public. Last but not least, we analyze the inuence of the leaderboard on self-
sabotaging behavior. There is only a limited amount of literature on self-sabotaging behavior.
One big reason for this is the lack of eld data that identify and quantify individual self-
sabotage. It is inherently dicult to separate factors such as lack of ability, luck of incentives
that lead to poor performance from self-sabotage. The appropriate use of experimental
methods in this paper enable us to directly identify and measure self-sabotaging at both the
aggregate and individual levels. Our real eort task allows us to further distinguish between
two types of self-sabotaging, known as active self-sabotage and lack of trying. Finally,
properly designed experiments allow us to identify how status concerns interact with tanking
incentives, which is impossible in reality.
Our results show that humans respond to tanking incentives in tournaments and that
they regularly self-sabotage in order to receive a consolation prize. Moreover, individuals
tend to self-sabotage just enough when the leaderboard is displayed to everybody. We
observe that losers from the leaderboard treatment tend to nish the task with exactly
the best performance for which still a consolation prize is paid. We conjecture that by
ending up on exactly the level of performance that yields the consolation prize, tankers in
the leaderboard treatment want to signal that they are actually not so bad at arithmetic
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but that they tanked to receive the consolation prize. Without the leaderboard, players
self-sabotage more excessively. This does not translate to an overall dierence in average
performance across treatments though, as we see slightly less losers falling to the level of
performance that pays a consolation prize when they are exposed to the leaderboard. In
real world, the leaderboard is already widely used in sports competitions to elicit the desire
for athletes to compete. Our results suggest that the leaderboard could also alleviate the
incentive to tank. Moreover, since the incentive to lose also exists among rms when they
compete for government handouts, rather than the market share, the leaderboard of rms
protability could be employed in industries as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce a
simple environment of a two-player contest that oers rewards for the winner and suciently
badly performing loser. The experimental design is described in Section 3.3. In Section
3.4, we present our behavioral hypotheses. Section 3.5 reports our results and Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
This section briey presents a theoretical model of a modied two-player winner-take-all
competition and basic predictions on self-sabotaging behaviors. In the competition, the
winner receives prize money whereas the loser with a suciently poor performance, i.e.,
scoring below a threshold, x, receives a consolation prize. This consolation prize could
represent a priority draft pick in sports leagues or subsidies in an industry-policy context.
We rst give a brief specication of the model and demonstrate the tanking incentive,
without fully characterizing equilibrium. The reason is that the game is very complex and
that the precise equilibrium characterization depends on the ability of our subjects, which
we cannot observe. Our supercial analysis suces to demonstrate the tanking incentives.
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Consider two homogeneous contestants, player i and player j, in a competition that consists
of multiple stages, n. It is assumed that players are rational prot maximisers who are
driven by monetary incentives alone. At each stage of the game, each player has a chance
to improve or to impair his or her score depending on the strategy applied. There are three
strategies for every player to choose from in every stage: Try to gain one point, Skip the
current stage without changing the point balance and Lose one point deliberately. For each
player who chooses to Try, there is a positive probability p > 1
2
, that he or she can increase
the point balance by one. On the other hand, there is a probability of (1− p) that he or she
may fail and lose a point instead. Trying causes a small eort cost ε. If a player selects Skip,
he or she moves on to the next stage with the point balance remaining the same. Lastly, if a
player opts to Lose, one point is deducted from the point balance with certainty. Lose also
causes a tiny eort cost. By allowing players to choose Lose, we make active self-sabotaging
behavior detectable in our model. At the end of the competition, the player with the higher
(lower) score value is regarded as the winner (loser). The winner receives prize money π
whereas the loser is compensated with a signicantly smaller amount of v if he or she has a
nal score less than or equal to x. Otherwise, the loser receives nothing.
Assume that we are at the beginning of the competition. Both players have a strong
monetary incentive to start o by trying to gain points in the early stage of the game because
the winning prize π is signicantly higher than the consolation prize v. Therefore, at the
start, Lose is not optimal for both players. Note that at the beginning of the game, there
are enough rounds left to bring the score down to x by deliberately losing scores even after
a successful try. At any stage t of the game where t ∈ [1, 2, . . . , n− 1], player i's and player
j's score balances are denoted with Sit and Sjt, respectively. Moreover, the probability that
player i will win the game is dened as prob(Sin > Sjn) and likewise, that player j will win
the game is prob(Sjn > Sin). The winning probability at each point in time depends on the
current scores and both players' future strategies. The winning probability increases with
one's own score and decreases with the opponent's score. Consequently, the front-runner
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should never play Lose as long as she is not so far in front that she cannot mathematically
lose the contest anymore.
Given this game has n stages in total, the number of stages left before the end of the
game is n − t. In each and every stage, a player's point balance can be increased by one,
decreased by one or stay unchanged. Consequently, the maximum possible increase as the
maximum possible decrease of a player's point balance is the number of remaining stages
itself. For example, at stage t, player i 's nal score is known to be within the interval
[Sit − (n− t), Sit + (n− t)]. Self-sabotaging behaviors are expected to arise in situations in
which winning is no longer feasible. We consider a scenario where one player is the denite
winner, whereas the other is the denite loser with some periods left. In this situation,
the gap between two players' point balances is greater than the number of stages left (i.e.,
Sit − Sjt > n − t). The leader can guarantee a win by skipping. The denite loser should
now make sure that he can secure the consolation prize. In case of a current score of above
x, some self-sabotage (choosing Lose) is optimal. However, this is attainable if and only
if the dierence between one's current score and the threshold is equal to or less than the
remaining stages (i.e., Sjt − x 6 n − t). If there are not suciently many rounds lefts to
reach the threshold by tanking, there is no monetary incentive for the denite loser to play
either Try or Lose. Thus, we expect the denite loser to exert minimum eort by playing
Skip for the rest of the game.
Note that this does not mean that trying until the game is out of reach is part of all
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. It might be optimal for a player who has fallen behind
to Skip or Lose before the game is out of reach. This is the case, whenever the winning
probability conditionally on playing Try in the future becomes suciently small, such that
it is better to make sure that the consolation prize remains reachable by skipping or self-
sabotaging. If and when not trying becomes optimal depends on the parameters.
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In what follows we describe the experimental setup, which is tailored to the study of the
impact a leaderboard has on performance and self-sabotaging behavior in a competitive
environment.
3.3 Experimental Design
Our experiments consist of two treatments. Within these treatments, pairs of subjects
compete against each other in tournaments which are based on a real eort task. In what
follows, we rst explain the underlying real eort task. Next, we lay out how subjects are
motivated and paid. Finally, the treatment variation is discussed.
3.3.1 The real eort task
In our experiment, we use a real eort task where subjects are incentivised to sum up streams
of single-digit numbers in a given time. Each set of real eort tasks contains eight summation
questions, which are identical for all the subjects in the same experimental session. There are
ve levels of diculty for these summation questions. The diculty of the tasks is varied by
changing the number of digits that have to be added up. The simplest task requires adding
seven digits, while sixteen digits have to be added in the most dicult task. Intermediate
diculties require the summation of nine, eleven and fourteen digits. Using dierent diculty
levels allows us to generate a spread in performance. Participants with better arithmetic
skills will be able to solve the more dicult tasks. The diculty levels are randomly chosen
once for all treatments, such that we have the same sequence of tasks for both treatments.
This excludes the risk that dierences in behavior across treatments could be generated by
variation of the drawn task diculties.
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Irrespective of the diculty of a task, subjects have only 20 seconds to complete it. Whenever
a new addition task starts, participants have a choice between two options: to attempt the
questions by submitting an answer or to skip the questions by clicking the LEAVE bottom
on the screen. If the question is solved, skipped intentionally or the time runs out, then the
player moves on to the next question automatically. In the event that a participant submits
a wrong answer, a dialog box informs the participant that the answer is incorrect. After
seeing the message, participants are then required to make a choice between GO BACK
or CONTINUE. After clicking GO BACK, the participant has another chance to solve
the same question within the remaining time, or else to skip the question. CONTINUE
submits the wrong answer. So a subject who presses CONTINUE is fully aware that the
submitted answer will be wrong. For each task, the warning that an answer is wrong only
appears once. The second wrong answer is registered without any chance of correction. This
discourages trial-and-error behavior and makes tanking behaviour visible at the same time.
The rules of how submission of answers occur are the same for all eight questions within a
tournament. The rules are also commonly known and explicitly explained in the instructions.
3.3.2 Payment schemes
Each subject will participate in four rounds consisting of solving eight tasks. The rst is a
piece-rate round, followed by three competition rounds. In the piece rate round, participants
are given eight real eort tasks to perform and they receive a xed amount of $1 AUD for
every correct answer they submit within the timeframe. When they submit a wrong answer
or they do not submit an answer, their payment does not change. In other words, there is no
penalty for wrong answers in the piece rate round. Consequently, individuals are incentivised
to solve as many questions as they can. Hence, participant's performance in this round serves
as a measurement of innate ability to perform the addition. After each task, subjects are
informed if they solved it correctly. Additionally, the current payout is displayed.
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The next three rounds are tournaments for which subjects are placed in groups of two.
In each session, subjects are ranked according to their piece-rate performance and divided
into the top and bottom half. Then the best subject from the top and bottom half are
paired to form a group. The second-best of both pools form the next group and so on. This
procedure ensures that there are ability dierences within groups, that are similar across
sessions. Thus, each group now has an underdog and a favorite. In order to obtain an
adequate amount of self-sabotage behaviour exhibited by the underdog, we make each group
an asymmetric contest. This is because in a symmetric contest, it is more likely that both
competitors put forth as much eort as possible into winning the game without considering
tanking as an option. At the beginning of the tournaments, subjects are reminded of their
own and informed about their competitor's piece-rate performance. This helps subjects to
form beliefs about the own and opponent's probability of solving a given task.
In the tournament subjects receive scores instead of a xed piece rate. After a correct
answer a point is added to the score, while a wrong answer leads to a deduction of one point.
When a subject skipped the task or ran out of time the score remains unchanged. At the end
of each eight-task tournament, the participant with the higher score in the group is declared
the winner. The other subject is deemed to have lost the tournament. In case of ties, the
winner is randomly determined by a coin toss. At the conclusion of the experiment, only one
of the three contests is randomly selected for payment. The winner in this selected contest
receives a prize of $15 AUD and the other subject receives either nothing or a consolation
prize of $5 AUD if the nal score was one point or lower. This compensation scheme gives
runners-up a monetary incentive to self-sabotage, once they realize that their chance of
winning the prize has become suciently low.
Throughout the contests, subjects are always informed about their updated own score
as well as about the group member's score. If a player intends to deliberately lose the
competition with a poor performance, he or she can choose to lose points by submitting
the wrong answers or by simply not performing the task. We distinguish between these
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two types of self-sabotaging behaviors in our experiment. Firstly, with our answer checker
design, subjects who click CONTINUE can be considered strictly self-sabotaging, as they
deliberately lose a point. This kind of self-sabotaging is similar to scoring an own-goal
in soccer or deliberately missing a ball in tennis. The other way of self-sabotaging is not
trying, which is known as lack of trying self-sabotage. We can identify this behavior
when underdogs skip the questions without prior submission, despite the fact that the rst
submission is checked by the computer before it has to be submitted. Notice that sometimes
it might be optimal for favorites that are far in front to not to submit, since this guarantees
a win with certainty. We are not counting these occurrence as self-sabotaging, as it is part
of a winning strategy, just as not to attack can be optimal for a soccer team that is leading.
3.3.3 Treatments
At the beginning of the experiment a picture of each participant was taken. During the
contests, in both treatments, a player's own prole picture is always displayed on the screen.
In the LB treatment, after each eight-round contest, subjects see also a leaderboard which
contains all subjects' prole pictures, scores and ranks within the session. We rank players
in ascending order on the leaderboard. To reinforce the eect of the leaderboard, we ensure
that subjects have sucient time to read the information and recognize the people on it.
Therefore, the leaderboard table is divided into multiple pages with each page showing
eight players. Each page stays on the computer screen for 15 seconds without an option to
skip. Where there were draws within a session, the ranking was determined randomly. The
instructions clearly explained how the leaderboard would be displayed. Moreover, in contest
rounds two and three subjects will have experience with the leaderboard procedure.
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3.3.4 Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the University of Adelaide. All sessions were computerized
and the software used was Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total, 138 individuals took part in
our six sessions.3 The rst three sessions belonged to the NO LB treatment. A leaderboard is
introduced to the last three sessions. Table 3.1 shows how sessions were related to treatments.
All subjects were invited through the University of Adelaide Experimental Lab (AdeLab)
online recruitment platform and each subject was allowed to join in one session only. Before
the sessions started, subjects were randomly allocated to a seat in the lab and were informed
that any type of communication between each other was not allowed during the whole
experiment. Once participants were seated, we took prole pictures for all subjects and
entered them in to the system. After that, the instructions were distributed and read out
loud by the experimenter. Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes and the average
prot earned was AUD 18.13, including a show-up fee of AUD 5.
Table 3.1: Information on the experimental sessions
Session Number of Number of Treatment
number subjects groups
1 26 13 NO LB treatment
2 26 13 NO LB treatment
3 22 11 NO LB treatment
4 22 11 LB treatment
5 22 11 LB treatment
6 20 10 LB treatment
3A coding error was made in the Z-tree program of the rst two LB sessions and the rst NO LB session.
According to the instructions, a subject who loses the competition with a score less than or equal to one will
receive the compensation. In the program, however, those who nish with a score value less than or equal
to two rather than one are rewarded with the consolation prize. Seven subjects were aected by this error.
In the main part of the paper we ignore this error and analyse the data as if no error was made, as the
number of subjects aected was so low. In the Appendix, we conduct robustness checks on this assumption
and report the results. Our analysis shows that the coding error does not change any ndings.
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3.4 Hypotheses
In this section, we present some hypotheses concerning the behaviors of the underdog
and the favorite as we manipulate the visibility of the performance ranking. Our rst
prediction is about the impact of the tournament scheme on performance of favourites
and underdogs, respectively. Standard tournament literature suggests that tournament
incentives increase legal output (i.e., eort, performance) due to the competitive preferences
(Sheremeta, 2018). Since our contest awards not only the winner but also the loser with
extreme poor performance, we conjecture that, favorites tend to perform better than in the
piece rate, while underdogs tend to perform worse in the contests. This is summarised in
the rst Conjecture.
Conjecture 3.1. Compared to performance under a piece rate, the contest with consolation
prize reduces the underdogs' performance but improves that of the favourites.
Next consider self-sabotaging behaviour. Underdogs have a monetary incentive to per-
form worse than they would if they tried as hard as possible. In our experiment, a deliberate
under-performance can be identied when underdogs use either the LEAVE button if they
are already at or below the tanking threshold or the CONTINUE button if they are above
the threshold. Consequently, we expect to observe these buttons being clicked more often
by underdogs in the contests than in the piece-rate task. If this is true, then we have direct
evidence of the presence of the self-sabotaging behavior. Moreover, favorites should never
use the CONTINUE button during the contests. When the favourite clicks the LEAVE
button, this is not regarded as self-sabotaging as it might be optimal if winning is the
objective, as explained in the model section.
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Conjecture 3.2. Underdogs under-perform on purpose by clicking either the LEAVE
button and/or the CONTINUE button. The number of clicks on these two buttons are
signicantly higher in the contests than in the piece rate, suggesting the presence of the
self-sabotaging behaviour.
The next Conjecture is with regard to the two dierent types of self-sabotaging. As shown
in the theoretical framework, it is optimal for laggards to start o by performing the task to
maximize the chance of winning and turn to self-sabotaging once they lag far behind and the
chance of winning becomes too low. Since the threshold of poor performance is a nal score of
one, underdogs should not use active self-sabotaging by clicking the CONTINUE button
in the rst half of the task. This is because the maximum score one can achieve after the
fourth question is four. Given there are four more questions left, individuals are able to get
down to a score of one or less in the end. Given this constraint on optimal dynamics of eort
over time, we expect rational laggards to exhibit active self-sabotaging more frequently
than lack of trying self-sabotaging in our contests. However, many studies demonstrate
that laggards are discouraged from expending eort due to disappointing outcomes in the
past, which is known as the discouragement eect (Konrad, 2012). In the present application,
those who lost in the previous competition may quit the contest in the early stage and lose the
game deliberately due to lack of trying self-sabotaging behaviour. Overall, how underdogs
self-sabotage and when do they start doing it remains an empirical question. This is stated
in Conjecture 3.3.
Conjecture 3.3. Rational underdogs should try for a higher score at the beginning of the
contest and only start self-sabotaging actively by clicking the CONTINUE button after the
rst half of the competition. The discouragement eect might cause underdogs giving up
earlier and conduct lack-of-trying self-sabotaging by clicking the LEAVE button early in
the contest.
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Standard expected utility theory suggests that a rational individual aims to maximize
his or her monetary payo only. Provided that is the case, we should not observe any
treatment eects since the monetary incentives are identical across the LB and NO LB
treatments. In both treatments the winner receives AUD 15 whereas the loser with a poor
performance receives a consolation prize of AUD 5. However, as shown in cited literature
above, people are motivated not only by the prize money but also by non-monetary factors,
such as their relative ranking in their reference group. Although the real eort task we
employ in this experiment requires little background to understand, basic mathematics
skills to attempt those summation questions are necessary. Therefore, the performance
achieved in the experiment is a reection of mathematics skills. According to Rustichini
and Vostroknutov (2008), when the results of game reects one's skill, players interpret the
ranking of the results as a proxy for status. Consequently, our real eort task serves a
purpose of motivating individuals to exert higher eort under the circumstances of showing
performance and rankings to the public. In summary, the rationale behind higher eort
exertion in the LB treatment is the preference for a higher rank. The ranking position
on the leaderboard sends a signal about one's numeracy skill and demonstrates the person's
positive traits like diligence and intelligence. We refer to this phenomenon as the leaderboard
eect. Therefore, our fourth conjecture is as followed,
Conjecture 3.4. The leaderboard has a positive impact on participants' performance and
therefore, a higher average score is expected in the LB treatment than in the NO LB treatment.
Based on previous conjectures, self-sabotaging incentives and the leaderboard eect are
two countervailing eects on underdogs' performance. If the concerns for the visibility
of outcomes outweigh the monetary compensation, the self-sabotaging behavior might not
occur despite the nancial incentives. In order to improve their scores that determine their
ranking, which is available to everybody in a session, underdogs may engage in costly status
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seeking activities by forgoing the consolation prize. Across the two treatments, underdogs
are expected to be more willing to sacrice the consolation prize for a higher ranking on the
leaderboard.
Conjecture 3.5. Underdogs in the LB treatment are expected to self-sabotage less than those
in the NO LB treatment.
3.5 Experimental Results
The experimental results across the two treatments are summarized in this section. We report
a series of ndings that relate to the ve Conjectures stated above. Firstly, we report some
descriptive statistics on average performance and the proportion of losers with the consolation
prize in each treatment. We then study the performance by dierent types of players (losers
and winners) from which we derive the presence of the self-sabotaging behaviour. Next we
investigating the impact of the leaderboard on the prevalence of self-sabotage. Lastly, we
consider dierent types of self-sabotaging behaviours on the individual level.
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 lists the average performance under the two payment schemes. Consider the piece
rate round rst. The average performance under the piece rate is measured by the average
number of questions solved. Two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are performed to test if
there are any treatment eects on the average performance under the piece rate scheme.
Subjects in the LB treatment, on average, solved 0.474 more question than those in the NO
LB treatment. However, this dierence is statistically insignicant with a p−value of 0.1767
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. Therefore, subjects' innate abilities to solve our real-eort summation tasks are believed
to be the same across the subjects assigned to the two treatments.
Now consider the tournament rounds. Since all groups stay constant for three contests,
each group constitutes one statistically independent observation. For a given treatment, the
average group performance is slightly lower in most of the contests than in the piece rate,
but the small dierence is statistically insignicant. The only weakly signicant increase
of performance is found in the last contest in the NO LB treatment, as compared to the
piece rate (sign-rank test; p = 0.077). This suggests that on aggregate, the contest does not
increase performance.
We then perform two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on the group average score in each
contest by treatments and nd no evidence of the positive impact of the leaderboard on the
aggregate performance (p > 0.1 for all pairs). Eriksson et al. (2009) obtained the similar
result that the average performance of workers when paired with one of their peers is not
improved by giving feedback on their relative performance. Although this result rejects
Conjecture 3.4, we need to be careful with the interpretation of it. It does not mean that
there is no leaderboard eect on the performance. The reasons are as follow. Firstly, our task
consists of eight questions in total, which puts an upper limit on the performance that can be
observed in our experiment. Compared to those who have already achieved the maximum
score of eight in the NO LB treatment, subjects who would be willing to improve their
performance due to the leaderboard eect are unable to do so. Secondly, one's performance
is bounded by mathematical skills. Subjects may have already exerted the maximum level of
eort under the NO LB treatment. By introducing the leaderboard, although there may be
a preference for higher rankings, one cannot easily improve performance. Therefore, further
regression analysis is needed to control for those restrictions.
Table 3.2 also reports the proportion of subjects who nished the task with a score of one
or less in every round. In the contests, these subjects can be regarded as successful tankers
as they received the consolation prize if that round was selected for payment. Note that
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this proportion is calculated as the number of subjects with a score of one or less divided by
the total number of subjects in a given session. As already discussed, Conjecture 3.2 states
that self-sabotaging should only exist among defeated players, meaning that this ratio is
doubled if we only consider the defeated (e.g., total number of successful tankers divide by
total number of losers). A signicantly larger proportion of successful self-saboteurs is found
in each and every contest round, compared to the piece rate round. This is statistically
conrmed using McNemar's chi-square statistics ( p = 0.0164 for the rst contest versus the
piece rate; p = 0.0011 for the second contest versus the piece rate and p = 0.0105 for third
contest versus the piece rate).
Next we ask: does the leaderboard have a deterrence eect on self-sabotaging? Or in
other words, is the proportion of successful self-saboteurs lower in the LB treatment than in
the NO LB treatment? Surprisingly, Table 3.2 shows that the proportion is slightly larger
in the LB treatment in contest 2 and contest 3. We then test the equality of the proportions
across the two treatments round by round with the help of the two-sample proportions test.
There is no signicant dierence ( p − values of 0.5679, 0.4947, 0.2310 and 0.3433 for the
piece rate, contest 1, 2 and 3, respectively). This means that the leaderboard does not reduce
the amount of successful tankers on an aggregate level as conjectured. As we will see later,
the leaderboard still makes an unexpected dierence.
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Table 3.2: Average performance and proportion of successful tanking subjects
N Average Proportion of Successful
Participants Performance Tanking Subjects4
Piece Rate
NO LB Treatment 74 4.689 5.405%
(1.986)
LB Treatment 64 5.125 7.813%
(1.972)
Contest 1
NO LB Treatment 74 4.595 13.514%
(2.669)
LB Treatment 64 4.766 15.625%
(2.524)
Contest 2
NO LB Treatment 74 4.459 20.270%
(3.035)
LB Treatment 64 4.641 15.625%
(2.698)
Contest 3
NO LB Treatment 74 5.108 12.162%
(2.551)
LB Treatment 64 4.906 18.750%
(2.480)
3.5.2 Minimum score and within-pair performance gap by winners
and losers
Figure 3.1 displays the range of variation of performances from the maximum to the minimum
in the two treatments across the four rounds. As shown in every panel in the gure, two
boxes (depicting the 25th to 75th percentile with the median represented as a line) are
approximately balanced at the same level, indicating that evidently the central performance
levels are similar in the treatments with and without the leaderboard. This again conrms
that, contrary to Conjecture 3.4, the leaderboard does not have a positive impact on average
performance. We observe that the maximum inside performance level (as evidenced by
the adjacent value) stays at eight in both treatments in all four rounds. This maximum
4In the piece rate, this is the proportion of subjects with a score of one or less
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performance requires subjects to solve all questions, which makes it impossible for those
players to perform better in the LB treatment, even if they would like to put in more eort.
On the other hand, the minimum inside eort level, which excludes outlier (i.e. the dots) is
always lower in the contests of the NO LB treatment. More specically, in the LB treatment,
the minimum score sits at zero in three rounds of competitions while the minimum scores in
the NO LB treatment range from -4 to -2. Without considering outliers in both cases. It is
reasonable to assume that the minimum inside and the maximum scores solely determined
by losers and winners, respectively. This suggests that the leaderboard may have an impact
on the performance of losers only. Given that the threshold for the consolation prize is a
score of one, there is neither a monetary nor a psychological incentives for underdogs to
keep self-sabotaging after this threshold is reached. A much lower minimum score in the NO
LB treatment is therefore an indication that the defeated players in the NO LB treatment
exhibit unnecessary excessive self-sabotaging behaviour. Additionally, there is a visible larger
variation of poor performance (i.e., performance that is below the medium) in the NO LB
treatment as indicated by the wider lower interquartile ranges in contest 2 and contest 3, as
compared to the LB treatment. This wider range means poor performance is more spread out
over a larger range of values than good performance (i.e., performance above the medium).
This visual nding points us to test statistically whether the leaderboard has an impact on
how poorly losers perform.
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Figure 3.1: The distribution of the performance in two treatments over time
To test whether there is a treatment eect on the minimum performance exhibited by
losers, we report non-parametric tests on the average performance and the performance
gap of dierent types of players (i.e., winners or losers). As shown in Table 3.3, the average
performance of winners is approximately double the size of that of the losers. For a given type
of player, Mann-Whitney U tests fail to nd signicant dierences between the distributions
of average performance across two treatments (p > 0.1), which suggests that the leaderboard
does not increase average performance of either type of players. However, winners' and losers'
similar average performance across treatments might mask countervailing eects.
Regarding the performance gap, we dene it as the dierence between one's average score
in contests and the points achieved in the piece rate. On average, winners obtained positive
performance gaps of 0.5495 and 0.2292 in the NO LB and the LB treatments whereas losers
in the NO LB and LB treatments have negative performance gaps of -0.4865 and -0.9375,
respectively. We run Sign test of matched pairs and nd that winners signicantly improve
their performance in contests than in piece rate (p = 0.0002; one-sided) whereas losers tend
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to have a signicantly lower score in contests than in piece rate (p = 0.020; one-sided).
That indicates that compared to the piece rate performance, winners tend to out-perform
themselves while losers tend to under-perform, which conrms Conjecture 3.1.




Winners Losers Winners Losers
NO LB Treatment 6.2973 3.1441 0.5495 -0.4865
(1.4808) (2.8472) (1.5652) (2.7695)
LB Treatment 6.2604 3.2813 0.2292 -0.9375
(1.5844) (2.4824) (1.6637) (2.4097)
3.5.3 Impact of the leaderboard on performance
Next, we run three OLS regressions to study individual's performance with robust standard
errors clustered at the group level. We report the results of three OLS regressions in Table
3.4. In model (1), the dependent variable is individual's performance. The independent
variables include the performance in the piece rate, the treatment dummy, time dummies
and demographic variables. We nd that subjects who perform better under a piece rate
continue to perform signicantly better in the contests.
In the second model, the dependent variable is the performance gap. Recall that the
performance gap is dened as one's average performance in contests minus the piece-rate
performance. The explanatory variables are the treatment dummy, time dummies and
the player type dummy which equals 1 if the participant lost the contest and 0 otherwise.
Further, we include an interaction variable between the treatment dummy and the player
type dummy. Model (2) shows that losers tend to have a signicantly lower performance
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gap than winners at the 1% level in both treatments. Given the opposite signs of the
performance gap by winners and losers, this nding means that a loser (winner) performs
signicantly worse (better) in contests than in the piece rate. Hence, our subjects react to
this special tournament design correctly. This is consistent with Conjecture 3.1. Note that
in model (2), the signicant dierence in the performance gap of losers and that of winners
is completely expected. Winners (losers) from the piece rate round are more likely to have
higher (lower) eort and larger positive (smaller) performance gap in the contests. What
we found interesting is the sign of the performance gaps of losers and that of winners. The
signicant negative (positive) performance gap of losers (winners) suggests a worse (better)
performance in contests than in the piece rate. This agains shows that our subjects respond
to dual incentives in contests correctly.
In the third model, we investigate the factors that impact the magnitude of the in-
dividual's performance gap. It shows that the magnitude of losers' under-performance is
signicantly larger than that of the winners' over-performance. This further conrms that
losers and winners have dierent incentives to exert eort. Furthermore, in all three models,
the insignicant coecients on the treatment dummy conrm that the leaderboard does not
have a positive impact on the average performance.
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Table 3.4: Pooled OLS on performance and performance gap
Models OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable performance performance gap absolute value of
performance gap
(1) (2) (3)






LB treatment 0.0966 0.0503 0.0381
(0.3577) (0.3851) (0.2780)
Type#Treatment
Loser#LB treatment 0.0238 -0.2506
(0.5969) (0.3984)
Time trend
Contest 2 -0.0521 -0.0521 0.1354
(0.2375) (0.2379) (0.2213)
Contest 3 0.4167 0.4167 0.0000
(2.886) (0.2886) (0.2026)
Demographics yes yes yes
*** Sig. at the 1 percent level, **Sig. at the 5 percent level, *Sig. at the 10 percent level
3.5.4 Impact of the leaderboard on self-sabotaging behavior
Our previous ndings point us to investigate whether there is an impact of the leaderboard on
the degree of self-sabotaging (i.e., extend of poor performance of losers). First, we classify
all groups into three categories, which are denoted as Clean (no self-sabotage), At-One
(self-sabotage ending up at a score of exactly one) and Below-One groups (where the self-
saboteur ends up with scores below one). For any group, the winner is always considered
not self-sabotaging. Hence, the group types are determined by what the losers do. If the
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loser from the group obtains a score higher than the tanking threshold, then the group is
considered a Clean group. If the loser nishes the game with a score of one, the group is
labeled as an At-One group. If the loser obtains a score lower than one, the group is known
as a Below-One group. According to our data, there is no winner who nishes the task with
a nal score equal to or less than one. Thus, all groups should t into these three categories.
The fractions of the three types of groups across the treatments are depicted in Figure 3.2.
Since laggards in both At-One groups and Below-One groups receive the same consolation
prize of AUD 5, there is no incentive for them to aim for a lower score. One would expect
very few Below-One groups. We observe that in the LB treatment, there is a larger fraction
of At-One groups compared to the negligible amount of Below-One groups. However, the
NO LB treatment does not show the same pattern. In other words, when the leaderboard is
displayed, more underdogs who opt for the consolation prize tend to try to deliberately with
a score of one which is the exact tanking threshold.
Figure 3.2: Fractions Of Three Dierent Types Of Groups In Two Treatments
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To test this visual observation statistically, we run a Multinomial Logistic Regression of
this three-level categorical group variable on the treatment dummy. While the coecient of
categorical group variable is our main interest, we control for other important factors in this
regression, including the ability dispersion within a group, the group ability and the trend
over time. The ability dispersion within a group is dened as the absolute gap between
two group members' performances in the piece rate round. Intuitively, the larger the ability
dispersion within a group, the lower the winning probability for the underdog and therefore,
underdogs from such a group should be more likely to self-sabotage. The group ability is
measured by the average performance of the two members in the piece rate. A higher group
ability hints at more competitive and able players. Such a group is more likely to be a Clean
group. Since the two-player groups are used as statistically independent observations in our
analysis, we cluster standard errors at the group level.
Table 3.5 reports our estimates. At the top we see the impact of the variables on a
group being Clean compared to At-One, while the bottom looks at the impact on being
Below-One rather than At-One. In the Clean group relative to At-One group model, no
signicant treatment eects can be found. This means that the leaderboard does not deter
self-sabotaging behavior on the group level, which provides evidence against Conjecture 3.5.
When we compare the impact on a group to end up Below One rather than At One, we nd a
positive eect of the LB treatment. The relative probability of being an At-One rather than
a Below-One is signicantly increased in the LB treatment. This means that if, everything
else equal, a group is moved from the NO LB treatment to the LB treatment, the relative
probability of being a Below-One group versus being an At-One group decreases by a factor
of 0.2709. Put simply, if a group is from the LB treatment, it would be more likely to fall
into the At-One category as compared to the Below-One category.
In summary, these ndings reject Conjecture 3.5 and suggest that the leaderboard does
not decrease the amount of tanking on the group level. However, the leaderboard has an
impact on the degree of self-sabotaging. In the LB treatment, tankers are more likely to sit on
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the tanking threshold rather than below the threshold. On the other hand, tankers in the NO
LB treatment tend to self-sabotage excessively and unnecessarily. Hence, the leaderboard
decreases the degree of unnecessary self-sabotaging in the contests. One possible explanation
is that when the leaderboard is available, underdogs attempt to climb to the highest possible
ranking on the leaderboard without forgoing the consolation prize, which is the threshold.
Sitting at the maximum score for the consolation prize could also be interpreted as sending
a signal to the public that they understand the game well and deliberately tank rather than
being bad at math.
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LB Treatment -0.7182 0.4876
(0.4484) (0.2187)
Ability Dispersion -0.3428 0.7098
(0.3288) (0.2333)
Group Ability 0.0555 1.0579
(0.2089) (0.2209)
Time trend
Contest 2 -0.2667 0.7659
(0.4241) (0.3249)




LB Treatment -1.3060** 0.2709**
(0.6367) (0.1725)
Ability Dispersion -0.4717 0.6240
(0.4507) (0.2812)
Group Ability -0.4231 0.6550
(0.3381) (0.2215)
Time trend
Contest 2 -0.1744 1.1906
(0.5623) (0.6694)
Contest 3 -0.5348 0.5858
(0.6944) (0.4068)
At One group is the base outcome. *** Sig. at the 1 percent level, **Sig. at the 5 percent
level, *Sig. at the 10 percent level
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3.5.5 Performance dynamics
On the individual level, the most intuitive qualitative method to analyze performance and
self-sabotaging behaviour is through observing individual performance dynamics directly 5.
By visualising individuals' performance patterns, we observe that almost all winners have a
similar upward performance trajectory. What is more interesting are the losers' performance
patterns. We identify three types of underdog performance patterns. A type 1 underdog
tries hard and competes all the way to the end of the game. Type 2 underdogs give up
easily and early in a contest. The third type refers to those underdogs who play the game
strategically. They try in the rst half of the game and consistently active self-sabotage in
the second half. Out of these three types, the last two types are self-saboteurs, while type
one underdogs play clean. We observe far more type 1 and type 2 underdogs than type 3
laggards, which suggests that most of losers do not play optimally.
Consider the two patterns of successful tankers (i.e., underdogs with a nal score of one
or less) in Figure 3.3. On the left panel, pattern 1 (red line) is a hump-shaped performance
curve, indicating a type 3 underdog. On the right panel, pattern 2 (red line) requires
underdogs to exhibit consistent lack of trying behaviour such that the score value always
stays within the threshold. This is typical type 2 loser behaviour. We nd that performance
pattern 1 is observed much less frequently than pattern 2 in both treatments. In the LB
treatment, 7 underdogs exhibit pattern 1 performance paths, while 26 underdogs show
pattern 2 dynamics. In the NO LB treatment, 10 losers are consistent with pattern 1,
while 18 underdogs adhere to pattern 2. Our qualitative data shows that the lack of
trying self-sabotaging is more prevalent than the active self-sabotaging. This observation
is consistent with the discouragement eect stated in Conjecture 3.3. Moreover, our data
visualisation shows that a substantial amount of successful tankers nishes the task with a
nal score of exactly one.
5 In Appendix A, we report all individual performance dynamics for all contest rounds.
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Figure 3.3: Typical performance patterns of successful tankers in contests
3.5.6 Self-sabotaging and the buttons clicked
Deliberate under-performance can be identied if a subject uses the LEAVE button and
the CONTINUE button. Hence, we quantify self-sabotaging behavior by counting the
total number of times an individual clicked these two buttons. More specically, we measure
active self-sabotaging by using the total number of clicks on the CONTINUE button and
lack of trying by using the total number of clicks on the LEAVE button. We then analyze
the total number of clicks within each group in every period. Table 3.6 reports the group
averages clicks on these two buttons and their standard deviations. We perform sign-rank
tests and nd that the clicks on the LEAVE button are signicantly more frequent in the
contests than in the piece rate (In the NO LB treatment, p = 0.043 for contest 1, p = 0.0149
for contest 2 and p = 0.0981 for contest 3. In the LB treatment, p = 0.0145 for contest 1,
p = 0.0315 for contest 2 and p = 0.0031 for contest 3). Compared to the piece rate, the
CONTINUE button is clicked signicantly more frequently in contest 2 and 3 in the LB
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Table 3.6: Average and standard deviation of the number of times the LEAVE button and
the CONTINUE button being clicked
NO LB LB
LEAVE CONTINUE LEAVE CONTINUE
Piece rate 0.2432 0.2162 0.1563 0.0625
(0.6414) (0.5838) (0.4479) (0.2459)
Contest 1 0.8108 0.5135 0.8750 0.4375
(1.6806) (1.1931) (1.6801) (0.9483)
Contest 2 0.8108 0.5405 0.7500 0.2813
(1.4877) (1.4258) (1.5240) (0.9583)
Contest 3 0.5946 0.4054 1.0313 0.2188
(1.1416) (0.9267) (1.8047) (0.4908)
treatment (p = 0.0791 for contest 2 and p = 0.0998 for contest 3), but not in any of the
contests in the NO LB treatment.
Within the contests, we nd no signicant treatment eect on the number of clicks on
either buttons. The CONTINUE button was clicked by less groups in the LB treatment
than in the NO LB treatment, but the dierence is not signicant (p values > 0.1 for all three
contests). Similarly, the dierence in the group average number of clicks on the LEAVE
button is not signicant (p values > 0.1 for all three contests).
Below, we plot the distributions of the number of clicks on the LEAVE button and on
the CONTINUE button by treatments and types of players (winner or loser) in Figure 3.4
and 3.5, respectively. It is obvious that losers clicked both buttons more frequently than
winners. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests conrms the signicant dierences in the distributions
of the clicks on both buttons between winners and losers (p = 0.008 for the LEAVE button
and p = 0.008 for the CONTINUE button). Hence, the under-performance of underdogs
in the contests is mainly due to actively clicking the LEAVE or the CONTINUE button
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rather than more genuine mistakes made under competitive pressure. These ndings support
Conjecture 3.2.
Figure 3.4: Number of clicks on the 'LEAVE' button by treatments and types of players
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Figure 3.5: Number of clicks on the 'CONTINUE' button by treatments and types of player
To test whether there is a leaderboard eect on dierent types of tanking we estimate
a Zero Inated Poisson model. This is appropriate as we have count data that represent
dierent types of tanking. That is, active self-sabotaging is measured by the number of
clicks on the CONTINUE button and lack of trying is measured by the number of clicks
on the LEAVE button). Table 3.7 reports estimates from estimating what inuences the
use of these ways of tanking. In model (1), the dependent variable is active self-sabotaging
and the explanatory variables are a player type dummy (loser or winner), treatment dummy
and time dummies. We nd that the player type dummy captures a signicant positive eect,
suggesting that losers are signicantly more likely to use the CONTINUE button, which
shows that losers exhibit active self-sabotaging behaviour. Moreover, subjects from the
LB treatment are less likely to self-sabotage actively than those from the NO LB treatment,
suggesting that a leaderboard marginally reduces active self-sabotaging behaviour. All
other factors do not have a signicant impact on active self-sabotaging.
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In model (2), the dependent variable is lack of trying (i.e., the number of clicks on
the LEAVE button). We again include a player type dummy, treatment dummy and time
dummies as regressors. Our data show that losers tend to skip more questions than winners.
No treatment eect can be established in model (2). Overall, our regression results conrms
that losers lose the game on purpose by using both active self-sabotaging and lack of
trying, rather than by making genuine mistakes.
Table 3.7: Zero Inated Poisson model on two types of self-sabotaging
Dependent variable ZIP model ZIP model






LB treatment -0.456* -0.274
(0.260) (0.413)
Time trend
Contest 2 0.045 -0.248
(0.332) (0.367)
Contest 3 -0.365 0.150
(0.348) (0.412)
Demographics yes yes
Estimates are conducted with robust standard errors clustered on the group level. *** Sig.
at the 1 percent level, **Sig. at the 5 percent level, *Sig. at the 10 percent level.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a contest model that rewards not only the winner with a winning
prize but also the poor performing loser with a consolation prize. Such a contest scheme is
often used to improve the competitive balance in sports competitions. However, this prize
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structure provides underdogs with an undesirable incentive to under-perform deliberately,
known as self-sabotage. We examine whether underdogs respond to this self-sabotaging
incentive in the laboratory. Moreover, we compare two treatments, one with a leaderboard
with pictures shown after each round of contests and one without. This treatment variation
tests whether status seeking is an ecient deterrence against self-sabotaging behavior. We
nd that underdogs under-perform through constantly skipping questions (lack of trying)
or by intentionally providing wrong answers (active self-sabotaging) in the contests. By
looking at individual performance dynamics, we observe that a poor performance is mainly
driven by lack of trying rather than active self-sabotaging. We propose that this is
because the latter strategy requires subjects to think strategically whereas the formal strategy
is less sophisticated. Although no signicant dierence in the amount of tanking can be
found across the two treatments, we nd evidence that the leaderboard is reduces excessive
self-sabotage. In the leaderboard treatment, underdogs who are prepared to self-sabotage in
order to obtain the consolation prize are more likely to tank just enough to reach the tanking
threshold. Losers that are successfully secure a consolation prize in the treatment without a
leaderboard are more likely to excessively self-sabotage. We conjecture that tankers in the
leaderboard treatment end up on exactly the score that yields the consolation prize because
they want to signal that they are actually not so bad at arithmetic but that they understand




Does joint liability reduce cheating in
contests with agency problems? Theory
and experimental evidence
4.1 Introduction
Contests can incentivise participants to cheat. The negative consequences are usually de-
signed to deter contestants from cheating. Matters become much more complicated if other
agents directly or indirectly benet from cheating and have an inuence on whether a
contestant cheats or not. A natural example of such a situation is sports, where often a
coach, an ocial or a doctor can inuence the decision to dope. In some instances athletes
might not even know that they are being administered illegal substances.1 However, there
are many other environments, where such an agency problem exists. Think of the recent
scandal in the automotive industry, where engine developers, who competed against other
rms' development teams, installed illegal software that reduced the measured emissions of
their engines. It became apparent that company executives had inuence over the decision to
1Examples are the state organised doping programs in the German Democratic Republic or more recently
the doping scandal at the Essendon Football Club in the Australian Football League.
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implement the software. In the Enron scandal, CEO Jerey Skillings, and to a certain degree
Anderson Consulting, were involved in decision making, when the CFO Andrew Fastow and
other executives illegally hid billions of dollars of debt (Watkins, 2003).
An intuitive remedy for such agency problems is to extend the liability for sanctions to
non-contestants involved in the cheating decision. This paper investigates if such a move
necessarily yields expected reduction in cheating. We show in a simple contest model with
agency that extending the liability from contestants to managers does not always decrease
over-all cheating. In some cases it can even increase the rate of cheating. Joint liability
decreases the cheating incentive of non-contestants while at the same time increases the
contestant's incentive. Non-aligned preferences of contestants and managers that result
from managers not exerting any contest eort and complex equilibrium eects are driving
the result that the magnitude of nes is crucial on whether joint liability reduces or increases
cheating. In order to test theoretical predictions we take our model to the laboratory. In a
two-by-two design we vary the sanctioning rule (individual liability2 versus joint liability) and
the sanction level (high versus low). Theory predicts that joint liability only reduces cheating
if nes are high but backres if nes are low. While our results conrm most qualitative
implications of the theory, we do not observe crisp equilibrium play. In particular we nd
that joint liability has the predicted cheating-reduction eect if nes are high, while it does
not backre under low nes.
There is some theoretical literature that investigates cheating in contests. Berentsen
(2002) analyzes cheating in a simple contest model between two asymmetric players, who
simultaneously choose whether to cheat or not and nds that in the resulting mixed-strategy
equilibrium the more talented player is more likely to cheat. Surprisingly, for a given
set of parameter values, the favourite has a smaller winning probability with cheating
opportunities than without. Gilpatric (2011) studies cheating behavior in a symmetric
rank-order tournament, where two players make eort and cheating decisions. Beyond some
2individual liability refers to the scheme that only contestant bears the consequence of cheating
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intuitive results, such as that cheating decreases with the probability of being audited and
increases with the gain from cheating, the main focus lies on the comparison of two dierent
audit systems  correlated audits where either all or none of the contestants are audited,
versus uncorrelated audits where audits follow a random draw. He nds that correlated
audits are more eective in deterring cheating. Stowe and Gilpatric (2007) extend Gilpatric
(2011)'s rank-order tournament model to discuss the impact of asymmetries among the
contestants. They demonstrate that whether the leading player or the trailing player has
a stronger incentive to cheat depends on the probability of an audit. When the audit
probability is high (low), the trailing (leading) player is more likely to cheat. Kräkel
(2007) studies cheating determinants in a two-stage cheating game between two heterogenous
players. By concentrating on the conditions required for an equilibrium without cheating,
he identies three eects that jointly determine the attractiveness of cheating: the likelihood
eect (i.e., cheating increases likelihood of winning), the cost eect (i.e., cheating aects
eort, which in turns aects eort costs), and the base-salary eect (i.e., a cheating player
would reduce his expected base salary since there is a chance that he will be caught).
Due to the fact that cheating is often concealed in reality and it is generally impossible to
identify how much cheating goes undetected, a substantial body of empirical work concerning
cheating is experimental. Faravelli et al. (2015) employ a real eort matrix task to investigate
the impact of the tournament incentives on cheating and nd that cheating is more likely
to occur in a tournament while eort (and output) is higher under an individual piece
payment. The authors allow subjects to select between these two payment schemes and nd
that dishonest people are more likely to self-select into competition. By using a maze-game,
Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010) again demonstrate that competitive pressure induces
cheating and nd that in a tournament, those individuals who under-perform tends to cheat
more, since for them the gain from cheating is larger. Aligned with prior work, Pettit et al.
(2016) point out that people cheat more to prevent a negative status change rather than
to gain a positive status in competition. Unlike the mentioned studies, which compare
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cheating in competitive and non-competitive environments, Cartwright and Menezes (2014)
investigate the impact of dierent levels of intensity of competition on cheating in the
workplace. They nd that high and low levels of competition can lead to less cheating.
The existence of competition only increases cheating propensities, if the level of competition
is intermediate.
All the theoretical and experimental studies mentioned above have individuals compete
and at the same time make the cheating decision. As mentioned earlier, in reality often other
agents have an interest in and an inuence on cheating. Just like contestants themselves,
managers who benet from outcomes of their contestants are not immune to unethical
behaviors such as cheating. A coach could tell an athlete to use performance enhancing drugs
to win a game (Dodge and Robertson, 2004). In an educational context, a teacher might
inate students' grades to improve their chance of getting into a good university (Jacob and
Levitt, 2003b,a). In a nancial company, a senior manager might suggest a nancial advisor
to misadvise for a higher commission to be promoted. As the largest corporate nancial fraud
and the biggest audit failure in American history, the collapse of the Enron Corporation
suggests that there are major systemic problems in corporations governance. Under the
former top levels of management's instructions, Enron's accountants inated earnings, hid
debts and concealed massive losses to manipulate the prot and its share price. Although
its former employee, Sherron Watkins, has explicitly warned the chairman and CEO about
accounting scandals, nothing has been done to deal with the company's highly questionable
practices. It is clear that far more employees may have contributed, including not only the
low level employees but also the top management level. To capture this form of cheating,
we distribute the contestant's cheating decision to the manager and allow them both to
implement cheating collaboratively.
Cheating in teams has so far only been investigated in non-competitive settings (Soraperra
et al., 2017). One possible factor that leads to more cheating when people work together is
the exposure to other peoples' unethical behaviors through communication (Kocher et al.,
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2017) and observation (Gino et al., 2009). Furthermore, Wiltermuth (2011) nds that people
are more likely to over-report their performance when the reward of cheating is shared with
another stranger than when it is completely captured by the actor alone. The increased
cheating in this case is caused by discounted moral concerns when benets of cheating
are shared. People are averse to cheating (Abeler et al., 2016; Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist
et al., 2009; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009). However, when cheating benets another person in
addition to oneself, people tend to discount the immorality of cheating and see themselves
as less unethical and therefore, more cheating occurs (Schweitzer and Hsee, 2002; Gino
and Pierce, 2010). Conrads et al. (2013) employ a simple die-rolling experimental design
which is borrowed from Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and conrm that there is a
positive impact of the team incentive on cheating behavior. They argue that the diusion
of responsibility could be another explanation for more observed cheating in team settings,
since the observability of one's actions is decreased within a team. Additionally, Gino et al.
(2013) point out that people genuinely care about the social utility of others to the extent
that they would cheat even if cheating only benets another person but not themselves.
Other researchers investigate the relationship between group identity and cheating. Cadsby
et al. (2016) show that people display in-group favoritism and tend to cheat more on behalf
of an in-group member to increase the payo of an in-group at the expense of an out-group
member. Danilov et al. (2013) nd that when group aliation is strong, the problem of a
nancial adviser deliberately recommending low quality products to customers is more severe
under a team compensation scheme. In spite of the apparent existence of the more pervasive
cheating in collaborative settings, there is little theoretical and empirical guidance as to the
impact of competitive settings on collaborative cheating with agency problems.
In competitions, the incentives of the manager to engage in cheating are aected by the
nature of her remuneration. A manager's payo often directly depends on the contestant's
performance which can be improved articially by cheating. In fact, an agency problem arises
in competitions because a non-liable manager always has the incentive to implement cheating
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on behalf of the contestant even if cheating hurts the contestant. The reason for this is simple.
Whenever unethical behavior is detected in competition, the contestants are the ones that
are penalized, whereas managers can escape punishment easily due to the fact that their
actions are dicult to observe and verify by the anti-cheating authorities. In what follows,
we will call a penalty system where only the contestant is sanctioned individual liability. An
agency problem occurs, because the incentives of the manager and the contestant are not
aligned. In order to align incentives of managers and the contestants, it may be appropriate
to extend the punishment to the manager if the contestant is caught cheating. That is to
say, the penalties incurred due to detected cheating contestant should be imposed on both
the contestant and the manager. We will call such a system joint liability. This practice is
common in situations where the identity of the oender is uncertain but the group that he or
she belongs to is well dened, which captures the characteristic of our model as it is dicult
for the authority to verify whether a cheating contestant is aected by his or her manager
or not. In September 2015, Volkswagen has been caught cheating in emission tests by tting
its diesel vehicles with defeat devices. At rst, only the VW engineer, James Liang pleaded
guilty to cheat on emissions tests. He was the rst person criminally convicted in relation
to this corporation fraud. In August 2017, the ex-top emissions compliance manager, Oliver
Schmidt, was accused of deceiving federal regulators and sentenced to 7 years in prison. The
justice has not yet been served after the lower level employees face prison sentences and
nes. A new lawsuit against the former CEO, Martin Winterkorn alleges that several parties
were involved in this massive fraud from their employees like engines experts and emissions
specialists to senior management like CEO and other ocers. The court case is still ongoing
today.
Previous legal, psychological and sociological research was particularly interested in
collective punishment as a mechanism to obtain compliance from others. Most studies
conrm that it is an ecient method when compared to individual punishment (Heckathorn,
1990; Miceli and Segerson, 2007; Pereira et al., 2015). The most closely related theory paper
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looking at the impact of joint liability on cheating under agency problems is Crocker and
Slemrod (2005). The authors develop a standard principal-agent model to study cheating
behaviour in the context of corporate tax evasion. In their setting, it is not the shareholders
of the rm, but their agent, a CFO who makes decisions about tax declarations. The CFO
possesses private information regarding the allowable deduction in taxable income and might
claim illegal deductions which incur penalties. Shareholders incentivise the CFO to lower the
company's tax burden by designing his compensation contract in the way that the CFO's
salary is inversely related to the eective tax rate. The paper then looks at the ecacy of
penalties levied on either the shareholders or the CFO alone and compare the incentives to
those under a joint liability regime. They nd that penalties imposed on the tax manager
are more eective in reducing evasion than are those imposed on shareholders. Our work
diers from this study in three key elements of the model we present below. Firstly, our
paper focuses on a top manager-contestant relationship. Second, in our model both parties
can inuence the nal cheating decision. Lastly, interesting equilibrium eects come from
the competition against other teams rather than from changes in the contract between the
parties. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst attempt to model and test
whether joint liability is more ecient in deterring people from cheating in contests with
agency problems.
We develop a game-theoretic model of a two-player contest and solve for equilibrium. In
our model, each contestant is paired with a manager to form a team. Our model has two
stages. In the rst stage, a contestant and a manager propose whether the contestant should
cheat or not in the upcoming competition. If both parties agree, then the agreed decision
is implemented. Otherwise the decision is determined randomly using a coin toss. If the
implemented decision is cheating, then the contestant's performance is enhanced. There is
a positive probability of being caught and receiving a xed ne. In the second stage, two
contestants simultaneously exert costly eort to ght for a share of a prize. We study this
contest model under individual and joint liability. Under individual liability, contestants
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bear the ne alone, whereas the same ne is shared by both the contestant and the manager
under joint liability. Our model provides a rst description of the impact of joint liability on
cheating and eort in contests. It shows that theoretically joint liability is not always a better
punishment regime. In fact, it can backre and encourage cheating instead if the original
punishment is not severe enough. More specically, when a ne imposed on cheating is low,
joint liability is ineective in preventing the manager from cheating at all. What made it
worse is that it induces more cheating behaviors of contestants. We show that joint liability
only reduces cheating when punishment is suciently severe. Our model also suggests that
optimal eort exertion of a contestant depends on the implemented cheating decisions of
both teams but not on the punishment regime.
We then implement our model in the laboratory via a 2×2 design with the aim to
test the model predictions and underlying mechanisms. We vary the punishment regime
(i.e., individual liability or joint liability). On the other dimension, we vary the size of
the ne (low versus high). Our main result corresponds with ndings of the theoretical
model that the amount of cheating decreases with joint liability when the ne is high. We
also nd, as predicted, that when a ne is low, joint liability has a signicantly positive
eect on the contestant's cheating incentive. In contrast to the model prediction, a low
shared ne under joint liability is still relatively eective in discouraging managers from
cheating. Hence, contradicting the theoretical predictions, the size of the ne does not aect
the manager's cheating incentive signicantly. Overall, joint liability performs similarly as
individual liability when the ne is low but it out-performs individual liability when the ne is
high. Generally, no dierences of eort exertion can be observed across dierent treatments.
However, a noticeable increase in contest eort and over-dissipation is observed if the own
team is cheating. This tendency, in contrast to theoretical predictions, is independent of the
opponent's implemented cheating decision. With these ndings, our experiments contribute
to the very limited literature that examines the interaction between distributed cheating
decisions and contests.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 lays out the theoretical
framework and derives the equilibrium predictions. In section 4.3, we introduce the exper-
imental design, hypotheses and procedures. Section 4.4 presents the results from the data
analysis, and the last section concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Model
We use a simple share contest model allowing for the possibility of cheating and a ne if
detected. Subsequently, we extend the model to a setting where the cheating decision does
not only depend on the contestant but also on the action of another player, which we will
call manager. For example, in sports contests with doping this could be a coach, sports
doctor or an ocial. There we study the average equilibrium cheating frequency under two
punishment schemes, the individual liability scheme and the joint liability scheme.
4.2.1 A two-player contest with cheating and audits
We have two contestants i, j ∈ {1, 2}. In stage 1 both contestants simultaneously choose
to cheat or not. Denote contestant i′s cheating decision as di ∈ 0, 1,where a value of one
indicates cheating. In stage 2, after observing the competitor's cheating decision, both
contestants simultaneously exert eort in order to determine the outcome of the contest.
The eort of contestant i is denoted by ei. In stage 3 random audits determine if cheating
that has occurred. Audits are individual and detect cheating if it happened with probability
p. If cheating is detected a contestant pays a ne. Further assume that the contestants only
receive a fraction r of their winnings S and have to give the remainder to somebody else
(e.g. manager, coach, or association).3 We express contestant i′s expected payo as
3This assumption does not play an important role yet but paves the way for the introduction of the
manager playing an active role later on.
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πi(ei, ej; di, dj) = rSi(ei, ej, di, dj)− ei − dipf, (4.1)
where Si is contestant i′s prize share and dipf is the expected ne. This setup implies that
we are normalizing the total prize to unity. This is without loss of generality. The ne
factor f < 1,measures the size of the ne as a fraction of the total prize. The prize share
Si is determined by a standard Tullock contest function, where eorts are augmented by an
eectiveness factor θ, which depends on the cheating decision. Cheating makes eort more




1 if di = 0
δ if di = 1,
(4.2)
where δ > 1. Under these assumptions contestant i′s share becomes:




if ei + ej > 0
θ(di)
θ(di)+θ(dj)
if ei + ej = 0.
Player j receives a share of Sj = 1 − Si, pays eort cost of ej and is ned an amount djpf
in expectation. This setup is the most tractable of the possible setups that do not assume
separability of cheating and eort decisions. Alternative ways of modeling the impact of
cheating, such as the reduction of marginal eort cost, yield similar equilibrium predictions
but are less tractable.
Optimal eorts
In the search for subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we start solving the model by rst
determining the equilibrium eorts conditional on the cheating decision. The Lemma below
describes the equilibrium eorts.
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(θ(di) + θ(dj)) 2
. (4.3)





(θ(di)ei + θ(dj)ej) 2







Note that the right-hand side is invariant to a swap of indices, which implies that in
equilibrium e∗i = e
∗




j in (4.4) and solving yields
e∗i =
rθ(di)θ(dj)
(θ(di) + θ(dj)) 2
.
Optimal eorts show an interesting dependence on the cheating decision. The contestants
exert the highest eorts when the contest is even. So if both either cheat or both abstain
from cheating, then nobody has an advantage in the contest and equilibrium eorts are
those a standard Tullock contest would produce. In the case of an unequal contest, where
one contestant has an advantage because he cheats while the competitor does not, eorts
are lower:




if di = dj
rδ
(1+δ)2
if di 6= dj.
(4.5)
The intuition for eorts being lower in an uneven contest is as follows. Compared to
somebody in an even contest, the contestant with an advantage has an incentive to reduce
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eorts for low and medium eorts of the opponent, since this saves resources without reducing
the share too much. For a high eort of the opponent it is optimal for the contestant to
exert higher eorts than in the even contest. Here the lower marginal cost of grabbing some
more of the prize dominates. On the other hand, the contestant with a disadvantage has
an incentive to increase eorts (compared to those in an even contest) for very low eorts
of the competitor in order to make up some of the disadvantage. For a medium or high
eort of the competitor, a lower eort than in the balanced contest is optimal, as increasing
the share of the prize has become to expensive. In equilibrium we end up in the medium
range of eorts, where both have lower best-response eorts in an uneven contestant than
in an even contest. This has interesting implications for the question of eorts and cheating
being strategic complements or substitutes. Cheating and eorts are complements if the
competitor cheats and substitutes if the competitor does not cheat.
Note that we assume the implemented cheating decisions are common knowledge to
both contestants before they choose eorts. In reality, however, one's cheating decision is
usually private information. If we relax this assumption, our two-stage game is equivalent
to a one-stage game where each contestant i simultaneously decides on the pair (di, ei).
An analysis of bayesian equilibrium is the natural solution concept. In Tullock contest
settings, however, incomplete information has received limited attention because of analytical
diculty. Fey (2008) shows the existence of equilibria in rent-seeking contests where player's
cost of eort is private information for two players. In his model, both players choose
eorts only and the eort cost is drawn independenly from a distribution before the game
is played. Kräkel (2007) investigates a rank-order tournament where cheating and eort
decisions are available between a favourite and an underdog. Moreover, cheating decisions
are modelled as incomplete information. In order to keep his model tractable, he focuses
on the no-cheating equilibrium and discusses whether one of the players has incentives to
deviate in this equilibrium. Gilpatric (2011) considers a rank-order tournament model where
the degree of cheating is common knowledge and demonstrates that the extent of cheating
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can be reduced by using two enforcements, the re-awarding system (i.e., the prize of the
top-ranked contestant is re-awarded to to the second-ranked contestant if the winner is caught
cheating) and the correlated audits (i.e., all contestants are checked for cheating or none are).
Given our contest model allows players to choose eort and cheating and it will be extended
to a contest among four players later on, with a focus on solving for all equilibria, we retain
the analytical tractability of Tullock's model by assuming it is a complete information game.
Equilibrium cheating decisions
We now turn to the cheating decisions. In order to determine the equilibrium cheating
decisions, we calculate the continuation payos for the four possible combinations of cheating
decisions. The continuation payo is:










Using our assumption on cheating eectiveness from Equation (4.2) in Table 4.1 we derive
a normal-form game with the payos that results from equilibrium continuation.
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4 − pf ,
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− pf r4 ,
r
4
Table 4.1: Normal-form rst stage of the two-player game given optimal continuation
Denoting the continuation payo of contestant i as πi (di, dj), we now look for dierent
kinds of equilibira. Cheating is a dominant strategy and the cheating game is a prisoners'
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dilemma if πi (1, dj) > πi (0, dj) for all dj ∈ {0, 1} . Checking the two resulting inequalities
reveals that the condition for such an equilibrium is a high cheating eciency.4 For a
moderate cheating eciency that makes cheating only a best-response if the other person
does not cheat, which implies πi (1, 0) > πi (0, 0) but πi (1, 1) < πi (0, 1), we have a chicken
game, with asymmetric equilibria, where one contestant cheats, while the other one does
not. For a very low cheating eciency, not to cheat is a dominant strategy and the unique
equilibrium implements the socially ecient outcome of both contestants not cheating. This
is summarised in Proporsition 4.1.
Proposition 4.1. The equilibrium cheating decisions in pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash
























2) = (1, 1) i δ ≥ δ̄
2. (d∗1, d
∗










2) = (0, 0) i δ ≤ δ.
Proof. It is straight-forward to check the inequalities. For (1) we require πi (1, 0) ≥ πi (0, 0)
and πi (1, 1) ≥ πi (0, 1). For (2) πi (1, 0) ≥ πi (0, 0) but πi (1, 1) ≤ πi (0, 1) are required, while
for (3) πi (1, 0) ≤ πi (0, 0) and πi (1, 1) ≤ πi (0, 1) is necessary.
As expected, the advantage cheating brings is the driving factor for how much cheating we
observe in a pure strategy equilibrium. For low δs, cheating does not occur. For intermediate
4We implicitly assume that the expected ne is not prohibitive (pf < r/4).
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values of δ, half of the players cheat and if the eectiveness of cheating is very high, then
everybody cheats. The expected ne pf , just as intuition suggests, has the opposite eect
on cheating. Similarly, the lower the fraction r of the prize retained by the contestant, the
higher the eectiveness of cheating has to be such that one ore both contestants cheat in
equilibrium.




, when the the under-
lying structure is that of a game of chicken with two asymmetric equilibria.
Proposition 4.2. Dene the probability of contestant i cheating when playing a mixed



















∀i ∈ {1, 2} .
Proof. For contestant 1 to be willing to randomise indierence is necessary and σ2π1 (1, 1) +
(1− σ2) π1 (1, 0) = σ2π1 (0, 1) + (1− σ2) π1 (0, 0) must hold. Solving for σ2 yields σ∗2. Sym-
metry implies σ∗1 = σ
∗
2.
The equilibrium cheating probability in the mixed-strategy equilibrium increases with
the eectiveness of cheating from zero at δ = δ to one at δ = δ̄. This observation is in
line with general intuition. Similarly, the cheating probability increases with the retention
fraction r and decreases with the expected ne.
It will prove useful for future comparison to reduce the dimensionality of the parameter
space by dening a constant h.
Denition. Dene h as the opponent's cheating probability that solves hπi (1, 1)+(1− h)πi (1, 0) =















Note that h can be interpreted as the opponent's cheating probability that makes a
contestant indierent between cheating and not cheating. This implies that for a cheating
probability of the opponent smaller (greater) than h (not) cheating is optimal.
Then we can replace the conditions in the Propositions above. For example, δ ≥ δ̄




becomes h ∈ [0, 1] and δ ≤ δ becomes h ≤ 1. Also the equilibrium
mixing strategy can be expressed as σ∗i = h.
Figure 4.1 plots the average cheating probability in the equilibria depending on h. The
average cheating probability, g, is calculated as (σ∗1 + σ
∗
2) /2. According to the Proposition
4.1, when h ≥ 1, both competitors play cheating as a pure strategy at equilibrium (i.e.,
(σ∗1, σ
∗
2) = (1, 1)) and therefore, g = 1. This relationship is captured by the at line segment
PSE1 in Figure 4.1. When h ≤ 0, there only exists a non-cheating pure strategy equilibrium
(i.e., (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) = (0, 0)), which yields g = 0. This is indicated by the at line segment
PSE2. When h ∈ [0, 1], in an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium of (σ∗1, σ∗2) = (1, 0) or
(σ∗1, σ
∗
2) = (0, 1), g is found to be 1/2 (i.e., see the at line segment PSE3). In addition, there
also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) = (h, h), g = h (i.e., see the upward
sloping line segment MSE). As expected the equilibrium cheating probability (weakly)
increases with h. Recall that a high value of h signies an environment that is cheating
friendly, because cheating is very eective at improving the outcome in the contest (i.e. a
high δ or a low expected ne pf).
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium cheating probabilities for individual cheating decisions
4.2.2 Non-liable manager with inuence on cheating
Let us now introduce the manager. We start with a scenario where the manager receives
a fraction (1− r) of the prize-share Si the contestant secures. The manager has an inuence
on the contestant's cheating decision but is not liable for it if the contestant is caught
cheating. Our new game now has four players, two contestants and two non-contestants that
have an input into the cheating decision and receive a share of the prize their contestants
receive. For simplicity we call the the non-contestants managers. Denote the four players as
{a1,m1, a2,m2}, where for example a1 stands for the contestant of team one, while m2 is
the manager of team two. A player can now be referred to as ri, where r ∈ a,m denotes the
role and i ∈ 1, 2 the team. The timing is as follows.
1. All four players choose their cheating intention dri ∈ {0, 1} .
2. For each team Nature picks one player at random with equal probability, whose
cheating intention is implemented. Denote the implemented decision for the contestant
i by di.
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3. Both contestants ai, i ∈ 1, 2, learn (di, dj) , i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j and choose eorts ei.
4. Payos are realised.
We model the distributed cheating decision as a random dictator mechanism. The random
dictator mechanism is chosen as a reduced-form description of an otherwise very complex
negotiation process. For a purely theoretical contribution, a more detailed modeling of
the intra-team bargaining would be preferable. Our choice is made with the experimental
implementation in mind, where simplicity is important in order to keep confusion and the
noise in behaviour resulting from it to a minimum. Our simple reduced-form mechanism
captures the salient feature of bargaining by ensuring that the likelihood of a contestant's
cheating increases with each team member's intention to cheat.
We, as usual, proceed backwards when solving the game for subgame-perfect equilibria.
When the contestants choose their eorts, the cheating decisions (d1, d2) have been imple-
mented. So the contestants' continuation payos are identical to those in the game without
an active involvement of a manager, as dened in Equation (4.1). This implies that Lemma
4.1 applies, and equilibrium eorts are given by Equation (4.5). Again, we assume the
implemented cheating decisions are common knowledge to both teams before contestants
choose their eorts. If we relax this assumption, our two-stage game is equivalent to a
one-stage game where each contestant i simultaneously decides on the pair (dai, ei) while
each manager i decides on dmi.
Now consider the choice of cheating intentions of the managers dmi, i ∈ 1, 2. It is easy to
see that the lack of liability for detected cheating leads to dmi = 1 being a dominant strategy
in the game that takes the equilibrium eorts as given. Regardless of the cheating decisions















The observation that the probability of the own team cheating increases by 1/2 if the
manager's intention is to cheat, in equilibrium she will always choose dmi = 1. This yields
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Non-liable managers will always choose to cheat, i.e. d∗mi = 1∀i ∈ 1, 2.
The payos for the contestants depending on the implemented cheating decisions are
identical to those in the individual choice problem laid out in Table 4.1. It turns out that
the conditions on parameters for contestants to have a dominant strategy in choosing dai
in the reduced normal-form game are identical to the individual case. The intuition behind
this is simple. Choosing dai = 1 increases the likelihood that cheating is implemented. Then
a contestant who prefers cheating regardless of the likelihood of the manager cheating will
choose dai = 1. Similarly, a contestant who prefers not to cheat to be implemented will
always choose dai = 0. Since the payos for the contestants are the same as in the individual















we obtain the following pure-strategy equilibria in weakly dominating strategies in the reduced















i2)=(1, 0; 1, 0) if h
I ≤ 1.
Proof. Denote the probability that the opponent implements cheating as µj. Then player
ai′s expected payo from choosing dai = 1 is given by
πai (1, d
∗
mi;µj) = µjπai (1, 1) + (1− µj) πai (1, 0) .
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Similarly, the payo form choosing dai = 0 calculates as
πai (0, d
∗
mi;µj) = µjπai (0, 1) + (1− µj) πai (0, 0) .
Note that the d∗mi = d
∗
mj = 1 from the proposition above.
µjπai (1, 1) + (1− µj) πai (1, 0) T µjπai (0, 1) + (1− µj) πai (0, 0) .









∀µj ∈ [0, 1]











∀µj ∈ [0, 1]
⇐⇒πai (1, 1) ≤ πai (0, 1) ∧ πai (1, 0) qπai (0, 0)
=⇒hI ≤ 0.
Recall that the constant hI is the probability of the opponent to implement cheating
that makes a contestant indierent between cheating an not cheating. The actual cheating
probability of the opponent (contestant aj) to implement cheating is calculated as (daj +
dmj)/2. If this actual cheating probability is greater than hI , then not cheating is optimal for
contestant ai. Now suppose contestant aj does not cheat (i.e. daj = 0), then the expected
probability of the opponent to implement cheating is equal to µj = (1 + 0)/2 = 1/2. In this
case, for hI ≤ 1/2, any contestant ai's best response is not to cheat. By symmetry, not
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cheating for both contestants becomes an equilibrium. Similarly, suppose that contestant aj
cheats (i.e. daj = 1). It follows that µj = (1 + 1)/2 = 1, which implies that for hI ≤ 1, not
cheating is a best response for contestant ai (i.e. dai = 0). Now we have to check if cheating
for contestant aj is a best response to contestant ai not cheating. The actual implemented
cheating probability of contestant ai is µi = 1/2. So for hI ≥ 1/2 daj = 1 is a best response
to dai = 0. So for hI ∈ [1/2, 1] we have two pure-strategy equilibria, where  additionally
to the two managers cheating  one of two contestants also cheats. Finally, in the same




, it follows that σ∗ai = 2h
I − 1 for i = 1, 2. We summarise the ndings in the
following proposition.
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hI ∈ [1/2, 1] .
To examine the overall amount of cheating at equilibrium when managers can inuence
cheating decisions, we dene the average cheating probability as







For each equilibrium identied in Propositions 4.4 and 4.5, g can be calculated accordingly:
1. When hI ≥ 1, in the cheating equilibrium, g = 1.5
2. When hI ≤ 1/2, in the equilibrium where contestants do not cheat (1, 0; 1, 0), g = 1/2.
6
5See the at dashed line segment PSEI1 in Figure 4.2.
6See the at dashed line segment PSEI2 in Figure 4.2.
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3. When hI ∈ [1/2, 1] , g = 3/4 in the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium (1, 1; 1, 0) or
(1, 0; 1, 1), 7or g = h in the mixed strategy equilibrium (1, 2h− 1; 1, 2h− 1).8
Figure 4.2 shows the plot of the average cheating probabilities for individual decision making
case (solid line) and compares it to the cheating probabilities under distributed decision
making where the contestant is fully liable for cheating (dashed line). Both correspondences
are increasing in hI , as one would expect. Recall that the manager always cheats in the
distributed decision-making case. This leads to weakly higher maximum and minimum
cheating probabilities for all levels of hI . In equilibria where the contestant can adjust his
own behaviour, such that he prefers the manager to cheat, there the cheating probabilities
are the same as in the individual decision case. In equilibria, where at least one contestant
cannot adjust her own behaviour such that she prefers the manager to not cheat, we have
a higher cheating probability in the joint decision making case. The cases where this leads
to strictly higher cheating probabilities in the joint decision case are for hI < 0and for
hI ∈(1/2, 3/4) .
7See the at dashed line segment PSEI3 in Figure 4.2.
8See the upward sloping dashed line segment MSEI in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of the average cheating probability between contestants only and
distributed decision regimes
Suppose that all equilibiria in a given regime at a given value of hIare all equally likely,
then the resulting expected cheating probability is higher under distributed decision making
for all values up to hI = 1 where cheating becomes a dominant strategy for the contestant in
both environments and everybody involved cheats with certainty. In summary, the addition
of a manager who is not liable for detected cheating to the cheating decision tends to lead
to an agency problem in teams, which tends to increase the prevalence of cheating.
4.2.3 Jointly liable manager with impact on cheating
We now turn to a regime, which only diers from the distributed cheating decision envi-
ronment described above by the payos. We want to see if making the manager liable for
detected cheating can overcome the problem that adding a non-competing agent with an
inuence on the cheating decision to the mix, tends to increase the equilibrium cheating
frequency. In this environment, the manager does not only receive a share 1− r of the prize
money but also has to pay his share of the ne if cheating is detected. Ideally, one would
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like to align the manager's and the contestant's incentives, such that the strategic situation
reduces to the case without an agency problem. However, even imposing joint liability does
not achieve this, since the manager cannot be forced to share the cost for the contestant's
eort in the contest. So introducing joint liability for nes, does not totally eliminate the
agency problem. The immediate consequence of joint liability is that the manager does not
have an incentive to cheat all the time anymore, as it was the case when the ne was solely
levied on the contestant. This deterrence eect has a negative eect on the equilibrium
cheating rate. However, there is also a countervailing eect. The contestant will now only
pay a fraction r of the ne if caught, which reduces the disincentive the ne has on her
cheating behaviour. So ex-ante the over-all eect of the shift in liability is unclear.
The expected payo for the contestants are now given by:
πai = rSi (ei, ej, di, dj)− ei − rdipf.
Note that the dierence to the individual liability case is that now the contestant only pays
her share r of the expected ne if she is caught cheating. Our rst observation is that this
dierence does not impact the equilibrium eorts since this changes neither the marginal
benet nor the marginal cost of eorts. This implies again that Lemma 4.1 applies, and the
equilibrium eorts are given by Equation (4.5). The continuation payos for the contestants
who are anticipating optimal eorts are given in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Contestants' continuation payos under joint liability
As in the other regimes, we can again calculate the probability of the opponent to
implement cheating as a function of the parameters that makes the contestant indierent
between cheating and not cheating.























we can now compare the resulting critical constant h in the individual liability systems,
which we denote by hI from now on, to the critical constant hJ under joint liability. The only
dierence is that under the joint liability regime the negative impact of the expected ne in
not divided by the share r. It is easy to see that hJ is greater than hI for all r ∈ (0, 1). This
has the important implication that the doping incentives are stronger for the contestant in
the joint liability case, which we establish formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6. Denote the dierent regimes as I for individual liability and J for joint
liability. Denote the optimal probability of cheating for contestant ai in regime K ∈ I, J for
given parameters δ, p and r and for a given implemented cheating probability of the opponent
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µj as σ∗K,ai, then we have




0 if hK < µj
∈ [0, 1] if hK = µj
1 if hK > µj.
Observe that for given µj, σ∗K,ai is increasing in h
K . Combining this with the fact hJ > hI
for given parameters implies inequality (4.8).
The proposition above documents the increased cheating incentive for the contestants,
which occurs since now the expected ne for cheating is shared with the manager. The share
of the ne borne by the manager causes a reduction in the managers' incentive to cheat.
Table 4.3 shows the managers' continuation payos depending on the team cheating or not
under the assumption that eorts will follow equilibrium.
Manager mj
dj = 1 dj = 0
Manager mi


































Table 4.3: Managers' continuation payos under joint liability
It turns out that depending on parameter values the managers either has a dominant
strategy to cheat or not to cheat.
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Lemma 4.2. In the joint liability regime, the optimal decision of the manager is9
σ∗mi =

0 if hJ < 1/2
∈ [0, 1] if hJ = 1/2
1 if hJ > 1/2
(4.9)
Proof. Checking the conditions for πmi(1, 1) Q πmi(0, 1) and πmi(1, 0) Q πmi(0, 0) reveals







Solving equation (4.7), which denes hJ for pf and substituting into the equality above yields
hJ Q 1/2.
According to the proposition above, joint liability over-all weakly reduces the cheating
incentive of the manager. For the case that the cheating eectiveness δ is low or the expected
ne for cheating pf is high, a manager does not any longer prefer to cheat if she is jointly
liable. The joint liability does not prevent the managers from cheating if the environment is
very favourable for cheating, though.
Interestingly, joint liability does not perfectly align the incentives of the contestants and
their managers. This stems from the fact that only the contestants have to bear the eort
cost from the competition. So there is still room for equilibrium cheating probabilities
to be distorted by the agency problem within manager-contestant teams. The question of
interest here is if joint liability, as simple intuition might suggest, always reduces the cheating
prevalence compared to the case where only the contestant is liable. The answer is no. As
we will show below, the equilibrium cheating probabilities with joint liability are lower for
9For notational ease, we drop the index for the regime in places where there is no risk of confusion.
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some parameter constellations, but equal or even greater than under individual liability for
other parameter constellations.
In what follows we will derive and describe the equilibria for dierent values for µj. It is
easy to see that for hJ < 0 all four players in the reduced game have a dominant strategy
not to cheat, which leads to an equilibrium without cheating. For hJ ∈ [0, 1/2] it is still
a best response for the managers not to cheat. Hence, the probability of the opponent to
implement cheating is µj = (σmj + σaj) /2 = σaj/2. Recall that any contestant ai has a
best response to cheat whenever µj is weakly below hJ . Suppose that the other contestant
does not cheat, which implies µj = 0. Then for contestant ai, it is a best response to cheat,
since hJ > µj given µj = 0 and hJ ≥ 0. With σai = 1 we obtain µi = 1/2, which in turn
makes the conjectured σaj = 0 a best response. Hence, for hJ ∈ [0, 1/2] there exist two
asymmetric equilibria, where one contestant cheats, while the other three players do not.
In the corresponding mixed strategy equilibrium we must have µi = µj = hJ ,which implies
that both contestants cheat with probability σ∗ai = σ
∗
ai = 2h
J ,since the managers do not
cheat. For the knife-edge case where hJ = 1/2, there exists a continuum of mixed-strategy
equilibria, where all four players are indierent and mix with probabilities, such that the
implemented cheating probability di is equal to 1/2. Any strategy prole (σm1, σa1;σm2, σa2)
that satises σmi + σai = 1∀i ∈ 1, 2 is an equilibrium.
If the environment is more favourable for cheating, i.e. hJ ∈ [1/2, 1], then the managers
have dominant strategies to cheat (dmi = dmj = 1). Now suppose that the contestant aj
does not cheat, daj = 0. Then µj = 1/2,which now implies that cheating is a best response
for contestant ai,since hJ ≥ µj. It remains to check if the assumption that contestant aj
does not want to cheat is actually true. With both team members of team i cheating, we
have µi = 1. Not to cheat is indeed a best response, since hJ ≤ 1. In this equilibrium we
can see that joint liability does not totally align the incentives of the two team members. In
one of the teams the manager and the contestant choose dierent actions. The contestant
would prefer if the manager did not cheat. In addition to the two asymmetric pure-strategy
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equilibria, a hybrid equilibrium exists where the managers cheat and the contestants mix.




J − 1. Finally for hJ ≥ 1, all four players have a dominant strategy to cheat,
which results in a cheating equilibrium. The following proposition summarises the equilibria.























a2)=(0, 1; 0, 0) , (0, 0; 0, 1) and g = 1/4,
12 or
(
0, 2hJ ; 0, 2hJ
)
and g = hJ


















a2)=(1, 1; 1, 0) , (1, 0; 1, 1); g = 3/4 or
(
1, 2hJ − 1; 1, 2hJ − 1
)
; g = hJ
if hJ ∈ [1/2, 1].14
4.2.4 Comparison of equilibrium cheating rates in the two regimes
Characterising the equilibria under both liability regimes, allows us to answer the question,
which regime yields lower predicted cheating rates. Figure 4.3 overlays the average cheating
probabilities in the two regimes. The solid line depicts the equilibrium average cheating
probability in the joint liability scheme, while the dashed line does the same for the individual
liability case. Note that the position of the dashed line depends on r. To see this take the
denitions of hIand hJ in equations (4.6) and (4.7). We see that hIconverges to hJwhen r
goes to one. For positive shares of the manager (i.e. 1 − r < 0), we have hI < hJ . Hence,
in Figure 4.3 the dashed line shifts to the the right when r decreases. On the other hand,
10See the at line segment PSEJ1 in Figure 4.3.
11See the at line segment PSEJ2 in Figure 4.3.
12See the at line segment PSEJ3 in Figure 4.3.
13See the at line segment MSEJ1 in Figure 4.3.
14See the at line segment MSEJ2 in Figure 4.3.
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when r goes to one, then the equilibrium cheating graph in the individual liability regime
converges to that under joint liability for hJ > 1/2. From the graph we can see that for
hJ < 1/2 the average equilibrium cheating probability is strictly higher under individual
liability. The incentive of the manager to cheat dominates. For higher values of hJ indicating
an environment that is more conducive to cheating, then the cheating probability tends to
be lower in the individual liability case. This is driven by the contestants reduced deterrence
in the joint liability case dominating the increased deterrence the joint liability regime has
on the manager.









. Then we can more precisely
summarise the results of our comparison.


























if hJ > 1/2.
Proof. This follows directly from propositions 4.4, 4.5 and 4.7.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of cheating rates under individual and joint liability















,which always exist since r < 1.






it follows that hI < 1/2 if hJ = h̃J . Now










With the previous proposition and and corollary we have shown that for any r there
exist parameter regions, where either the joint or the individual liability regime leads to a
strictly lower cheating probability. In environments with lower cheating incentives (i.e. low
cheating eectiveness δ,or high expected nes pf), joint liability is preferable due to the
less equilibrium cheating. In environments that are more favourable for cheating, individual
liability is preferred. In the next Section, we bring our model to the laboratory and check if
human behaviour is consistent with our model and if the policy implication from the model
are likely to be valid in reality.
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4.3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
In what follows we will present an experimental design, which will be used to test if the
general result from our model, that joint liability tends to lead to lower cheating rates in
environments with low cheating incentives, while putting all liability on the contestant is
theoretically preferred in environments where cheating incentives are strong. In our 2 × 2
design we vary the cheating incentives by employing two dierent ne levels fl and fh, as
increasing the ne reduces the cheating incentives. The other dimension is the liability
regime. In the individual-liability regime I the ne for caught cheating is borne by the
contestant alone. Under joint-liability J the manager and the contestant share not only the
revenue from the contest but also the ne if cheating is detected. We end up with the four
treatments Ifl, Ifh, Jfl, and Jfh. For the four treatments we choose the parameters such
that we obtain clear predictions on cheating. In the individual liability case for both nes
levels in equilibrium both managers cheat, while both contestants do not. This leads for both
Ifl and Ifh to a predicted cheating probability of 50%. In the joint-liability treatments the
equilibria dier. Here with a high ne in Ifh in equilibrium on average one contestant cheats,
while both managers do not cheat, which results in a cheating probability of 25%. For the
high-ne treatment Jfl in equilibrium on average still one contestant cheats. Now the lower
ne renders it optimal for both managers to cheat, which increases the average cheating
probability to 75%. Figure 4.4 shows the location of the treatment on the equilibrium map,
where the dark line captures the individual liability regime, while the lighter (red) lines
correspond to joint liability.
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Figure 4.4: Equilibria in the four treatments
The parameter values we use in order to obtain these equilibria are as follows. The
cheating eciency δ is set to 2. This means that if both contestants choose the same eort
and don't cheat, then switching to cheating unilaterally increases the prize share from 1/2
to 2/3. The contestant's share r is set to 2/3. This leads to equilibrium payos that are
similar between the manager and the contestant. In order to obtain payos in experimental
currency units that are of a reasonable size we choose a prize V of 90. 15 The probability of
getting caught cheating p is equal to 25 percent. The nes for the two treatments are set to
fl = 55 and fh = 65. The parameter values and the predictions are summarized in Table 4.4.
15In the model section we normalized the prize to unity. The prize V just scales contest revenue and
therefore equilibrium eorts and enters hJand hI in an obvious way: pf becomes pf/V and pf/r becomes
pf/rV,respectively.
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Ifl Ifh Jfl Jfh
Prize, V 90 90 90 90
Cheating eciency, δ 2 2 2 2
Probability of getting caught, p 25% 25% 25% 25%















Fixed ne, f 55 65 55 65
Cheating rate of contestants
σai = 0 σai = 0 σai = 1, σaj = 0 σai = 1, σaj = 0
σaj = 0 σaj = 0 or σai, σaj = 0.5 or σai, σaj = 0.5
Cheating rate of managers σmi, σmj = 1 σmi, σmj = 1 σmi, σmj = 1 σmi, σmj = 0







Table 4.4: A summary of values of parameters by treatment
Based on the parameters chosen, we then can derive the important theoretical predictions
on how players should behave in our experiment. Firstly, comparing predicted average
cheating probability across four treatments, shows that the Jfl treatment produces that
highest rate of cheating of 3/4, followed by the Ifl and the Ifh treatments where a cheating
rate of 1/2 is predicted. The Jfh yields the lowest predicted cheating probability of 1/4.
This can be summarised in Conjecture 4.1.
Conjecture 4.1. Theoretically, the average cheating probabilities across four treatments
follows a relationship of Jfh < Ifh = Ifl < Jfl.
From Equation (4.5) , we nd that eort is higher if symmetric implemented cheating
decisions are reached. Given contestant's and manager's cheating incentives at equilibrium,
the probability of having same cheating decisions implemented is the same between the
Ifh and the Ifl treatments, at 1/4. This probability is higher, at 5/8, in both the Jfh
and the Jfl treatments. This means average eort is predicted to be higher in the joint
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liability treatments than in the individual liability treatments. Hence, we summarize this in
Conjecture 4.2.
Conjecture 4.2. Induced by optimal cheating decisions of both teams, equilibrium eorts
across the four treatments follow a relationship of Ifh = Ifl < Jfh = Jfl.
A corollary to the above Conjecture, eorts should only depend on actually implemented
cheating decisions but not on treatments, once the cheating conditions are controlled for.
By design, in the Ifl and Ifh treatments, the size of the ne does not aect manager's and
contestant's cheating incentives. Therefore, under individual liability, contestants should not
cheat whereas managers should always cheat, which yields the following Conjecture:
Conjecture 4.3. Under the individual liability scheme (Ifl and Ifh), contestants never
cheat while managers always do.
Under joint liability, however, the magnitude of the ne plays an important role. While
a shared low ne is ineective in deterring managers from cheating, a shared high ne
eliminates manager's cheating incentive completely. The contestant's equilibrium cheating
incentive is not aected by the ne size. That is,
Conjecture 4.4. Under joint liability, managers are more likely to cheat in the Jfl treat-
ment, while the size of the ne does not impact the cheating behavior of contestants.
The experiment took place at the Adelaide Laboratory for Experimental Economics (AdLab)
at the University of Adelaide. For each treatment we ran three sessions. All 12 sessions were
programmed and implemented using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 248 subjects were recruited
using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Each subject participated in
one session only.
Upon arrival the subjects were randomly assigned to a computer. The instructions were
distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. Subjects then were required to answer
test questions correctly to proceed to the actual experiment. In each session, subjects were
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placed into teams of two. We randomly assigned roles (one contestant and manager per
team), which stayed the same for the whole experiment. Then two teams were randomly
matched to compete against each other. Matched teams competed in 20 identical rounds
of the two-stage contest game with cheating. In the rst stage both players, contestant
and manager, made their individual cheating decision. One of the decisions was randomly
selected and implemented as the team's decision for this round. Thereafter, all individual
and implemented cheating decisions were displayed to the contestants. In the second stage
contestants had to decide on how much eort to exert. To help them with their decisions,
competitors were provided a prot calculator on screen, which calculated the resulting
prize share and the manager's and contestant's prots (not including potential nes) for
hypothetical eorts the contestants entered. The managers who could not inuence their
contestant's eort choice observed all actions (including the hypothetical prot calculations)
of their contestant on their screens. At the end of each round, all subjects were informed if
their team was caught cheating and learned the eorts of both contestants and the resulting
prize shares. Furthermore, both manager and contestants learned their and the their team
member's payo for the round. All payments were in ECU, which were converted into AUD
at an exchange rate of 10:1 (10 ECUs for 1 AUD). A session lasted on average 1 hour and 20
minutes, during which participants earned 26.23 AUD on average, which included a show-up
fee of 5 AUD.
4.4 Results
In this section, we present the main results. We rst present summary statistics on the
prevalence of cheating and on eort levels. After that we investigate the aggregate dynamics
of cheating. Next, we conduct regression analysis on the individual level in order to gain an
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insight on the drivers behind the aggregates. Finally, we take a closer look on the impact of
treatments on individual eort exertion and competitiveness.
4.4.1 Aggregate cheating
Table 4.5 reports the average proportion of cheating subjects by treatment and role. Initially,
we report raw proportions and make no judgments on statistical signicance. In later
sections we will use panel data analysis for this purpose. 16 On average, we observe
similar proportions of cheating subjects, slightly over 60%, in three treatments (Ifh, Ifl
and Jfl). In the Jfh treatment, however, this proportion is noticeably lower at 53%. Given
a certain punishment regime (individual liability or joint liability), average cheating tends to
be somewhat higher when the ne is low than when the ne is high. On the other dimension,
we observe that for a high ne joint liability seems to outperform individual liability (Jfh
has lower cheating rates than Ifh). The dierence between the regimes is negligible when
nes are low.
Next we break the overall cheating proportions into two components: the proportion of
cheating decisions made by contestants and by managers. The highest and lowest fraction
of cheating contestants is found of occur in the Jfl (62.3 and the Ifh(41.7 treatments.
Moreover, contestants are more inclined to cheat under joint liability (Jf (h and l )) than
under individual liability (If (h and l )). This shows that the joint liability regime causes
unwanted increased cheating incentives for contestants, as suggested by theory.
We now consider the data of cheating managers. A similar proportion of cheating
managers, slightly over 80%, is observed in the If (h and l ) treatments. The fraction
of cheating is approximately 18% and 24% lower in the Jfl and the Jfh treatments. This
16The appropriate level of an individual observation for a non-parametric test is a that of a matching group
of two teams, which leaves us with too few observations (about 15 per treatment) for meaningful statistical
tests.
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implies that that managers respond to joint liability (Jf (h and l )) with reduced the
cheating.
Treatments
N Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of
Obs. cheating subjects cheating con. cheating mana.
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Jfl 1120 0.621 0.485 0.623 0.485 0.620 0.486
Jfh 1200 0.53 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.560 0.497
Ifl 1360 0.624 0.485 0.446 0.497 0.801 0.399
Ifh 1280 0.610 0.488 0.417 0.493 0.803 0.398
Table 4.5: Averages and standard deviations of total cheating, cheating contestants and
cheating managers
In a rst summary, we do not observe crisp equilibrium behaviour. However, the data
reveal regularities that qualitatively agree with theory. On aggregate the ne matters for
cheating under joint liability but not under individual liability. Managers cheat more under
individual liability, while contestants cheat more under joint liability. The clearest deviation
from theory is that managers are not as reactive to the ne level under joint liability as
theory suggests. Note that in theory conditional on subgame-perfect eorts managers have
dominant strategies to cheat in the Jfl and not to cheat in Jfh, while in the experiment the
cheating fractions for the two treatments only dier by 0.06 percentage points.
4.4.2 Overall cheating dynamics and cheating patterns by role
The environment is quite complex and strategically rich. Therefore, learning to play the
game might play an important role. Figure 4.5 plots the proportion of cheating subjects per
period and per phase (a phase consists of four periods). As expected, there is quite some
across-period variation. The highest and the lowest fractions of cheaters are observed most
frequently in the Jfl and the Jfh treatments. From the right panel where we smooth out
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some of the short-term variation by aggregating four periods, we observe more clearly that
the Jfl, Ifh and Ifl treatments yield similar proportions of cheating subjects, while the
Jfh treatment results in a smaller fraction of cheaters over time. Moreover, we observe a
downward trend of the average cheating probability over phases in the Jfh treatment, while
no clear time-trend can be established in other three treatments.
Figure 4.5: Proportion of cheating subjects over time by treatment
In order to understand which type of players causes the overall cheating rate to be lower in
the Jfh treatment, we compare the evolution of cheating behaviour by roles and treatments.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the proportion of cheating contestants per period in the upper left
panel. The smoothed cheating fractions of contestants per phase is depicted below in the
lower left panel. The proportion of cheating managers by period and phase can be seen in
the two panels on the right.
First consider the cheating dynamics of contestants on the left two panels. Among the
four treatments, the Jfl treatment has the highest fraction of 60% cheating contestants per
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phase. In the Jfh treatment, approximately 60% contestants cheat in the rst two phases
and this fraction decreases noticeably in the next three phases. In both the Ifh and the
Ifl treatments, between 40% to 50% cheating contestants per phase is observed. This is in
strict contrast to Conjecture 4.3, which states that the equilibrium prediction of cheating
contestants should be zero in these treatments.
When analysing the proportion of cheating managers over time, our data tells a dierent
story. Not surprisingly, the highest rate of 80% over phases is observed under individual
liability, which is still lower than the model prediction of 100% and therefore violates
Conjecture 4.3. The lack of a time-trend towards higher levels of cheating is suggestive
evidence against confusion driving compliance in this case. A possible explanation for
non-cheating managers, who do not have to fear a penalty can be social preferences. A
large body of existing researches shows that people do not only care about their own payos,
but also payos of others when their actions aect others' payos (Charness and Rabin,
2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Chen and Li, 2009). Comparing to joint liability treatments,
payos in individual liability treatments are more likely to be unequal between a manager
and her contestant. Hence, managers who care about fairness and the payo equality with
their contestants could show concern for their contestants, who suer from managers cheating
and therefore, choose to not cheat even though the non-cheating decision does not maximise
their own monetary payos. Moreover, we observe that managers do not respond to the
ne level under joint liability. Theory predicts that managers always cheat if the ne is
low and never do so if the ne is high. Given subgame-perfect continuation eorts managers
have dominant strategies. Taking into account of social preferences, managers could be more
likely to cheat. This is because when managers share the ne with their contestants, they
might nd it easier to justify their cheating action than when they do not share the ne at
all. However, social preferences fail to explain managers under-cheating in the Jfl treatment
and over-cheating in the Jfh treatment. In contrast, contestants should not react to the ne
level under joint liability. This is an equilibrium prediction though and therefore depends
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on the behaviour of the managers. Given the very similar behaviour of the managers in the
two join liability treatments, contestants have a higher cheating incentive in the low ne
environment. In this light the observation that contestants cheat more in Jfl than in Jfh
becomes rationaliseable.
Figure 4.6: Proportion of cheating subjects over time by role and treatment
Given these observations we can assess, where the two main deviations from theory with
respect to the comparative statics of cheating result from. First of all the, the best perfor-
mance of the joint liability regime with high nes Jfh with respect to cheating prevention,
does not stem from the dierent behaviour of managers when nes rise but result from the
reaction of contestants to the changed cheating incentives given that managers do not react
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to it. Similarly, the observation that joint liability with low nes does not backre and lead
to the highest cheating incidence also stems from the fact that managers do not react to
nes. Instead of switching between cheating and not cheating if the ne changes, they cheat
under both ne levels about 60% of the time.
A further illustration for the observation that nes have no eect on cheating behaviour
in the individual liability regime, while they do under joint liability. For this we classify each
team choice into one of the four natural categories: no one cheats, only manager cheats,
only contestant cheats and both cheat. For further reference denote these categories as
no, man, con and both, respectively. We then plot the distributions of the team type
by treatment in Figure 4.7. Clearly, the distributions are virtually identical under individual
liability (in the If (h and l ) treatments) but dier under joint liability. There we observe
more no one cheats and less both cheat teams in the Jfh treatment than in the Jfl
treatment.
Figure 4.7: Histogram of types of teams by treatment
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4.4.3 Treatment eect on cheating
After the descriptive aggregate analysis, we will use panel-data models to further investigate
the determinants of cheating behaviour. Conditional on the validity of the underlying
statistical assumptions, we will also establish the statistical signicance of our results. We
start by running a random-eects logistic regression on the team's nal cheating decision and
use treatment dummies as the explanatory variable 17. Since subjects are learning in early
periods, the choice made early are typically noisy. Therefore, we run the regression twice.
The rst model considers all periods, while the second model covers the last three phases
(periods 9 to 20), where we expect less noise, since subjects are familiar with the game. In
Table 4.6, we report both the estimated coecients and the corresponding marginal eects
of both models. In the full model, teams tend to be less likely to cheat in the Jfh treatment
than in the other treatment (p = 0.076 for Jfh versus Jfl; p = 0.1496 for Jfh versus Ifl;
p = 0.1731 for Jfh versus Ifh). The marginal eect dierences are between 0.08 and 0.11.
The result that joint liability with high nes is best at deterring cheating becomes stronger
in the last three phases, where teams are less likely to cheat in the Jfh treatment than
all other three treatments (p = 0.053 for Jfh versus Jl; p = 0.0858 for Jfh versus Ifl;
p = 0.0806 for Jfh versus Ifh). The marginal eect dierence are now between 0.12 and
0.14. On the team level, we observe that the Jfh treatment is performing best as Conjecture
4.1 suggests. Contrary to the expectations, the Jfl treatment is not the worst performing
treatment, violating Conjecture 4.1.
17 Recall that team's cheating decision is randomly chosen from the manager's and the contestant's cheating
decisions
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All phases Last three phases





Jfh -0.5634* -0.1103* -0.7844* -0.1425*
(0.3208) (0.0616) (0.4057) (0.0726)
Ifl -0.1270 -0.0241 -0.1185 -0.0209
(0.3081) (0.0585) (0.3938) (0.0693)
Ifh -0.1460 -0.0278 -0.1014 -0.0178
(0.3115) (0.0593) (0.3973) (0.0698)
Intercept 0.7003*** 0.7059**
(0.2282) (0.2916)
*** Sig. at the 1 percent level, **Sig. at the 5 percent level, *Sig. at the 10 percent level
Table 4.6: Logistic regression on individual cheating decision with clustered standard errors
Next, we analyze cheating determinants on the individual level. To allow for the correla-
tion between subject's cheating decisions across 20 periods and the correlation between two
team member's cheating decisions, we use a multilevel mixed-eects logistic regression model
with a random intercept for individuals and a random intercept for teams. The dependent
variable is the individual's cheating decision, with 0 and 1 corresponding to not cheating
and cheating, respectively. The independent variables of major interest are treatment
dummies, role dummies and the interaction term between the two. We further include time
dummies and subject's characteristics as additional explanatory variables. Table 4.7 presents
the estimated coecients and the corresponding marginal eects of the full model and that
of the model with the last three phases.
The full model regression reveals that the likelihood of a contestant cheating is signi-
cantly higher in the Jfl treatment than in the Ifl and the Ifh treatments with a p value
of 0.011 and 0.003, respectively. However, the propensity of contestants to cheat is not
signicantly dierent between the Jfh and the Ifl treatment (p = 0.4220) and between the
Jfh and the Ifh treatments (p = 0.2276). This shows that the counterproductive incentive
of joint liability on contestants who now bear less of the ne is only triggered if the ne
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is low. The manager's cheating probability is signicantly higher under individual liability,
i.e. in the If (h and l ) treatments than in the Jf (h and l ) treatments (both signicant
on the 1% level). Signicant time eects are found between the rst phase and three later
phases, indicating a noisy environment in earlier periods. Our main results on cheating
behaviour of contestants and managers are robust to the use of just the last three periods.
Additionally, under the joint liability schemes, now managers are not aected by the size of
the ne whereas contestants are signicantly less likely to cheat in the Jfh treatment than
in the Jfl treatment (p = 0.026). This nding agrees with descriptive ndings from above
and are in conict with Conjecture 4.4.
In short, we conrm what our descriptive analysis already revealed. Managers and
contestants behave similarly in the individual liability treatments (Ifh and the Ifl) . The Jfl
treatment has a positive impact on the compliance of contestants but a negative impact on
that of managers when compared to both the Ifh and the Ifl treatments. These two eects
oset each other, erasing part of the theoretical treatment eect on total cheating. Therefore,
the Jfl treatment performs similarly to the Ifh and the Ifl treatments. Consequently, the
Jfh treatment is the only treatment that yields a dierent level of over-all cheating because it
has no signicant impact on contestants while its negative impact on managers is persistent,
when we compare it to the Ifh and the Ifl treatments. If we compare it to the low Jfl
treatment, then in contrast to theory the behaviour of the contestants rather than that of
the manager makes the dierence. In summary, in contrast to the theoretical prediction, we
do not nd the highest rate of cheating in the Jfl treatment. The potential of joint liability
backring if nes are low, which is predicted by theory, does not occur. However, the Jfh
treatment results in a signicant reduction in the average cheating rates, as predicted in
the model but driven by the reaction of contestants to managers that are non reactive to
ne levels rather than by managers who reduce their cheating if nes are high. This implies
that the joint liability scheme performs at least as well as the individual liability scheme
empirically.
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Treatment interacted with Role (Base: Jfl#Contestant)
Jfl#Manager -0.2010 -0.0436 -0.3583 -0.0718
(0.4712) (0.1022) (0.6347) (0.1272)
Jfh#Contestant -0.8073 -0.1882 -1.7150** -0.3882**
(0.5213) (0.1189) (0.7712) (0.1579)
Jfh#Manager -0.5674 -0.1295 -0.7940 -0.1705
(0.5198) (0.1174) (0.7597) (0.1609)
Ifl#Contestant -1.2014** -0.2844** -1.7272** -0.3909**
(0.5041) (0.1124) (0.7441) (0.1511)
Ifl#Manager 1.3363** 0.2005 1.6834** 0.1938*
(0.5184) (0.0850) (0.7659) (0.1056)
Ifh#Contestant -1.4164*** -0.3346*** -2.009*** -0.4504***
(0.5107) (0.1111) (0.7500) (0.1441)
Ifh#Manager 1.1190** 0.1860 1.6332** 0.1909*
(0.5175) (0.0865) (0.7678) (0.1059)
Phases (Base: 1st Phase; 3rd Phase)
2nd Phase -0.2671** -0.0520**
(0.1187) (0.0231)
3rd Phase -0.1627 -0.0314
(0.1190) (0.0230)
4th Phase -0.4115*** -0.0809*** -0.3101** -0.0535**
(0.1185) (0.0233) (0.1316) (0.0229)
5th Phase -0.2740** -0.0534** -0.1390 -0.0239
(0.1187) (0.0231) (0.1319) (0.0227)
Controls (periods, age, gender, math, degree) not signicant
Intercept 1.5770*** 0.6210** 2.0191** 0.6088***
(0.5617) (0.0278) (0.8137) (0.0382)
*** Sig. at the 1 percent level, **Sig. at the 5 percent level, *Sig. at the 10 percent level
Table 4.7: Mixed eects logistic regression on individual cheating decision
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4.4.4 Average eort and over-dissipation
Moving to the second stage of the game, we analyze the eort decisions. Table 4.8 reports the
average eorts and the average deviation from of optimality. The deviation from optimality
is calculated by taking the dierence between the eort and the optimal eort conditional
on the eort of the competitor. A positive deviation from optimality implies over-exertion
of eort, while a negative value implies under-exertion. The average eorts are very similar
across four treatments with a minimum of 16.5 in the Jfl treatment and a maximum of
18.88 in the Ifh treatment. The mean values for average deviation from optimality in all
treatments are positive, suggesting an over-exertion of eorts in contests. This nding is
consistent with the literature (Chaudhuri, 2011; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Sheremeta, 2018).
Treatments
N Average Average
Obs. Eort Dev. f. Optimality
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Jfl 560 16.500 7.950 2.1964 7.9346
Jfh 600 18.870 15.510 4.5367 15.5178
Ifl 680 17.794 13.183 3.5049 13.1840
Ifh 640 18.880 13.942 4.6089 13.8229
Table 4.8: Averages and standard deviations of eorts, optimality and over-dissipation
4.4.5 Dynamics of eort
We now examine the dynamics of eort exerted by contestants over time. Figure 4.8 depicts
the average eort per period in dierent treatments in the left panel and the average per
phase in the right panel. In the rst period, the average eorts all start at about 22 to 27 and
in all treatments decrease dramatically over the next ve to seven periods. The extremely
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high eorts in early periods, especially the rst period, are due to strategic confusion among
subjects at the beginning of the experiment. Once they receive payo feedback and realize
that over-exertion leads to low or even negative prots, most subjects drastically reduce
eorts in the following periods. From the second phase onward, the eort slowly trends
upwards again in all treatments except for the Jfl treatment, where it gradually declines
further until the end. The upward trend suggests a more competitive environment in later
periods. Moreover, according to the theoretical model, the optimal eorts are 15 if the two
teams have the same nal cheating decisions and 13.5 if they have dierent nal cheating
decisions. We observe that the actual eorts are consistently above the optimal levels in
all treatments, which reveals that our subjects, on average, do not play subgame-perfect
continuation eorts. Overall, the eorts are very similar across treatments, though.
Figure 4.8: Average eort by treatment over time
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4.4.6 Over-dissipation
Noticing that average eort are consistently higher than the equilibrium eort, we next
analyze over-dissipation of contestants. Figure 4.9 depicts actual eorts of contestants
against the best response to their competitor's eort. We overlay this by a quadratic tting
line. We calculate the best response eort by substituting the opponent's actual eort and
implemented cheating decisions of both teams into the best response equation 4.4.
In all treatments, the quadratic prediction is above the 45-degree line, conrming a
consistent over-dissipation across treatments. Moreover, we observe that when the best
response eort approaches zero, the deviation of one's own eort from the optimal level is
larger, as shown by the wider gap between the quadratic prediction and the 45-degree line
for low values. This implies that when the opponent of a contestant exerts an extremely
high eort, the contestant on average also puts in an eort well above the optimal level,
suggesting that contestants become more irrationally competitive if their rivals are irra-
tionally over-competitive. Some of these extremely over-competitive periods are repeated
between rivals across periods and become feuds. The problem of over-dissipation becomes
less severe when both contestants exert a reasonable eort. This can be seen as actual eorts
cluster around the equilibirum-eort levels of 13.5 and 15. Our result shows that when an
opponent's deviation from the equilibrium eort is large, the contestant is more likely to act
irrationally and therefore, over-dissipation of eort becomes more severe. However, when
both contestants are not engaging in feuds, then average eort decisions are close to the best
response eorts as predicted by theory. Quite a bit of noise remains though.
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Figure 4.9: Eort versus best response eort by treatment
We are now interested in which factors can explain the over-dissipation of eort. For
this we employ a random-eects interval-data regression. The dependent variable, over-
dissipation, is point data which is left- and right-censored. This is accounted for by the
use of an interval regression. The covariates include treatment dummies, interaction terms
between the own team's and the rival team's cheating decision, time dummies as well as
subject characteristics.
The estimated coecients are presented in Table 4.9. First, over-dissipation is signicant
and positive in all treatments in the full model (p − values of 0.015 for the Jfl, 0.000 for
the Jfh, 0.001 for the Ifl and 0.000 for the Ifh treatments). In the model containing only
last three phases, over-dissipation of eort persists in the Jfh (p = 0.009), the Ifl (p = 0.05)
and the Ifh (p = 0.010) treatments while it is no longer signicantly dierent from zero
in the Jfl treatment (p = 0.164). In addition, given that over-dissipation is a function of
implemented cheating decisions and eorts, the result shows that as predicted by theory
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and a corollary to Conjecture 4.2, controlling for the cheating decisions, treatments have
no impact on over-dissipation. Moreover, inspecting the coecients on the interaction term
between two team's cheating decisions, we observe that over-dissipation is signicantly higher
when one's own team is cheating, given the opponent team's cheating decision. We obtain
a p value of 0.024 for Not cheat× Not cheat teams versus Cheat×Not cheat teams and
a p value of 0.0424 for Not cheat×Cheat teams versus Cheat×Cheat teams in the full
model. This shows that it is mainly one's own cheating decision that has an impact on the
eort rather than whether the contest is symmetric or not. It seems as if contestants have
the feeling that they need to make it count when they cheat. The same positive eects of
the team's implemented cheating on over-dissipation is persistent in the model that includes
only the last three phases. Finally, over-dissipation is signicantly more prevalent in the rst
phase when subjects are most confused and are still guring out how to play the game. This
time eect on over-dissipation disappears after the rst phase.
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Own team cheat interacted with opponent
team cheat
(Base: Not cheat×Not cheat)
Not cheat×Cheat 0.7547 0.5419
(0.8050) (0.8743)










4th Phase -2.4425*** -0.3975
(0.7207) (0.6040)





*** Sig. at the 1 percent level, **Sig. at the 5 percent level, *Sig. at the 10 percent level
Table 4.9: Random-eects interval-data regression on over-dissipation
18Except for gender eect which is siginicant at 8% level in the full model
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4.5 Conclusion
Individual contestants often interact with other agents and work as a team in competitions.
The agency problem that agents have incentives to cheat on behalf of their contestants, since
they are not bearing the negative consequences if caught has received insucient attention
by economists. A natural remedy for such a moral hazard model is to extend the liability
to the agent. We have shown in theory that this can backre if nes are low, as now the
deterrence eect for the acting contestants are reduced. In order to get a clearer picture if
a) the joint liability can really backre for low nes and b) if joint liability really reduces
over-all cheating if nes are high we developed a two-player share-prize contest experiment
with four treatments. We vary the the enforcement regime between individual liability and
joint liability as well as the severeness of the ne. We calibrate the experiments such that we
get a crisp ordering of predicted cheating frequencies. Joint liability is theoretically eective
in reducing cheating if nes are high but is less eective than individual liability if the nes
are low.
The robust nding in our data shows that managers and contestants respond dierently
to the joint liability schemes, than to individual liability schemes. The cooperative statics of
individual agent and contestant behaviours across regimes are roughly in line with theoretical
predictions. We do not observed crisp equilibrium behaviour though. The comparative
statics in our data with respect to changes in the ne are o under the joint liability regime.
Agents do not react to changes in the ne level as predicted by theory. Contestants who
are not expected to react in equilibrium do react though. Under a high ne there is less
cheating among contestants under a joint liability regime. This is a reasonable reaction to
incentives and out of equilibrium behaviour of the agents. This very specic deviation from
equilibrium play implies that joint liability still delivers the expected reduction in cheating
if nes are high, without suering from the reverse eect if nes are low. Hence, imposing
joint liability for cheating on agents is shown to be a benecial policy despite the theoretical
potential to backre. Joint liability under high nes has the additional benet of potentially
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being able to reduce over-dissipation of rents in contests with cheating, as our analysis of
eorts has shown that contestants over-exert more eorts when their teams are cheating.
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Appendix A
Additional Information on Chapter 3
A.1 Performance dynamics by groups in contests
Figure A.1 to A.6 show performance dynamics of individuals by groups in each contest.
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Figure A.1: Performance dynamics by groups over contest 1 in the LB treatment
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Figure A.2: Performance dynamics by groups over contest 2 in the LB treatment
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Figure A.3: Performance dynamics by groups over contest 3 in the LB treatment
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Figure A.4: Performance dynamics by groups over contest 1 in the NO LB treatment
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Figure A.5: Performance dynamics by groups in contest 2 in the NO LB treatment
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Figure A.6: Performance dynamics by groups over contest 3 in the NO LB treatment
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A.2 Correction for the coding error
Due to the coding error made in the rst three sessions, subjects who lose the competition
with a score of two receive the consolation prize. This mistake aects seven subjects. The
rst time that the player nish the game with a score of two does not count since they have
not received the incorrect feedback from the program yet. It is only in the following contests,
their behaviors might be changed. To correct this mistake in the following tests, we identify
the rst time that subjects lose the game with a score of two in these three sessions. Then,
we mark the following two contests as being aected.
In Table A.1, we report the proportion of successful tanking subjects after taking into
consideration of the coding error. For subjects who are not aected by the error, successful
self-saboteurs are those who nish the tasks with a score of one or less. For those who are
marked as being aected, however, successful tanking means to achieve a nal score of two
or less. McNemar's tests report a consistent result as the previous case where the coding
error is omitted. The defeated players are more likely to have a poor performance in contests
than in the piece rate (p− values of 0.0027, 0.0002 and 0.0043 for the rst, second and third
contest, as compared to the piece rate round). Within each contest, no signicant proportion
dierence can be found between two treatments based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
(p > 0.1).
146
Table A.1: Proportion of successful tanking subjects after correction of the coding error
N Proportion of Successful
Participants Tanking Subjects1
Piece Rate
NO LB Treatment 74 5.405%
LB Treatment 64 7.813%
Contest 1
NO LB Treatment 74 13.514%
LB Treatment 64 15.625%
Contest 2
NO LB Treatment 74 20.270%
LB Treatment 64 15.625%
Contest 3
NO LB Treatment 74 14.865%
LB Treatment 64 20.313%
Taking into account of the coding error, we need to redene At-One and Below-One
groups. At-One groups now include groups with two kinds of losers. First, for those who
are not aected by the error, groups of losers who nish with a score of one are identied
as At-One groups. Additionally, for losers who are aected by the error, when they have
a nal score of two, their groups are classied into the At-One category. In terms of the
Below-One groups, if a loser is not aected by the error and nishes the task with a score less
than one, his or her group is referred to as a Below-One group. For a loser who is aected
by the error, his or her group is still Below-One if he or she nishes the task with a score
1In the piece rate, this is the proportion of subjects with a score of one or less
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less than two. As shown in Figure A.7, we nd consistent results as before. There are more
At-One than Below-One groups when the leaderboard is shown. On the other hand, there
are more Below-One than At-One groups when there is no leaderboad. With new types of
groups, we then run multinomial logistic regression on group types. Again, the result is
consistent.
Figure A.7: Fractions of three dierent types of groups in two treatments after correction
for the coding error
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LB Treatment -0.7103 0.4915
(0.4472) (0.2198)
Ability Dispersion -0.2980 0.7423
(0.3202) (0.2377)
Group Ability 0.08947 1.0936
(0.2092) (0.2288)
Time trend
Contest 2 -0.2676 0.7652
(0.4230) (0.3237)




LB Treatment -1.2916** 0.2738**
(0.5891) (0.1619)
Ability Dispersion -0.2992 0.7414
(0.4157) (0.3082)
Group Ability -0.3001 0.7407
(0.2935) (0.2174)
Time trend
Contest 2 0.1719 1.1876
(0.5565) (0.6609)
Contest 3 -0.1106 0.8953
(0.6575) (0.5887)
At One group is the base outcome. *** Signicant at the 1 percent level; **Signicant at







The experiment is about solving a series of arithmetic tasks. The number of tasks you solve
correctly and the time you spend on solving tasks will determine your nal payment. Your
payment will increase with the number of task you solve. However, there is a cost associated
with doing tasks. The longer the time you spend on completing tasks, the more costly it is.
In this experiment, your earning will be measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs).
The ECUs you have earned will be converted into real money at the exchange rate of 70:1
(70ECUs for 1 dollar).
Tasks and Eort
In this experiment, you will be given 240 seconds. You may choose to complete up to
a maximum of 20 tasks in total. The rst task involves adding two single-digit numbers
together. To solve this task, you must enter your answer in the in total box and then click
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the OK button. If your answer is correct, you will move on to the next task which has three
new single-digit numbers for you to add together. If the answer is incorrect, you have to try
again until you enter the correct answer. After you enter a correct response for this task and
click the OK button again, it will take you to the third task which has four numbers to be
added up and so on, until you reach the point you want to stop (See the screenshot attached
on the next page).
Payment
It is important for you to choose how to allocate and optimise the 240 seconds.
The payo of this experiment is as such:
1. If you allocate time to do tasks, you will earn 15 ECUs per task solved.
2. For every second that is left of the initial 240 seconds when you click the Leave button
you will receive one ECU per second.
For example, if you click Leave after spending 40 seconds, where you managed to solve 6
tasks, then you receive 6 x 15= 90 ECUs as a payment for solving the tasks and 200 ECUs
for the remaining time, which would be 290 ECU in total.
Here is an example of how the screen will look:
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In this example the player has solved 5 tasks already and has 223 seconds left. To solve the
sixth task, she would have to add up the seven numbers, 5, 8, 9, 9, 5, 4 and 2. After nding
the right solution, she enters it in the in-total box and clicks the OK button. On the top
left of the screen it is shown how much money the player has forgone for solving the last task.
Recall that the player will be paid one ECU for every second not used for solving tasks. So
the money equivalent spent on solving a particular task is the time it takes to solve it times
one ECU.
On the bottom there is the Leave button. As soon as you decide that it is not worthwhile
anymore to spend more time on solving sums anymore. When you hit the leave button you
will be paid 15 ECUs per task solved so far plus one ECU per second still remaining on the
clock in the top right corner.
Please raise your arm if you have any questions.
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B.1.2 Penalty free treatment
General Information
The experiment you are about to participate in consists of 3 periods. At the beginning of the
rst period, you will be placed in a group of three (you and two unidentied competitors).
You will play all three periods with the same two competitors.
In this experiment we will use the task you have just played to simulate a competition. Now
the payo from solving tasks will not be a certain amount per task solved. Your payment
will depend on the number of tasks you solve and the numbers of tasks two competitors
solve.
Your earnings will be measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the conclusion
of the third period, the ECUs you have earned will be converted into real money at the
exchange rate of 70:1 (70 ECUs for 1 Dollar).
Competition
In each competition round, there is a 600 ECUs prize money awarded to each group. You
can increase your share by solving tasks, where you again have to decide when to stop solving
tasks. As before, the maximum time given is 240 seconds. For each second not used to solve
tasks, you will be given one ECU.
It is important for you to choose the right time to stop doing the summation tasks:
1. If you spend time doing tasks, your score increases with the number of tasks you solve.
The higher your score, given the scores of other two group members, the greater is
your share of the prize of 600 ECUs.
2. On the other hand, you will lose one ECU for every second while you are working on
the task. Again, you will be paid one ECU for every second remaining (of the initial
240) when you click Leave on the task screen.
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Here is an example of how the screen will look:
Score, Number of Tasks Solved, Multiplier and Cheating
The score for a given period is calculated as the number of tasks a player solved times a
multiplier (which can be 2, 3, or 4). In each period there is one player in the group with
a multiplier of 2, one with 3 and one with 4. You will be shown which multiplier you will
have in the three periods before the rst period and you will be reminded in the subsequent
periods.
At the beginning of each period you will be asked if you want to cheat in the contest. If you
decide to cheat then you will get a 20 percent bonus.
For example, for any participants, if you are assigned a multiplier of 3 and you solve 10 tasks
in total, your score will be 3Ö10=30. If you accept the 20% cheating bonus, then the nal
score will be 30+20 percent bonus=36.
Payment
Your nal money payment consists of two parts:
154
1. Fixed payment, 1 ECU per second of remaining time from eort stage
2. Share of the prize
Your share of the prize is calculated as follows. If everybody has the same score then the
prize is shared equally. So everybody gets 200 ECUs, which is one third of the total prize
of 600. If your score is higher than the average score of the other two players you receive 6
ECUs for every unit that your score is higher than the average of competitors' score. For
example if your score is 10 units higher than the average score of the other two competitors,
then you will receive 200+60=260 ECUs as prize money.
On the other hand, if your score is lower than the average, then for every unit your score is
lower than the average of the others, 6 ECUs are deducted from 200 ECUs. So if your score
is, e.g. 10 units lower than the average, then you receive 200-60=140 ECUs as prize money.
Recall that at the eort stage, you are given 240 seconds to do tasks. You get paid 1 ECU
per second for the remaining time on the clock after you leave the stage.
So your prize money is calculated as:
Prize money in ECU = 200 + 6× (your score− average score of others)
Your total earnings per period are calculated as:
Total earnings in ECU = Prize money + time not spent solving tasks
Note that the payos for your competitors are calculated in the same manner.
Summary
You are competing in three competitions with the same two other competitors. In order to
determine you scores in second and third competitions, we use the same addition tasks as
before. The score in a period will be the number of tasks solved times a multiplier. You can
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decide to cheat and get a 20 percent bonus on your score. Your score relative to the average
score of the two competitors determines how much the prize money of 600 ECUs you receive.
In addition to the prize money you also receive one ECU per second left on the clock when
you leave the summing-up task.
Questions
To make sure you fully understand how the prize money works, you will be given two
numerical examples with two questions on the screen. You need to answer both of them
correctly before we can start the experiment. Please click OK button once you nish the
questions. Please raise your arm if you have any questions.
B.1.3 Fine treatment
General Information
The experiment you are about to participate in consists of 3 periods. At the beginning of the
rst period, you will be placed in a group of three (you and two unidentied competitors).
You will play all three periods with the same two competitors.
In this experiment we will use the task you have just played to simulate a competition. Now
the payo from solving tasks will not be a certain amount per task solved. Your payment
will depend on the number of tasks you solve and the numbers of tasks two competitors
solve.
Your earnings will be measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the conclusion
of the third period, the ECUs you have earned will be converted into real money at the
exchange rate of 70:1 (70 ECUs for 1 Dollar).
Competition
In each competition round, there is a 600 ECUs prize money awarded to each group. You
can increase your share by solving tasks, where you again have to decide when to stop solving
tasks. As before, the maximum time given is 240 seconds. For each second not used to solve
tasks, you will be given one ECU.
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It is important for you to choose the right time to stop doing the summation tasks:
1. If you spend time doing tasks, your score increases with the number of tasks you solve.
The higher your score, given the scores of other two group members, the greater is
your share of the prize of 600 ECUs.
2. On the other hand, you will lose one ECU for every second while you are working on
the task. Again, you will be paid one ECU for every second remaining (of the initial
240) when you click Leave on the task screen.
Here is an example of how the screen will look:
Score, Number of Tasks Solved, Multiplier, Cheating and Fine
The score for a given period is calculated as the number of tasks a player solved times a
multiplier (which can be 2, 3, or 4). In each period there is one player in the group with
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a multiplier of 2, one with 3 and one with 4. You will be shown which multiplier you will
have in the three periods before the rst period and you will be reminded in the subsequent
periods.
At the beginning of each period you will be asked if you want to cheat in the contest. If you
decide to cheat then you will get a 20 percent bonus on your score. However, there is a 30%
chance that you will get caught cheating if you choose to cheat. If you get caught, you will
lose all your share of the prize in that round. If you choose not to cheat, there is no risk of
losing your share of prize.
For example, for any participants, if you are assigned a multiplier of 3 and you solve 10 tasks
in total, your score will be 3Ö10=30. If you accept the 20% cheating bonus, then the nal
score will be 30+20 percent bonus=36.
Payment
Your nal money payment consists of two parts:
1. Fixed payment, 1 ECU per second of remaining time from eort stage
2. Share of the prize
Your share of the prize is calculated as follows. If everybody has the same score then the
prize is shared equally. So everybody gets 200 ECUs, which is one third of the total prize
of 600. If your score is higher than the average score of the other two players you receive 6
ECUs for every unit that your score is higher than the average of competitors' score. For
example if your score is 10 units higher than the average score of the other two competitors,
then you will receive 200+60=260 ECUs as prize money.
On the other hand, if your score is lower than the average, then for every unit your score is
lower than the average of the others, 6 ECUs are deducted from 200 ECUs. So if your score
is, e.g. 10 units lower than the average, then you receive 200-60=140 ECUs as prize money.
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Note that after you complete the competition, there is 30% chance that you will lose your
prize money if you get caught cheating.
So your prize money is calculated as:
Prize money in ECU = 200 + 6× (your score− average score of others)
Remember that your prize money if you get caught is zero.
Recall that at the eort stage, you are given 240 seconds to do tasks. You get paid 1 ECU
per second for the remaining time on the clock after you leave the stage.
Your total earnings per period are calculated as:
Total earnings in ECU = prize money + time not spent solving tasks
Again, prize money will be zero if you get caught.
Note that the payos for your competitors are calculated in the same manner.
Summary
You are competing in three competitions with the same two other competitors. In order
to determine you scores in second and third competitions, we use the same addition tasks
as before. The score in a period will be the number of tasks solved times a multiplier. You
can decide to cheat and get a 20 percent bonus on your score in each round. However, there
is a 30% chance that you will be caught and lose all your prize money in each round as
well. If you choose not to cheat, there is no risk of losing your prize. Remember that the
consequences of cheating in all three periods are independent. For example, if you choose
to cheat in period 1 but not cheat in period 2, you will have 30% chance of being caught in
period 1 but no risk of being caught in period 2. You will not be punished for cheating in
previous periods. Your score relative to the average score of the two competitors determines
how much the prize money of 600 ECUs you receive. In addition to the prize money you
also receive one ECU per second left on the clock when you leave the summing-up task.
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Questions
To make sure you fully understand how the prize money works, you will be given two
numerical examples with two questions on the screen. You need to answer both of them
correctly before we can start the experiment. Please click OK button once you nish the
questions.
Please raise your arm if you have any questions.
B.1.4 Ban treatment
General Information
The experiment you are about to participate in consists of 3 periods. At the beginning of
the rst period, you will be placed in a group of three (you and two unidentied competitors).
You will play all three periods with the same two competitors.
In this experiment we will use the task you have just played to simulate a competition.
Now the payo from solving tasks will not be a certain amount per task solved. Your payment
will depend on the number of tasks you solve and the numbers of tasks two competitors solve.
Your earnings will be measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the conclu-
sion of the third period, the ECUs you have earned will be converted into real money at the
exchange rate of 70:1 (70 ECUs for 1 Dollar).
Competition
In each competition round, there is a 600 ECUs prize money awarded to each group.
You can increase your share by solving tasks, where you again have to decide when to stop
solving tasks. As before, the maximum time given is 240 seconds. For each second not used
to solve tasks, you will be given one ECU.
It is important for you to choose the right time to stop doing the summation tasks:
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1. If you spend time doing tasks, your score increases with the number of tasks you solve.
The higher your score, given the scores of other two group members, the greater is
your share of the prize of 600 ECUs.
2. On the other hand, you will lose one ECU for every second while you are working on
the task. Again, you will be paid one ECU for every second remaining (of the initial
240) when you click Leave on the task screen.
Here is an example of how the screen will look:
Score, Number of Tasks Solved, Multiplier, Cheating and Ban
The score for a given period is calculated as the number of tasks a player solved times
a multiplier (which can be 2, 3, or 4). In each period there is one player in the group with
a multiplier of 2, one with 3 and one with 4. You will be shown which multiplier you will
have in the three periods before the rst period and you will be reminded in the subsequent
periods.
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At the beginning of each period you will be asked if you want to cheat in the contest.
If you decide to cheat then you will get a 20 percent bonus on your score in that round.
However, there is a 30 percent chance that you will get caught cheating in each competition.
Recall that there are 3 competitions in total. If you get caught in a certain competition, you
will be banned from participating in next competition. Hence, you will not receive a score
in next competition where you get banned. If you choose not to cheat, there is no risk of
getting banned in the future.
For example, for any participants, if you are assigned a multiplier of 3 and you solve 10
tasks in total, your score will be 3Ö10=30. If you accept the 20% cheating bonus, then the
nal score will be 30+20 percent bonus=36.
Payment
 If you are banned, you payment in the banned period is 110 ECUs. There will be no
prize money since you are not allowed to participate in the competition.
 If you are not banned, your payment in each competition consists of two parts:
1. Share of the prize money
2. Fixed payment, 1 ECU per second of remaining time from the eort stage.
Your share of the prize is calculated as follows. If everybody has the same score then the
prize is shared equally. So everybody gets 200 ECUs, which is one third of the total prize
of 600. If your score is higher than the average score of the other two players you receive 6
ECUs for every unit that your score is higher than the average of competitors' score. For
example if your score is 10 units higher than the average score of the other two competitors,
then you will receive 200+60=260 ECUs as prize money.
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On the other hand, if your score is lower than the average, then for every unit your score
is lower than the average of the others, 6 ECUs are deducted from 200 ECUs. So if your
score is, e.g. 10 units lower than the average, then you receive 200-60=140 ECUs as prize
money.
So your prize money if you are not banned is calculated as:
Prize money in ECU = 200 + 6× (your score− average score of others)
Notice that if any of your group members are banned in the competition, his or her score
will be substituted by the score of another random player in the room with the same ability
level as the banned person.
Again, for the 240 seconds you are given, you get paid 1 ECU per second on the time
not spent solving tasks.
Your total earnings per period are calculated as:
Total earnings in ECU = Prize money + Time not spent solving tasks
Note that the payos for your competitors are calculated in the same manner.
Summary
You are competing in three competitions with the same two other competitors. In order
to determine you scores in second and third competitions, we use the same addition tasks as
before. The score in a period will be the number of tasks solved times a multiplier. You can
decide to cheat and get a 20 percent bonus on your score. However, there is a 30% chance
that you will be caught and get banned for next competition. If you are banned, you receive
a xed amount of 110 ECUs. If you are not banned, your score relative to the average score
of the two competitors determines how much the prize money of 600 ECUs you receive. In
addition to the prize money you also receive one ECU per second left on the clock when you
leave the summing-up task.
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Questions
To make sure you fully understand how the prize money works, you will be asked three
questions on the screen. You need to answer all of them correctly before we can start the
experiment. Please click OK button once you nish the questions.
Please raise your arm if you have any questions.
B.1.5 Conditional-superannuation treatment
General Information
The experiment you are about to participate in consists of 3 periods. At the beginning of
the rst period, you will be placed in a group of three (you and two unidentied competitors).
You will play all three periods with the same two competitors.
In this experiment we will use the task you have just played to simulate a competition.
Now the payo from solving tasks will not be a certain amount per task solved. Your payment
will depend on the number of tasks you solve and the numbers of tasks two competitors solve.
Your earnings will be measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the conclu-
sion of the third period, the ECUs you have earned will be converted into real money at the
exchange rate of 70:1 (70 ECUs for 1 Dollar).
Competition
In each competition round, there is a 600 ECUs prize money awarded to each group.
You can increase your share by solving tasks, where you again have to decide when to stop
solving tasks. As before, the maximum time given is 240 seconds. For each second you are
not using to solve tasks, you will be given one ECU.
It is important for you to choose the right time to stop doing the summation tasks:
1. If you spend time doing tasks, your score increases with the number of tasks you solve.
The higher your score, given the scores of other two group members, the greater is
your share of the prize of 600 ECUs.
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2. On the other hand, you will lose one ECU for every second while you are working on
the task. Again, you will be paid one ECU for every second remaining (of the initial
240) when you click Leave on the task screen.
Here is an example of how the screen will look:
Score, Number of Tasks Solved, Multiplier and Cheating
The score for a given period is calculated as the number of tasks a player solved times a
multiplier (which can be 2, 3, or 4). In each period there is one player in the group with a
multiplier of 2, one with 3 and one with 4. You will be shown which multiplier you will have
for which period in the rst period and you will be reminded in the subsequent periods.
At the beginning of each period you will be asked if you want to cheat in the contest. If
you decide to cheat, then you will get a 20 percent bonus on your score in that round.
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For example, for any participants, if you are assigned a multiplier of 3 and you solve 10
tasks in total, your score will be 3Ö10=30. If you accept the 20% cheating bonus, then the
nal score will be 30+20 percent bonus=36.
Cheating, Payment and Superannuation Fund
The period payment you will receive at the end of each period consists of two parts:
1) Your share of the prize money which depends on your score relative to other two
competitors' scores.
AND
2) 1 ECU for every second remaining (of the initial 240 seconds).
After each round, 35 percent of your share of the prize money will be put in your
superannuation fund. This contribution is compulsory for all three periods.
Remember that you can cheat for higher score value. However, there is a 30 percent
chance that you will get caught cheating in each competition. As long as you are caught
cheating once, you will lose your entire contribution. Only if you are not caught cheating
for all three periods, you will be able to get your total contribution back at the end of the
third period. You will be told that if you lose your entire superannuation fund contribution
at the end of each period, which indicates whether you are caught cheating or not. If you
choose not to cheat, there is no risk of losing your money in superannuation fund.
Payment
Again, your guaranteed nal money payment consists of two parts:
1. Share of the prize after contribution to the superannuation fund
2. Fixed payment, 1 ECU per second of remaining time from eort stage
Your share of the prize is calculated as follows. If everybody has the same score then the
prize is shared equally. So everybody gets 200 ECUs, which is one third of the total prize
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of 600. If your score is higher than the average score of the other two players you receive 6
ECUs for every unit that your score is higher than the average of competitors' score. For
example if your score is 10 units higher than the average score of the other two competitors,
then you will receive 200+60=260 ECUs as prize money.
On the other hand, if your score is lower than the average, then for every unit your score
is lower than the average of the others,Sc 6 ECUs are deducted from 200 ECUs. So if your
score is, e.g. 10 units lower than the average, then you receive 200-60=140 ECUs as prize
money.
So your prize money is calculated as:
Prize money in ECU = 200 + 6× (your score− average score of others)
You will have to make a compulsory contribution of 35% of the prize money to your
superannuation fund each period:
Contribution = 35%
Therefore, your net prize money after contribution is 65% of the total prize money:
Net prize money = 65%
Recall that at the eort stage, you are given 240 seconds to do tasks. You get paid 1
ECU per second for the remaining time on the clock after you leave the stage.
Your guaranteed total earnings per period are calculated as:
Gauranteed total earnings in ECU = net prize money + time not spent solving tasks
If you are not caught cheating for all 3 periods, the contribution you make will be fully
paid back to you at the end of the third period.




You are competing in three competitions with the same two other competitors. In order
to determine you scores in second and third competitions, we use the same addition tasks
as before. The score in a period will be the number of tasks solved times a multiplier. You
can decide to cheat and get a 20 percent bonus on your score. However, there is a 30%
chance that you will be caught and lose your 35% contribution of the prize money for all
three periods. Your score relative to the average score of the two competitors determines
how much the prize money of 600 ECUs you receive. In addition to the prize money you
also receive one ECU per second left on the clock when you leave the summing-up task.
Questions
To make sure you fully understand how the prize money works, you will be given two
numerical examples with two questions on the screen. You need to answer both of them
correctly before we can start the experiment. Please click OK button once you nish the
questions.




The experiment is about solving a series of arithmetic tasks. You will receive a 5-dollar
show up fee. The number of tasks you solve correctly will determine your nal payment.
 For every task you solve correctly, you will receive 1 point.
 For every task you solve incorrectly, or for every task you skip, you will receive 0 point.
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Every point is worth of 1 AUD.
Background
In this experiment, there will be eight dierent tasks for you to solve. You will have
20 seconds to complete each task and the remaining time is always shown on the top right
corner.
The task involves adding a stream of single-digit numbers together within 20 seconds.
There are ve levels of diculty:
1. Beginner: adding up 5 single-digit numbers
2. Easy: adding up 7 single-digit numbers
3. Normal: adding up 9 single-digit numbers
4. Hard: adding up 11 single-digit numbers
5. Very hard: adding up 13 single-digit numbers
For each task, the level of diculty is randomly assigned and everyone face the same diculty
level.
Task
For each task, you have two choices:
 If you wish to skip the task, you can click the LEAVE button on the bottom right
corner. Then, you will receive nothing and move on to the next task.
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Or
 If you wish to solve this task, you must enter your answer in the IN TOTAL box and
then click the OK button.
A screenshot is as below:
For example, if you wish to solve this task in the screenshot, you need to add 2, 3, 3, 7,
6, 8, 1, 1 and 2 together. Then, put your answer in the IN TOTAL box and click OK
button.
 If the answer submitted is correct, you will receive 1 point and move on to the next
task.
 If the answer submitted is incorrect, for the rst time only, you will see a pop-up
window with a message saying You submitted an incorrect answer. Would you like to
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Continue or Go Back? If you would like to keep the incorrect answer as it is, then you
should click Continue button. If you would like to go back and re-submit an answer,
then you should click Go Back button (see the screenshot below).
 Once you choose to keep the wrong answer and click the Continue button, you will
receive nothing and move on to the next task.
 On the other hand, the pop-up window will disappear after you click the Go Back
button. Just like before, now you can choose to re-submit an answer in the IN TOTAL
box and click the OK button or skip the task by clicking the Leave button. Notice
that this time, no message will be shown. Whatever answer re-submitted will be treated
as the nal answer. Hence, if the answer re-submitted is correct, you will receive one
dollar. Otherwise, you will receive nothing.
171
If you failed to submit an answer within 20 seconds, you will be treated as if you skipped
the task.
This process is repeated for all eight tasks.
To summarise, for every task, you can choose to skip it and get nothing or try to solve
it. You will receive 1 point (equivalent to 1 dollar) if you solve it correctly. You will be
reminded if you submitted a wrong answer for the rst time. You can then choose between
Continue and Go back. To continue, you keep your wrong answer and get nothing.
If you choose to go back, you will have another chance to retry the task. This time,
whatever answer submitted will be counted.
At the end, your payment is calculated as:
Y our payment = 5 dollars show up fee+ number of tasks solved correctly
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B.2.2 No leaderboard treatment
General Information
The experiment you are about to participate in consists of three rounds. At the beginning
of the rst round, you will be placed in a group of two (you and another unidentied
competitor). You will play all three rounds with the same competitor.
In this experiment we will use the task you have just played to simulate a competition
(such as in sports). Your monetary payment will depend on you and your competitor's
performance. Performance is measured in points.
Competition
In each round, you and your competitors will be given eight summation tasks. In each of
the three competitions, everybody starts with a balance of zero point. You can either choose
to submit an answer or not. Scoring works as follows:
 If you submitted a correct answer, one point will be added to your balance.
 If you submitted an incorrect answer, one point will be deducted from your balance
 If you don't submit an answer, your point balance does not change.
So, at the end of each round, the maximum score one can achieve is 8 and the minimum
score is -8.
The summation tasks will have the identical structures to those you played before. You
will have 20 seconds to complete each task and the remaining time is always shown on the
top right corner. There will be the same ve levels of diculty of the tasks. The higher the
level of diculty, the more single-digit numbers to be added.
For every task, you can choose to submit an answer or not. If you don't submit an
answer, you will move to the next task. If you submitted a correct answer, you will move
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to the next task. However, if you submitted an incorrect answer for the rst time, you will
see the same pop-up window as before. Then, you will need to make a choice between Go
Back and Continue depending on whether you want to re-submit an answer or not. Your
prole picture will be shown in the top left corner on your screen throughout three rounds
(See the screenshot below).
Notice that every time when a task is completed, both you and your group member's
scores will be updated and shown. See the screenshot below:
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Payment
After you complete all three rounds, ONE of the three competitions will be randomly
selected to determine your payment. That is, you will receive a payo according to the
ranking of your score in that one specic round:
 If you won the competition (i.e. having the highest point balance), you will receive 15
AUDs. On the other hand, if you lost the competition, you will receive nothing.
 However, as a compensation for subjects who are not very good at math, a person who
lost the competition and nished with one point or less will receive 5 AUDs.
Notice that if you and your competitor have the same score, the computer randomly picks
the winner.




The experiment you are about to participate in consists of three rounds. At the beginning
of the rst round, you will be placed in a group of two (you and another unidentied
competitor). You will play all three rounds with the same competitor.
In this experiment we will use the task you have just played to simulate a competition
(such as in sports). Your monetary payment will depend on you and your competitor's
performance. Performance is measured in points.
Competition
In each round, you and your competitors will be given eight summation tasks. In each of
the three competitions, everybody starts with a balance of zero point. You can either choose
to submit an answer or not. Scoring works as follows:
 If you submitted a correct answer, one point will be added to your balance.
 If you submitted an incorrect answer, one point will be deducted from your balance
 If you don't submit an answer, your point balance does not change.
So, at the end of each round, the maximum score one can achieve is 8 and the minimum
score is -8.
The summation tasks will have the identical structures to those you played before. You
will have 20 seconds to complete each task and the remaining time is always shown on the
top right corner. There will be the same ve levels of diculty of the tasks. The higher the
level of diculty, the more single-digit numbers to be added.
For every task, you can choose to submit an answer or not. If you don't submit an
answer, you will move to the next task. If you submitted a correct answer, you will move
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to the next task. However, if you submitted an incorrect answer for the rst time, you will
see the same pop-up window as before. Then, you will need to make a choice between Go
Back and Continue depending on whether you want to re-submit an answer or not. Your
prole picture will be shown in the top left corner on your screen throughout three rounds
(See the screenshot below).
Notice that every time when a task is completed, both you and your group member's
scores will be updated and shown. See the screenshot below:
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Payment
After you complete all three rounds, ONE of the three competitions will be randomly
selected to determine your payment. That is, you will receive a payo according to the
ranking of your score in that one specic round:
 If you won the competition (i.e. having the highest point balance), you will receive 15
AUDs. On the other hand, if you lost the competition, you will receive nothing.
 However, as a compensation for subjects who are not very good at math, a person who
lost the competition and nished with one point or less will receive 5 AUDs.




At the end of each round, you and everyone in this room will be ranked according to your
scores. Then, everybody in this room will see a leaderboard showing the ranking from the
top player to the bottom player with prole pictures and points balances. Each page of the
leaderboard contains four players and each page stays on your screen for 15 seconds before
it moves to the next page automatically. After all the players are listed out, you will see an
OK button. After you click the OK button, you will nish that round. An example of
the leaderboard is shown below.
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Please raise your arm if you have any questions.
B.3 Experiment 3
B.3.1 Individual liability low ne treatment
General Information
The experiment you are about to participate in consists of 20 rounds of team competitions.
At the beginning of the rst round, you will be placed in a team of two (you and another
unidentied team member). Then, you and your team member will compete with another
team that also consists of two players. You will compete with the same other team for 20
rounds.
You will receive a show-up fee of 5 Dollars for this experiment. In addition to the show-up
fee you can earn money by making smart choices in the contest game. Your earnings will
be measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the conclusion of the last round,
the ECUs you have earned will be converted into real money at an exchange rate of 10:1 (10
ECUs for 1 Dollar).
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Competition
At the beginning of the rst round you will be randomly assigned a role in your team.
Each team will consist of one manager and one player. You will keep the assigned role
throughout the 20 rounds of the experiment. In each round, your team will compete with
your opponent team for a share of a prize of 90 ECUs. How much of the share your team
gets will depend on your team's performance relative to that of the competitor. Your team
performance will be determined by the choice of costly eort by the player and by the team's
decision to cheat or not to cheat. The part of the prize your team wins will be shared between
the player, who receives 2/3 of wining share and the manager, who receives the remaining
1/3.
Your team share of the prize is calculated as:
Y our team performance
Y our team performance+ Y our competitor′s performance
× 90ECUs
Basically, your team gets the fraction of the total prize that is equal to the fraction of
your team's performance of the total performance by both teams. This means, for example,
that if your performance is the same as the performance of the other team that you receive
half the total prize. If your performance is half the performance of the other team then you
receive 1/3 of the total prize. If your performance is twice as high as the performance of the
other team then you receive 2/3 of the total prize.
Note that both the player and the manager have an inuence on the cheating decisions
for the team. The player will choose the eort for the team.
Cheating
At the beginning of each round, player and manager can indicate if they wish to cheat via
a push of a button. Then, the computer ips a coin to determine which team member's choice
to implement. So both team members have a 50% chance that their choice is implemented.
If the implemented choice is not cheating, then your team performance is the team eort
that will be chosen by the player. If your team is cheating, then your team performance
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will be double the eort chosen by the player. Hence, by cheating, you can double the team
performance. For instance, if the team eort is 30, then cheating yields a team performance
of 60. However, there is a potential cost associated with cheating for the player only. Any
cheating team might be caught and the player in the team might be ned. The chance of
the team getting caught cheating is 25%. If caught, the player from this caught team will
face a ne of 55 ECUs. The manager, however, will not be ned.
Player and manager will be asked to newly decide to cheat or not in every of the 20
rounds.
Eort
Once the cheating decisions are implemented, managers and players will be informed
about the cheating decisions within their and their rival team. See the screenshot below.
In this stage, the players in both teams have to decide on their team's eort. The higher
the eort chosen, for a given performance of the competitor, the larger is the share of the
prize that your team gets. Recall that a team's performance is equal to the eort (if not
cheating) or twice the eort (if cheating). While increasing the eort increases the share of
the prize, there is a cost associated with the eort. For each unit of eort the player puts
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in, he or she has to pay one ECU. Note that eort cost has to be paid for by the player in
full. They are not shared between the player and the manager.
To help players to make better eort decisions, there is a prot calculator on their screen.
A player can put in hypothetical own eorts and eorts of the opposing team, and the
calculator will show the prize money the team would earn, how much the player has to give
to the manager, the eort cost the player will incur and the resulting payo for the player
(not including potential nes).
A player can calculate payos for dierent pairs of hypothetical eorts as many times
as he or she wants. Once the player is ready to decide on her eective eort, he or she
should enter a number in the eld Your eort and then click the OK button. Please see
the screenshot below.
While a team's player is calculating hypothetical payos and is taking the eort decision,
the manager, who cannot make any choices here, will be able to observe all actions of the
players on his or her screen.
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Payment
After each round of the competition, every participant will be informed about the payo
received in this round. All players will see the cheating decisions, the eort decisions, the
resulting shares of the prize and the ne imposed on the player if relevant.
Recall that your team share of the prize is calculated as:
Y our team performance
Y our team performance+ Y our competitor′s performance
× 90ECUs
This team share is then divided between the player and the manager at a ratio of 2:1. A
xed ne of 55 ECUs is paid by the player only, if a team is caught cheating.
Therefore, a player's payment for each competition round is:
Player
′
s payment = Team share in ECUs× 2
3
− Effort cost− possiblefine
A manager's payment for each competition round is:
Manager
′
s payment = Team share in ECUs× 1
3
B.3.2 Individual liability high ne treatment
General Information
The experiment you are about to participate in consists of 20 rounds of team competitions.
At the beginning of the rst round, you will be placed in a team of two (you and another
unidentied team member). Then, you and your team member will compete with another
team that also consists of two players. You will compete with the same other team for 20
rounds.
You will receive a show-up fee of 5 Dollars for this experiment. In addition to the show-up
fee you can earn money by making smart choices in the contest game. Your earnings will
be measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the conclusion of the last round,
the ECUs you have earned will be converted into real money at an exchange rate of 10:1 (10
ECUs for 1 Dollar).
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Competition
At the beginning of the rst round you will be randomly assigned a role in your team.
Each team will consist of one manager and one player. You will keep the assigned role
throughout the 20 rounds of the experiment. In each round, your team will compete with
your opponent team for a share of a prize of 90 ECUs. How much of the share your team
gets will depend on your team's performance relative to that of the competitor. Your team
performance will be determined by the choice of costly eort by the player and by the team's
decision to cheat or not to cheat. The part of the prize your team wins will be shared between
the player, who receives 2/3 of wining share and the manager, who receives the remaining
1/3.
Your team share of the prize is calculated as:
Y our team performance
Y our team performance+ Y our competitor′s performance
× 90ECUs
Basically, your team gets the fraction of the total prize that is equal to the fraction of
your team's performance of the total performance by both teams. This means, for example,
that if your performance is the same as the performance of the other team that you receive
half the total prize. If your performance is half the performance of the other team then you
receive 1/3 of the total prize. If your performance is twice as high as the performance of the
other team then you receive 2/3 of the total prize.
Note that both the player and the manager have an inuence on the cheating decisions
for the team. The player will choose the eort for the team.
Cheating
At the beginning of each round, player and manager can indicate if they wish to cheat via
a push of a button. Then, the computer ips a coin to determine which team member's choice
to implement. So both team members have a 50% chance that their choice is implemented.
If the implemented choice is not cheating, then your team performance is the team eort
that will be chosen by the player. If your team is cheating, then your team performance
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will be double the eort chosen by the player. Hence, by cheating, you can double the team
performance. For instance, if the team eort is 30, then cheating yields a team performance
of 60. However, there is a potential cost associated with cheating for the player only. Any
cheating team might be caught and the player in the team might be ned. The chance of
the team getting caught cheating is 25%. If caught, the player from this caught team will
face a ne of 65 ECUs. The manager, however, will not be ned.
Player and manager will be asked to newly decide to cheat or not in every of the 20
rounds.
Eort
Once the cheating decisions are implemented, managers and players will be informed
about the cheating decisions within their and their rival team. See the screenshot below.
In this stage, the players in both teams have to decide on their team's eort. The higher
the eort chosen, for a given performance of the competitor, the larger is the share of the
prize that your team gets. Recall that a team's performance is equal to the eort (if not
cheating) or twice the eort (if cheating). While increasing the eort increases the share of
the prize, there is a cost associated with the eort. For each unit of eort the player puts
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in, he or she has to pay one ECU. Note that eort cost has to be paid by the player in full.
They are not shared between the player and the manager.
To help players to make better eort decisions, there is a prot calculator on their screen.
A player can put in hypothetical own eorts and eorts of the opposing team, and the
calculator will show the prize money the team would earn, how much the player has to give
to the manager, the eort cost the player will incur and the resulting payo for the player
(not including potential nes).
A player can calculate payos for dierent pairs of hypothetical eorts as many times
as he or she wants. Once the player is ready to decide on her eective eort, he or she
should enter a number in the eld Your eort and then click the OK button. Please see
the screenshot below.
While a team's player is calculating hypothetical payos and is taking the eort decision,
the manager, who cannot make any choices here, will be able to observe all actions of the
players on his or her screen.
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Payment
After each round of the competition, every participant will be informed about the payo
received in this round. All players will see the cheating decisions, the eort decisions, the
resulting shares of the prize and the ne imposed on the player if relevant.
Recall that your team share of the prize is calculated as:
Y our team performance
Y our team performance+ Y our competitor′s performance
× 90ECUs
This team share is then divided between the player and the manager at a ratio of 2:1. A
xed ne of 65 ECUs is paid by the player only, if a team is caught cheating.
Therefore, a player's payment for each competition round is:
Player
′
s payment = Team share in ECUs× 2
3
− Effort cost− possiblefine
A manager's payment for each competition round is:
Manager
′
s payment = Team share in ECUs× 1
3
B.3.3 Joint liability low ne treatment
General Information
The experiment you are about to participate in consists of 20 rounds of team competitions.
At the beginning of the rst round, you will be placed in a team of two (you and another
unidentied team member). Then, you and your team member will compete with another
team that also consists of two players. You will compete with the same other team for 20
rounds.
You will receive a show-up fee of 5 Dollars for this experiment. In addition to the show-up
fee you can earn money by making smart choices in the contest game. Your earnings will
be measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the conclusion of the last round,
the ECUs you have earned will be converted into real money at an exchange rate of 10:1 (10
ECUs for 1 Dollar).
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Competition
At the beginning of the rst round you will be randomly assigned a role in your team. Each
team will consist of one manager and one player. You will keep the assigned role throughout
the 20 rounds of the experiment. In each round, your team will compete with your opponent
team for a share of a prize of 90 ECUs. How much of the share your team gets will depend
on your team's performance relative to that of the competitor. Your team performance will
be determined by the choice of costly eort by the player and by the team's decision to cheat
or not to cheat. The part of the prize your team wins will be shared between the player,
who receives 2/3 of wining share and the manager, who receives the remaining 1/3.
Your team share of the prize is calculated as:
Y our team performance
Y our team performance+ Y our competitor′s performance
× 90ECUs
Basically, your team gets the fraction of the total prize that is equal to the fraction of your
team's performance of the total performance by both teams. This means, for example, that
if your performance is the same as the performance of the other team that you receive half
the total prize. If your performance is half the performance of the other team then you
receive 1/3 of the total prize. If your performance is twice as high as the performance of the
other team then you receive 2/3 of the total prize.
Note that both the player and the manager have an inuence on the cheating decisions for
the team. The player will choose the eort for the team.
Cheating
At the beginning of each round player and manager can indicate if they wish to cheat via a
push of a button. Then the computer ips a coin which team member's choice to implement.
So both team members have a 50% chance that their choice is implemented.
If the implement choice is not cheating, then your team performance is the team eort
that will be chosen by the player. If your team is cheating, then your team performance
will be double the eort chosen by the player. Hence, by cheating, you can double the team
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performance. For instance, if the team eort is 30, then cheating yields a team performance
of 60. However, there is a potential cost associated with cheating. Any cheating team might
be caught and ned. The chance of getting caught cheating is 25%. If caught, your team
will face a ne of 55 ECUs. If ned, then the player will pay 2/3 of the ne (36.7 ECUs),
while the manager pays the remaining 1/3 (18.3 ECUs). So player and manager are sharing
the ne payment in the same way they are sharing the prize.
Player and manager will be asked to newly decide to cheat or not in every of the 20
rounds.
Eort
Once the cheating decisions are implemented, managers and players will be informed
about the cheating decisions within their and their rival team. See the screenshot below:
In this stage, the players in each team have to decide on their team's eort. The higher
the eort chosen, for a given performance of the competitor, the larger is the share of the
prize that your team gets. Recall that a team's performance is equal to the eort (if not
cheating) or twice the eort (if cheating). While increasing the eort increases the share of
the prize, there is a cost associated with the eort. For each unit of eort the player puts
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in, he or she has to pay one ECU. Note that eort cost has to be paid for by the player in
full. They are not shared between the player and the manager.
To help players to make better eort decisions, there is a prot calculator on their screen.
A player can put in hypothetical own eorts and eorts of the opposing team, and the
calculator will show the prize money the team would earn, how much the player has to give
to the manager, the eort cost the player will incur and the resulting payo for the player
(not including potential nes).
A player can calculate payos for dierent pairs of hypothetical eorts as many times
as he or she wants. Once the player is ready to decide on her eective eort, he or she
should enter a number in the eld Your eort and then click the OK button. Please see
the screenshot below.
While a team's player is calculating hypothetical payos and is taking the eort decision,
the manager, who cannot make any choices here, will be able to observe all actions of the
player on his or her screen.
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Payment
After each round of the competition, every participant will be informed about the payo
received in this round. All players will see the cheating decisions, the eort decisions, the
resulting shares of the prize and the nes if relevant.
Recall that your team share of the prize is calculated as:
Y our team performance
Y our team performance+ Y our competitor′s performance
× 90ECUs
This team share is then divided between the player and the manager at a ratio of 2:1. A
xed ne of 55 ECUs is shared in the same way, if a team is caught cheating.
Therefore, a player's payment for each competition round is:
Player
′
s payment = Team share in ECUs× 2
3
− Effort cost− possible fine× 2
3
A manager's payment for each competition round is:
Manager
′
s payment = Team share in ECUs× 1
3
− possible fine× 1
3
B.3.4 Joint liability high ne treatment
General Information
The experiment you are about to participate in consists of 20 rounds of team competitions.
At the beginning of the rst round, you will be placed in a team of two (you and another
unidentied team member). Then, you and your team member will compete with another
team that also consists of two players. You will compete with the same other team for 20
rounds.
You will receive a show-up fee of 5 Dollars for this experiment. In addition to the show-up
fee you can earn money by making smart choices in the contest game. Your earnings will
be measured in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the conclusion of the last round,
the ECUs you have earned will be converted into real money at an exchange rate of 10:1 (10
ECUs for 1 Dollar).
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Competition
At the beginning of the rst round you will be randomly assigned a role in your team. Each
team will consist of one manager and one player. You will keep the assigned role throughout
the 20 rounds of the experiment. In each round, your team will compete with your opponent
team for a share of a prize of 90 ECUs. How much of the share your team gets will depend
on your team's performance relative to that of the competitor. Your team performance will
be determined by the choice of costly eort by the player and by the team's decision to cheat
or not to cheat. The part of the prize your team wins will be shared between the player,
who receives 2/3 of wining share and the manager, who receives the remaining 1/3.
Your team share of the prize is calculated as:
Y our team performance
Y our team performance+ Y our competitor′s performance
× 90ECUs
Basically, your team gets the fraction of the total prize that is equal to the fraction of your
team's performance of the total performance by both teams. This means, for example, that
if your performance is the same as the performance of the other team that you receive half
the total prize. If your performance is half the performance of the other team then you
receive 1/3 of the total prize. If your performance is twice as high as the performance of the
other team then you receive 2/3 of the total prize.
Note that both the player and the manager have an inuence on the cheating decisions for
the team. The player will choose the eort for the team.
Cheating
At the beginning of each round player and manager can indicate if they wish to cheat via a
push of a button. Then the computer ips a coin which team member's choice to implement.
So both team members have a 50% chance that their choice is implemented.
If the implement choice is not cheating, then your team performance is the team eort that
will be chosen by the player. If your team is cheating, then your team performance will
be double the eort chosen by the player. Hence, by cheating, you can double the team
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performance. For instance, if the team eort is 30, then cheating yields a team performance
of 60. However, there is a potential cost associated with cheating. Any cheating team might
be caught and ned. The chance of getting caught cheating is 25%. If caught, your team
will face a ne of 65 ECUs. If ned, then the player will pay 2/3 of the ne (43.3 ECUs),
while the manager pays the remaining 1/3 (21.7 ECUs). So player and manager are sharing
the ne payment in the same way they are sharing the prize.
Player and manager will be asked to newly decide to cheat or not in every of the 20 rounds.
Eort
Once the cheating decisions are implemented, managers and players will be informed about
the cheating decisions within their and their rival team. See the screenshot below:
In this stage, the players in each team have to decide on their team's eort. The higher the
eort chosen, for a given performance of the competitor, the larger is the share of the prize
that your team gets. Recall that a team's performance is equal to the eort (if not cheating)
or twice the eort (if cheating). While increasing the eort increases the share of the prize,
there is a cost associated with the eort. For each unit of eort the player puts in, he or she
has to pay one ECU. Note that eort cost has to be paid for by the player in full. They are
not shared between the player and the manager.
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To help players to make better eort decisions, there is a prot calculator on their screen.
A player can put in hypothetical own eorts and eorts of the opposing team, and the
calculator will show the prize money the team would earn, how much the player has to give
to the manager, the eort cost the player will incur and the resulting payo for the player
(not including potential nes).
A player can calculate payos for dierent pairs of hypothetical eorts as many times as he
or she wants. Once the player is ready to decide on her eective eort, he or she should enter
a number in the eld Your eort and then click the OK button. Please see the screenshot
below.
While a team's player is calculating hypothetical payos and is taking the eort decision,
the manager, who cannot make any choices here, will be able to observe all actions of the
players on his or her screen.
Payment
After each round of the competition, every participant will be informed about the payo
received in this round. All players will see the cheating decisions, the eort decisions, the
resulting shares of the prize and the nes if relevant.
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Recall that your team share of the prize is calculated as:
Y our team performance
Y our team performance+ Y our competitor′s performance
× 90ECUs
This team share is then divided between the player and the manager at a ratio of 2:1. A
xed ne of 65 ECUs is shared in the same way, if a team is caught cheating.
Therefore, a player's payment for each competition round is:
Player
′
s payment = Team share in ECUs× 2
3
− Effort cost− possible fine× 2
3
A manager's payment for each competition round is:
Manager
′
s payment = Team share in ECUs× 1
3
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